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Abstract 
Hugh Gaitskell was leader of the Labour Party between 1955-63. The Cold War 
was at a critical level and bi-partisanship in international affairs was expected. 
With Gaitskell's accession this appeared to end, marked in particular by the 
disputes over Suez, the independent nuclear deterrent and Britain's 11rr lication to 
join the European Economic Community. Simultaneously, he was challenged by 
the Left over nearly every aspect of Labour's foreign and defence policy. Despite 
these major controversies, Gaitskell's influence over international affairs remains a 
neglected area of research, and he is remembered more for the domestic 
controversies over nationalisation, his ill-fated attempt to revise Clause Nand 
defeat at the 1960 Scarborough conference. 
This thesis addresses that imbalance by examining Gaitskell's contribution to 
foreign affairs and the following inter-related areas: bi-partisanship; policy 
formulation; internal divisions and the power struggle between Left and Right. In 
addition, it also considers how the structure of the Labour Party benefited the 
leadership during this turbulent period. 
The conclusions revise Gaitskell's reputation as a figure of unyielding principle, 
and demonstrates that his leadership was marked by a mixture of finesse and 
blunder. His responsibility for the end of bi-partisanship can be discounted, as 
Labour remained firmly committed to the policies laid down and followed since 
1945. Yet, the personal control over policy that he exercised, allied to his 
determination to mould the Labour Party in his own image, needlessly accelerated 
the internal struggles for power. While the Scarborough defeat illustrates the 
limitations of his authority, Suez and Europe display his acute political awareness 
of the requirements needed to balance national interests, electoral prospects and 
maintain party unity. 
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INTRODUCDON 
This thesis seeks to examine the British Labour Party's views on foreign and 
defence policy under the leadership of Hugh Gaitskell between 1955-1963. 
This was a period where the Cold War was still at a critical level and the 
world was beset with international crises. World War Two had ended the 
predominance of the European states in world affairs and propelled the 
Soviet Union and United States of America to international primacy. Britain 
itself had emerged from the war victorious, but seriously weakened. Despite 
both major British political parties clinging to the notion of parity with the 
new superpowers it was increasingly evident that this position was 
unrealistic. Serious economic difficulties, the ending of empire and an 
increasing dependence on America were widely thought of as demonstrating 
Britain's diminishing world role. 
In opposition from 1951, bi-partisanship in international affairs was largely 
adhered to by Labour despite pressure from the Party's left-wing. With 
Gaitskell's accession to the leadership in December 1955, the tacit acceptance 
of the Conservative Government's foreign policy appeared to break down, 
marked in particular by Labour's attitudes to the Suez Crisis, the dispute over 
the 'independent' British nuclear deterrent and the application to join the 
European Economic Community (EEC). In addition, his period as leader 
witnessed bitter internal divisions over foreign affairs, especially defence 
policy, which culminated in the unilateralist victory at Scarborough in 1960. 
Gaitskell's political career still arouses considerable controversy. Although 
the major cause of Gaitskell's disagreement with the Left lay in foreign 
affairs, he is primarily remembered for domestic, social and economic policy, 
and as leader after 1955, for the controversies that arose over nationalisation 
and the ill-fated attempt to revise Clause IV of the Labour Party's 
constitution. Gaitskell's leadership appeared to be divided into three phases. 
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Between 1955-1959, albeit with some difficulty, he managed to hold the Party 
together. Mter the general election defeat of 1959 he was subjected to defeats 
over Clause IV and unilateralism, only reversing the latter defeat in 1961. 
Finally, the Party came together again, regaining the Left's support over his 
stand on Europe, until his death in January 1963. 
As Kenneth 0. Morgan has observed, despite the controversial nature of 
these 'crises', Gaitskell's foreign policy has remained 'relatively neglected'.1 
The aim of this thesis is to address any imbalance and provide an overview 
of Gaitskell's influence on Labour's foreign and defence policy. While it will 
focus primarily on the controversial issues of Suez, the H-bomb and Europe, 
the research will examine the nature and extent of Labour's opposition to 
government policy; the Labour Movement's foreign and defence policy-
making process, the internal divisions over policy and the power struggle 
between left and right. Linked to these factors is a consideration of the Party's 
structure which, with the exception of the 1960 conference defeat, 
demonstrates Gaitskell's personal control. In a wider context, the thesis will 
argue that Gaitskell's political career as leader is in need of reassessment in 
order to avoid the rigid polarisation that it has attracted from historians and 
political scientists. 
1. British Foreign Policy Since 1945: Beyin's Legacy 
In July 1945 the Labour Party swept into power with a large majority over the 
Conservatives. Labour proceeded to embark on an ambitious domestic 
programme including nationalisation, the implementation of the National 
Health Service, social welfare legislation, a commitment to full employment 
and the promise of a fairer society. These measures caught the public 
imagination, albeit briefly, and were hailed by allies and opponents alike as 
constituting a 'social revolution'. In foreign affairs the same optimism was 
to be found, and with Labour in power, many confidently expected a different 
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approach in Britain's conduct of foreign policy.2 Wartime co-operation and 
widespread admiration for the Soviet Union, a rejection of the pre-war 
policies of the National Government and a long-term antipathy to 
imperialism appeared to bind all sections of the Party in a new spirit of 
internationalism. 
This optimism, however, was shortlived: it soon became clear that the 
wartime alliance of Britain, America and the USSR had simply been a 
'marriage of convenience' forced upon all of them in order to defeat the 
common enemy. Once achieved, the raison d'etre of the alliance ceased to 
exist and was replaced instead by the mutual suspicion and the polarisation 
of the two power blocs that lasted for the next forty five years. The fear of 
communism gained momentum with the threat to British interests in Iran, 
Greece and Turkey between 1945-46. On a wider scale, communist agitation 
in France and Italy, the 'coup' in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade 
seemed to confirm the fears of impending Soviet domination of western 
Europe. From a British perspective, Bevin's tactics as Foreign Secretary were 
to manoeuvre the Americans into assuming responsibilities that Britain 
could no longer offer, while skilfully preserving an illusion of independence 
and national prestige. This policy prevented the United States from 
returning to its pre-war isolationism and culminated in the Truman 
Doctrine, economic help in the form of Marshall Aid and the formation of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NAT0).3 
While Britain had succeeded in committing the Americans to the defence of 
Europe, they in turn pressed for an end to the British Empire. Labour's 
victory in 1945, promised this in the near future. Indeed, withdrawal from 
the Indian Subcontinent rapidly followed. Despite the communal violence 
on partition, and some Conservative regret, this is usually regarded as a great 
success for the Labour Government, especially when it is compared with 
some European experiences of decolonisation. Unfortunately, the same 
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cannot be said of Palestine where the British withdrawal was confused, bitter 
and has earned widespread condemnation ever since.4 
While the Government's foreign policy attracted approval from the British 
political establishment generally, there was some dissent from Labour's left-
wing. A fluid alliance of pacifists, fellow-travellers, anti-militarists and 
neutralists, encapsulating principles long held within the the Party, were 
generally critical of the Government's growing hostility to Russia and 
subservience to America.5 Shifts of opinion within this alliance occurred 
according to the behaviour of the two superpowers. Between 1945-47 the Left 
pressed for a distinctive 'Socialist' foreign policy: in effect, a 'Third Force' 
with Britain taking the moral leadership of a united socialist Europe (later to 
be directed to the Commonwealth}, holding a balance and remaining 
independent of Russia and America. This policy collapsed during 1947-49 
due to a combination of factors: perceived Soviet intransigence and 
aggression; the re-emergence of right-wing governments in France and Italy 
(which denied hopes of a united socialist Europe); and above all the 
American offer of economic aid to all of Europe in the form of the Marshall 
Plan. This was particularly important, as many on the left took this as a sign 
that the Truman administration was similar in ideology to the Labour 
Government and its ideals of democratic socialism.6 Nevertheless, many of 
these fears reappeared with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. 
Korea turned the 'Cold War' into a 'Hot War'. The emphasis of American 
policy abruptly swung from economic aid to military preparation and the 
'containment' of communism, and they expected their allies to follow suit. 
The Labour Government accepted the need for heavy rearmament, even 
though many were alarmed by the escalating costs and the effect on the 
fragile economy. This in turn threatened the recently expanded social 
services, regarded as some of the Party's proudest achievements. Although 
the Korean conflict and the issues raised over German rearmament disturbed 
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many Labour MPs, they were unwilling to vote against their own 
government for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, in April 1951 the internal 
crisis came to a head when Bevan, Wilson and Freeman resigned. Whatever 
the subsequent controversy over Bevan's contribution, he was adopted as the 
rallying point of the Left and played a key role in Labour's internal politics 
until his death in July 1960. 
The Conservatives returned to power under Churchill in October 1951 with a 
small but workable majority of seventeen. In opposition during 1945-51, the 
Conservatives had been critical over a number of features of Labour's 
domestic programme. In foreign affairs and defence policy however, they 
had followed a bi-partisan approach, despite some misgivings over Indian 
independence and the problems in the Middle East. In fact, ever since his 
'Iron Curtain' speech at Fulton, Missouri, Churchill had rarely missed an 
opportunity to boast that the Labour Government was actually following 
policies that he had recommended. When Anthony Eden returned as 
Foreign Secretary, the basic tenet of British foreign policy was to maintain 
Britain's influence as one of the 'Big Three' wherever possible. This was to 
be forged in the 'three interlocking circles' approach: the 'Special 
Relationship' with the United States; the dominance of Western Europe and 
the leadership of the global'alliance' of Empire and Commonwealth 
nations.7 
There is little doubt that in the decade after the end of World War Two 
Britain projected itself as a great power. Yet it was also clear that the 
maintenance of the world role chosen was incompatible with the economic 
problems that Britain faced. In 1952 Britain had become the third nuclear 
power after the USA and USSR, seven years ahead of France. During 1953 
nearly 10 per cent of GNP was being spent on defence and keeping 865,000 
personnel in the armed forces. 8 A struggling economy, bedevilled by rising 
defence expenditure due to international crises and exacerbated by nationalist 
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agitation in colonial possessions, led to monetary crises that could not be 
ignored. By the mid-1950s, economic considerations, more than anything 
else, led to a reassessment of foreign and defence policy. 
2. International Affairs & Opposition 
Though defeated in the general election of 1951, few in the Labour Party were 
unduly concerned. There was a general belief that once the Tories were back 
in office, they would dismantle many of the popular measures that the 
Labour Government had put into effect. In turn this would cause increasing 
unpopularity amongst the electorate and, as the Conservatives only had a 
small majority in Parliament, it would not be long before Labour regained 
power. Despite these hopes, Labour did not actually return to power until 
1964. In the general elections of 1955 and 1959, the Tory Government actually 
increased its majority in Parliament by 58 and 100 seats. 
During the election campaign of 1951, Labour had warned that the Tories 
would take a far more aggressive stance over foreign affairs. Although 
Conservative rhetoric over the Abadan affair had given this concern some 
credibility, there was actually little change. While the Conservatives had 
followed a bi-partisanship approach in opposition, back in office they 
expected Labour to do the same. In fact, it was difficult in many respects to do 
otherwise, even if Labour had wished. To do so, with the Cold War still at a 
dangerous level and nationalist movements threatening perceived British 
overseas interests, the Labour leadership would have left itself wide open to 
charges of irresponsibility; a charge not to be taken lightly when it was 
considered quite possible that Labour could soon be returned to power. In 
addition, the Labour leadership were hampered by the fact that many of the 
policies that were being put into practice by the Conservatives had been 
initiated by them in the first place, something that the Labour Left rarely let 
their leadership forget. Even though there were occasions when Labour felt 
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compelled to criticise the Government, the period between 1951-55 was 
remarkably free of any fundamental disagreements over foreign affairs 
between the opposing front benches. 
When Gaitskell became leader in December 1955 bi-partisanship in foreign 
affairs appeared to deteriorate. Initial misgivings over government policy in 
the Middle East, especially the decision to use the Baghdad Pact to boost 
British predominance, rose to outright condemnation over the use of force 
during the Suez Crisis in 1956. Similarly, despite the Labour leadership's 
support for a British nuclear capacity, the 1957 defence review and its policy 
of 'massive retaliation' resulted in Labour's advocacy of a 'non-nuclear club' 
and harsh criticism later, of the Government's insistence that Britain should 
retain an independent nuclear deterrent. On Europe, after a distinct lack of 
enthusiasm for the Government's decision to apply for EEC membership in 
1961, Gaitskell appeared to come out in total opposition at the Labour 
conference the following year. 
Yet any supposition that Gaitskell's leadership caused a breakdown in bi-
partisanship needs qualification. Despite the cited rifts, Gaitskell and the 
majority of the Labour Party supported 'traditional' British foreign policy 
goals. They believed in the Atlantic Alliance, the importance of the 
Commonwealth and the maintenance of British political influence on a 
global scale. As all three were threatened by the Government's Suez policy, 
Labour could justify their objections on this basis. Similarly, they supported 
the manufacture and testing of British nuclear weapons, and would only 
contemplate reductions on a multilateral basis. Even Labour's EEC policy 
reflected the widespread resentment that Britain had lost the opportunity to 
lead Europe, that it might restrict a socialist government's freedom of 
manoeuvre and threaten the sentimental ties to the Commonwealth. If bi-
partisanship did deteriorate, then it was the Conservative Government that 
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had drifted away from the policies laid down and followed since 1945, rather 
than the fault of Labour under Gaitskell. 
While the Labour leadership essentially followed the traditional approach to 
foreign affairs, the same views were not held in all sections of the Party. 
Mter the 1951 election defeat the Party's latent rivalries emerged and divided 
openly into antagonistic factions. Nowhere in the period between 1951-1964 
was the internal rivalry more clearly illustrated than in disputes over foreign 
and defence policy: initially, the most important issues were German 
rearmament and later, the H-bomb. During the thirteen year period of 
opposition there were a total of 35 revolts against the leadership's policies 
and only two of these concerned domestic issues.9 Although there are other 
factors, including a sincere wish for moral leadership, it does appear that 
overseas and defence policy were considered a useful weapon by the Left with 
which to attack the Labour leadership, as it represented an area where a clear 
distinction of socialist ideology could be drawn. This was in stark contrast to 
domestic policy where the Left was not so sure of itself, apart from the 
familiar insistence on further nationalisation.10 
Since the end of the war, the Left's 'distinctive socialist foreign policy' goals 
had manifested themselves in many forms, whether advocating a 'Third 
Force' as a wedge between East and West, pro-Russian and anti-American 
sentiments or anti-imperialist ideals. From 1951 on, they were turned to 
issues such as German rearmament and unification, national service and 
decolonisation. While Attlee remained leader, the rivalry was generally held 
in check by ambiguity and appeals for Party unity. With Gaitskell's 
succession, the Left felt that the revisionists had obtained too much control, 
gone too far, and were determined to do something about it. As a result, 
dissent developed into the pitched battles over nuclear weaponry and the 
arms race, unilateralism, NATO, Polaris, the training of German troops on 
British soil and the EEC. 
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3. Gaitskell as Leader: The Historical Debate 
Gaitskell's political career, especially as leader, still arouses considerable 
controversy amongst historians, political scientists and the Labour 
Movement, and suffers from the way it has attracted either total support or 
outright opposition. To his supporters, Gaitskell was a leader who would not 
propose policies that could not be carried out in office, and was far more 
willing to give a strong and early lead, in marked contrast to his predecessor, 
Clem Attlee.11 According to his official biographer, although Gaitskell 
believed that Labour's left-wing had failed to recognise the socio-political 
changes that had transformed the country, he nevertheless set out to reunite 
Labour, both by healing bruised personal relations and working out a new 
and broadly acceptable policy. As proof, he cites the fact that all the leading 
rebels made their peace with him, at least until 1959. Williarns blames the 
1959 election defeat, and the controversies over Clause IV and unilateralism 
for having diverted attention from Gaitskell's successes. He points out that 
after this, the conciliatory stance that had characterised the early years of his 
leadership was readopted, despite the fact that it alienated some of his close 
allies in the process.I2 
In the view of Professor Stephen Haseler, Gaitskell's greatest achievement 
was that he combined middle-class egalitarianism with traditional 
constitutionalism and patriotism. This dual appeal to the working-class, 
forged throughout his leadership, left a legacy which both the Party and his 
successor, Harold Wilson, heavily relied on in the approach to the 1964 
general electionP More detached but nevertheless sympathetic 
commentators of Gaitskell's career hold slightly more critical views. 
According to Robert McKenzie, he lacked the political antennae of Attlee, 
with the result that he frequently found himself in difficulties through a 
failure to anticipate the consequences of his own initiatives. More recent 
studies go further: they suggest that Gaitskell's eagerness to tackle issues 
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head-on, sometimes needlessly, compounded and prolonged Labour's 
problems.14 
Despite support for his leadership challenge in 1955 from a majority of the 
PLP, trades union leaders and traditional Labour supporters, Gaitskell still 
had many opponents within the Movement, both from the Left and amongst 
those who nursed more personal grievances. At the time, the Left 
condemned Gaitskell on several grounds. He was never forgiven for having 
supported rearmament and for imposing national health charges while 
Chancellor in Attlee's second administration. He had compounded this out 
of office, with the 1952 Stalybridge speech and in his attempts to oust Bevan 
in 1955. In addition, he was regarded as the leader of a small clique of 
Hampstead revisionists, supported by right-wing trades unions, who had 
betrayed the Party's socialist ideals and pandered to the electorate.15 To the 
. Left, the Party was no longer even in the hands of an errant socialist, but 
had instead been captured by an anti-socialist, an outright traitor. Despite the 
passage of time, and some mellowing, this is a view that still persists.16 
Others in the Party had grievances against Gaitskell too, though of a more 
personal than political nature. They also viewed him as an intellectual with 
shallow roots in the Movement and were determined to see him ousted, or 
at least, harassed at every opportunity. Emanuel Shinwell had been replaced 
by Gaitskell as Minister of Fuel and Power in 1947 and remained hostile 
thereafter. Herbert Morrison, who had lost the leadership contest to Gaitskell 
in 1955, was another leading figure who became increasingly bitter. George 
Wigg, Shinwell's Parliamentary Private Secretary (PPS) in 1947, was also 
extremely critical of Gaitskell. In early 1956, just a few weeks after the 
leadership election, rumours circulated that Wigg had tried to mobilise some 
of the older working-class leaders, including Morrison, for a revolt which 
Bevan might joinP Although nothing came of this particular incident 
Morrison, Wigg and Shinwell continued to pursue a vendetta against the 
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Labour leader throughout his period of office, and in Shinwell's case, even 
after Gaitskell's death.18 
Despite the hardcore of opposition to his leadership, and with the exception 
of 1959-1961, Gaitskell appeared as Attlee before him, to have benefited in a 
large measure from the very structure of the Labour Party. During this 
period, the leader was elected solely by the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP). 
The 1918 constitution had created a tripartite division of power between the 
PLP, the Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs) and the Annual Conference, the 
latter effectively dominated by the trades unions. In theory, this was 
arranged to maintain a balance and ensure that no single source of authority 
had control, but in practice it meant that the Party was prone to factionalism. 
In office a Labour Prime Minister and Cabinet, able to supplement Party 
powers with national prestige, argued that national concerns must take 
precedence over party matters and sometimes felt justified in ignoring 
Conference decisions. When the Party was out of office the National 
Executive Committee (NEC), elected by Conference, regained much of its 
influence.19 
Robert McKenzie and Stephen Haseler argue that the Party leadership held 
the key to policy-making: that despite the role granted to the extra-
parliamentary wings in theory (i.e. the CLPs and Conference), in practice final 
authority rested with the PLP and its leadership, of whom the most 
important individual was the Party Leader. Denis Kavanagh also believes 
that policy-making was concentrated in the hands of an elite few. Rather 
than just concentrating solely on the PLP and its leader, Kavanagh emphasises 
the importance of the individuals who were members of several key 
committees, the union barons who controlled the block vote, or a 
combination of both.20 
I I 
Others take a different view, and have argued that it is a mistake to simply 
concentrate on the primacy of the leadership regarding policy formulation. 
Samuel Beer has argued that all the individual Party members had equal say 
in policy-making and that 'ultimate control...belongs to the members acting 
through the democratic structure of the party conference'.21 Lewis Minkin 
also concludes, that despite all other considerations, Conference remained 
the cornerstone of policy-making.22 Michael Gordon suggests several reasons 
to counter the primacy of leadership argument: the relative numbers and 
importance of the opposition to the leadership; the adherence to socialist 
symbolism which still had a great impact and appeal far wider than for just 
those on the left-wing; that while Gaitskell's heavyweight supporters had 
mostly disappeared by 1955, the Left had articulate individuals who used 
their own influence in the media to their advantage; that the leadership 
could not discipline the rebels effectively due to their number, the absence of 
any widescale enthusiasm within the PLP to act, and because of constituency 
opposition. 23 
In general terms, the approach taken by McKenzie, Haseler and Kavanagh 
appears to hold the upper hand. For much of his term of office Gaitskell and 
the leadership held the whip-hand, while Conference and the right-wing 
trades union block vote denied the Left any successes. Nevertheless, after the 
general election defeat in 1959, Gaitskell's primacy was seriously challenged 
and, although ultimately unsuccessful, shows the validity of the Beer -
Gordon- Minkin argument. Gaitskell's decision to update, or even question 
that revered article of faith, Clause IV, led to the defection of many of his 
former friends and allies, especially in the trades unions. This created the 
opportunity the Left had waited for with which to turn the tables. They 
believed they had succeeded when the 1960 Conference defeated Gaitskell 
over unilateralism, putting his position at risk and prompting the leadership 
challenge by Harold Wilson. However, unilateralism was defeated in 1961 
and it is worth pointing out that with the exception of the Clause IV 
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controversy, Gaitskell and his supporters won every major battle in the eight 
years of his leadership. The two views demonstrate the polarisation in the 
debate, whereas both are valid. 
4. The Historical Debate: Filling the Gaps 
Up to the general election of 1992, the years between 1951-64 found the 
Conservatives in office for the longest term of any British political party this 
century. For the Labour Party, it was a period marked by internecine warfare. 
It has been argued that the vast majority of the internal disputes that plagued 
the Labour Party in this period arose over foreign affairs. There is ample 
evidence to suggest that foreign policy, the issues it raised and the 
personalities it brought to the fore, were crucial to the future development of 
the Party. Yet in their own right, Labour's attitudes over foreign and defence 
policy are of interest. The course pursued by the Labour Government during 
1945-51 is not that surprising, considering the situation imposed by economic 
factors and the rigid polarisation of the Cold War. What may be more 
surprising is how close1Labour remained attached to the same orthodox 
policies once back in opposition where, without the responsibility imposed by 
office, they might have been expected to avoid many of the internal disputes 
simply by reverting to the principles of Hardie and Lansbury. That they did 
not, especially under Gaitskell's leadership, illustrates the very nature of 
Labour's social democratic tradition, the acceptance of responsibility and the 
control exercised by their leaders. 
With such considerations in mind it is difficult to imagine that these issues 
would not have been fully covered; yet this is far from the case. Despite a 
massive amount of literature written about the Labour Party, this is an area 
that has been relatively neglected and where there is clearly a need for the 
'gap' to be filled. Although the period in opposition 1951-64 has continued to 
attract enthusiastic scrutiny, this has concentrated on domestic policy, 
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especially the battlefield of further 'socialisation' versus 'consolidation' and 
'revisionism'. Where foreign and defence policy issues are raised, they are 
usually associated with the battle for control of the Party between the rival 
wings, and in particular the struggle between Bevan and Gaitskell. After they 
came to terms, it was pursued by the remnants of the Bevanites and 
converging groups on the left, culminating in the controversy over 
unilateralism at the end of the decade. 
Although there is no comprehensive work examining Gaitskell's influence 
on foreign affairs in the years 1955-63, there are many valuable background 
studies. Socialist ideology and its influence on Labour foreign policy 
formulation have been examined, though they tend to concentrate on the 
1930s and the reaction to the growth of fascism in Europe.24 Similarly, the 
wartime years and the period in government are well documented. Specific 
studies such as the work on the Labour Government's foreign policy, with 
contributions by specialists such as Northedge, Fieldhouse, and Ovendale are 
of immense value.25 So too, in a different way, is Alan Bullock's biography 
of Ernest Bevin. With its attention to detail and extensive use of primary 
material, this is still regarded as a classic study of British foreign policy during 
Bevin's term of office as Foreign Secretary.26 
Various studies on Labour Party foreign policy views which cover the period 
concerned do exist, but cover specific issues and use a longer time scale than 
the one envisaged here. As they provide a basis for further investigation on 
topics such as the Atlantic Alliance, Europe, imperialism, unilateralism and 
the internal conflict over foreign affairs, their value and limitations in 
relation to this work need some further explanation. 
One of the most neglected areas is that of the Atlantic Alliance and its effect 
on the attitudes of the Labour Party. Although various works have 
mentioned this, they tend to concentrate on the anti-Americanism from the 
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left-wing at the expense of the views of the majority of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party or, indeed, the Movement as a whole. The exception to this is 
Pelling's work on America and the British leftP Yet, even this is of limited 
value since it was published in 1956. The relationship between the British 
left-wing and America is covered in some detail up to Roosevelt's 'New 
deal'. After this, although the period up to 1955 is briefly examined, it 
inevitably puts more emphasis on Anglo-American relations during 1945-51. 
Another work that deserves some mention is that of Leon D. Epstein.28 This 
is a study, from a left-wing perspective, of the post-war Labour Government's 
relationship with the Americans. Like Pelling's, it was written in 1954 and so 
again is of limited value to this particular study. 
Labour and Europe has received more attention. The most detailed analysis 
is to be found in the 1979 study by L. J. Robins. Nevertheless, although it 
covers the period between 1961-75, it concentrates on the Labour 
Government's attitudes to Europe between 1964-70, and from 1974 to the EEC 
referendum. A study which views Gaitskell's actions as positive in terms of 
party management, it includes a brief examination of Gaitskell's terms for 
entry into the European Community, the Campaign for Democratic 
Socialism (COS) and the concern over the Commonwealth's reaction. 
However, it does suffer from a reliance on secondary sources, notably the 
works of Haseler, McKenzie and Gordon. To be fair, the work is a general 
one and the author, as he acknowledges, did not have access to the 
invaluable primary sources such as Research Department papers, 
Parliamentary Committee, PLP and NEC meeting minutes.29 On the other 
hand, there is little evidence of a willingness to use the other primary 
material available, apart from Labour Party Conference and Trades Union 
Reports. Other general studies are those by Miriam Camps and Robert Leiber, 
which although dated, are useful. Both examine British politics and 
European unity. Leiber takes the view that Gaitskell's stand over Europe was 
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highly principled, in marked contrast to the alternative hypothesis, that he 
used the European issue merely as an instrument of party management.30 
The Empire, Commonwealth and the more general question of Imperialism 
are areas that have been examined in more depth, and recent studies allow 
further elucidation for the purposes of this thesis largely unnecessary, apart 
from their effect on other issues such as Suez and the EEC. The works by 
Gupta and Howe are especially noteworthy. Gupta's work covers the period 
1914-64 and provides an overall assessment of the Labour's attitudes to 
imperialism, while Howe's recent study examines that of the British left as a 
whole.31 In a wider context, Goldsworthy's work on colonial issues between 
1945-61 is a useful guide; as are the recent studies by John Darwin.32 
Regarding Britain's role east of Suez to 1967, the work of Darby is a standard 
text, while G. L. Williams' consideration of this from Labour's point of view 
is invaluable.33 
The nuclear issues are the exception to the rule, in that there is a large 
amount of material written about the Labour Party and the Bomb. This 
emotive issue obviously holds a fascination and there are some notable 
studies. 34 Despite this, they again tend to examine a longer time period and 
do not concentrate on Gaitskell's outlook: the exception are those that 
examine the personalities, such as the biographies of Gaitskell and Bevan.35 
This is hardly surprising in the circumstances when their respective 
supporters and detractors use it to justify their subject's actions. Work on the 
battle between the Left and Right over the question of nuclear weapons falls 
into a similar trap.36 Two studies worth mentioning from a related angle are 
Driver's work on the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) and 
Taylor's recent study.37 
Labour's internal divisions over foreign policy are contained in a number of 
works (the biographies), but of specific interest is Michael Gordon's study 
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which covers the period from 1914 to 1965.38 Gordon concludes that there is 
very little hope that all sections of the Labour Party will ever reach consensus 
on foreign policy considering the diversity of opinion within it. His work 
provides a good basic overview of the unity and divisions regarding overseas 
affairs. In addition, he examines the wide range of opinions, arguing that it is 
a mistake to concentrate simply on the primacy of the leadership regarding 
policy formulation. His thesis provides an alternative view to McKenzie and 
Haseler, namely that the structure of the Party is weighted to the leadership's 
benefit. Whatever the merits of that particular argument, once again it has 
limitations as far as this work is concerned. First of all, one chapter out of ten 
deals with the period 1951-64: secondly, it concentrates on the disputes within 
the Party rather than the development of policy, though of course that is 
what the author intended; and thirdly, it was written in 1969 and therefore, a 
common theme, did not have access to many of the primary sources now 
available. 
5. Chapter Outlines 
These, then, are the specialist works that examine various aspects of Labour's 
foreign policy. While they are all useful for the purpose of this study their 
limitations have been outlined in this context, especially regarding the period 
covered, lack of access to primary material and their assessment of Gaitskell's 
role. The purpose of this thesis, using material previously unavailable, is to 
provide an overall assessment of Gaitskell's contribution to Labour's foreign 
policy and discuss its nature, successes and limitations. 
The first chapter is divided into two main parts. The first discusses 
Gaitskell's accession to the leadership, his outlook on foreign affairs and the 
team appointed to assist him. The second examines the period from 
December 1955 to July 1956, focussing on Labour's changing policy towards 
the Middle East prior to the Suez Crisis and the evolving attitude towards the 
Soviet Union in the wake of Khruschev's denunciation of Stalin. In 
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particular, it demonstrates the primacy of the leadership and Gaitskell's 
determination to assert his own stamp on foreign affairs. The desire to 
distance Labour policy from that of the Government soured relations 
between himself and Eden, and was to have a profound effect during the 
Suez Crisis. 
Chapter Two examines Labour's response to the Suez Crisis of 1956. 
Beginning with the Party's initial reaction to government policy, it traces the 
development and extent of their opposition. Labour's concern over the 
international consequences, especially the effect on world opinion, the 
United Nations, the Americans and the Commonwealth cannot disguise a 
desire from all sections of the Party to embarrass the Government and 
promote Labour to the British people as the only alternative; a strategy that 
actually proved surprisingly counter-productive. However, this chapter 
shows that the controversy over Gaitskell's role has been inspired for 
partisan and personal reasons and that unity, after some initial doubts from 
the Left, was genuine. In addition, the chapter argues that any blame attached 
to the decline of bi-partisanship was the product of Conservative policy, 
rather than the fault of Labour. 
Chapter Three examines Labour policy towards nuclear weapons between 
1955-59. Support for the nuclear deterrent, combined with deep concern over 
the hazards and a desire for disarmament made this an emotive issue within 
the Party. While the leadership was reluctant to renege on its earlier 
acceptance of a British H-bomb, a number of factors, the Government's policy 
of 'massive retaliation', left-wing agitation and the loss of the moral 
highground to CND, made some change in policy necessary. However, this 
chapter reinforces the McKenzie - Haseler thesis, as it demonstrates 
Gaitskell's determination not to concede any change until absolutely forced 
to do so, and only then in order to avoid a schism which could harm 
Labour's electoral prospects. In addition, it also contests the orthodox view 
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that 1957-59 was a period of unity and conciliation; instead it argues that the 
scale of opposition within the Movement was far wider than often assumed. 
Chapter Four continues to follow the nuclear dispute, from the general 
election defeat in 1959, through the unilateralist challenge, to the defusing of 
the crisis in late 1962. This period is regarded as marking the end of bi-
partisanship in nuclear policy, and when the bitter internal divisions within 
the Labour Movement over the issue came to a head, culminating in the 
unprecedented defeat of the leadership at conference in 1960. This chapter 
argues that on the question of bi-partisanship, the leadership's adherence to 
the nuclear deterrent, multilateralism and the Atlantic Alliance remained as 
strong as ever. It also examines the validity of the arguments for and against 
the primacy of the leadership. It demonstrates that while Gaitskell's position 
was seriously undermined by his tactical blunder over public ownership, he 
stubbornly refused to countenance the demands of the unilateralists, even 
though some of his closest allies deemed it politically prudent to do so. 
Indeed, with the structure of the Party working in the leadership's favour 
and Gaitskell's control of the Party elite intact, the Left had very little chance 
of turning Scarborough into long-term victory. It was also clear that far from 
flowing from unshakeable principles, the furore over the Bomb was inspired 
by the struggle for control of the Party. 
Chapter Five examines Labour's policy towards the European Economic 
Community between 1955-63. From tacit approval for the formation of the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA), Labour proceeded through various stages 
of pro and anti-common Market sentiments before rejecting the 
Government's proposals to apply for EEC membership in October 1962. This 
is one area that appears to show a decisive break in bi-partisanship. 
However, the chapter argues that while the Government had revised their 
position, Labour continued to follow the 'traditional' approach to Europe. 
Within the Party itself the European question, with some exceptions, stirred 
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few emotions and was not initially treated as an issue of any great 
importance. This has been cited to explain Gaitskell's apparent lack of 
interest until 1962. Nevertheless, this chapter contends that on the European 
question, the Labour leader displayed a greater degree of political awareness 
than on other issues, both in his response to public opinion, in his concern to 
win over his opponents and to avoid another damaging split in Labour's 
ranks. While again supporting the McKenzie - Haseler case, this chapter also 
illustrates the validity of Kavanagh's argument. 
This thesis demonstrates that Gaitskell's role was central to Labour's foreign 
and defence policy during his period as leader. Unlike Attlee, Gaitskell was 
determined to shape policy as much as possible in order to safeguard his 
personal notions of national prestige and power. Although this jarred with 
many, particularly the Left, it appealed to the majority of those determined to 
promote and uphold British interests, both within and outside the Labour 
Movement. When attempts were made to thwart his preferences, for 
instance over unilateralism, he could rely on the ambiguity of Labour's 1918 
constitution, appeals for unity and a hard core of support amongst Labour's 
elite. In this, as the thesis argues, he was undoubtedly assisted by the party's 
structure and its emphasis on the primacy of the leadership. Although his 
unwillingness to compromise over nuclear weapons led to the 1960 
conference defeat, this was due more to the struggle for power between the 
different factions, rather than the actual issue itself. While this is often cited 
to demonstrate Gaitskell's limitations, it has drawn attention away from the 
successful handling of the Suez and European disputes which also threatened 
to split Labour. Here Gaitskell demonstrated an astute awareness of what was 
required to safeguard national interests, maintain intra-party unity and in the 
latter case, boost Labour's electoral chances. Overall, the thesis provides a 
more balanced interpretation of Gaitskell's effect on foreign policy, and thus 
avoids the polarisation that his career has been subjected to for so long. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Gaitskell Takes Over; December 1955-July 1956 
In May 1955 the Conservative Party, under its new leader Anthony Eden, won 
the general election with an overall majority of fifty five. Mter this defeat 
Clement Attlee carried on as leader of the Labour Party until, on 7 December, 
he resigned abruptly and went to the House of Lords. Attlee had been leader 
of the Party for twenty years. Assessments vary: regarded as aloof and taciturn 
with few friends, in Cabinet or NEC meetings he tended to sum up the 
prevailing opinion rather than giving a lead. Attlee's period in government 
has been credited with enacting Labour's pre-war j>olicy, and reconstructing 
the post-war economy, but it has been accused of reacting to successive crises 
instead of trying to shape events. In opposition after 1951, the Party was riven 
with internal disputes and confused by the Tories' exploitation of affluence. 
Attlee's leadership during this time has been held to be weak, confused and 
ineffective, by both supporters and critics.1 
With Attlee's departure, three candidates stood for the leadership of the Party: 
Hugh Gaitskell, Herbert Morrison and Aneurin Bevan. Gaitskell's election 
was assured with a clear majority on the first ballot, with 157 votes to Bevan's 
70 and Morrison's 40, a result which gave him the largest margin of victory 
any Labour leader had received up to that point. Gaitskell's victory was 
undoubtedly helped by having the support of most of the leading 
parliamentarians and several powerful trades union leaders. Bevan had 
antagonised too many people and Morrison's age would mean only a brief 
term of office. In addition, former prominent supporters of Bevan and 
Morrison switched their support to Gaitskell. Despite some reservations, 
Gaitskell's accession to the leadership appeared to offer a great deal: the 
'honeymoon period' promised a greater degree of unity and avoided another 
leadership contest in the near future.2 Labour also had a leader, with the 
Party's structure firmly balanced in his favour, who was prepared to lead 
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rather than follow. Many within the Labour movement believed that the 
internecine warfare that had plagued the last four years in opposition would 
subside and that they could instead concentrate on opposing the Conservative 
Government of Sir Anthony Eden. 
This chapter is divided into two main parts. The first considers the problems 
facing Gaitskell at the beginning of his leadership, his outlook on foreign 
affairs and the composition and reasons behind the team appointed to assist 
him. The second examines Labour's foreign and defence policy from 
December 1955 to July 1956, assessing the changing policy towards the Middle 
East prior to the Suez Crisis and the reaction towards the Soviet Union in the 
wake of Khruschev's denunciation of Stalin. This demonstrates Gaitskell's 
determination to assert his own stamp on foreign affairs and a desire to 
distance Labour's policy from the Government's. Although largely ineffectual 
in practice, this policy nevertheless managed to sour the relationship between 
the parties, especially between Gaitskell and Eden, and was to have a profound 
effect during the Suez Crisis later that year. In addition, the chapter illustrates 
the new leader's control over policy, supporting the McKenzie - Haseler 
thesis, and how this set the scene for his future role. 
PART ONE 
The Honeymoon Period 
1.1 Gaitskell's Accession: Problems & Views 
Mter Attlee's resignation Gaitskell faced the problem of leading a political 
organisation torn apart by internal feuding and a Conservative Government 
that had won the last two general elections, and was benignlypresiding over a 
welfare state created by Labour and reaping the political benefits of rising 
living standards. Despite support for his leadership challenge in 1955 from a 
majority of the PLP (reflected by 60 per cent voting for him), trades union 
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leaders and traditional Labour supporters, he still faced a hard-core of 
opposition within the Movement.3 As Gaitskell knew, foreign policy had 
been one of the main causes of internal strife within the Party. In opposition 
between 1951-55 there had been fifteen major public rebellions against the 
Labour leadership, all but one of them over foreign and defence policy.4 To 
many, the revolts were all interwoven and dominated by one outstanding 
individual, Aneurin Bevan. The undisputed leader of the Left until his 
reconciliation with the leadership in 1957, Bevan had received 70 votes for the 
1955 leadership contest and could rely on a fifth of the PLP's support.5 
Although Labour was committed to harassing the Conservatives wherever 
possible, one area where the leadership's opposition to the Government could 
not be taken for granted was foreign policy. Since World War Two, the 
Labour and Conservative Party's had followed a bi-partisan approach, anxious 
to maintain Britain's influence as one of the 'Big Three' and typified in the 
'Special Relationship' with the United States, the dominance of Western 
Europe and the leadership of the 'global alliance' of Empire and 
Commonwealth countries.6 When relegated to opposition in 1951, Labour's 
leaders had felt that to attack the Government too strongly over foreign policy 
would invite charges of hypocrisy and irresponsibility. Yet at the same time, 
the four years to 1955 had witnessed major internal revolts against the 
leadership over foreign policy, and while bi-partisanship was desirable in 
some respects, internal unity had to be considered. Facing this dilemma, 
Gaitskell wanted to assert his own stamp on foreign affairs, an area where he 
was not an expert and where his personal approach was restricted by his 
acceptance, with some modifications, of 'traditional' British foreign policy 
goals? 
Perhaps the most enduring of Gaitskell's views were those on the United 
States. Since 1945, along with the majority of the PLP, he was convinced that 
the Anglo-American alliance was crucial in order to rebuild and maintain 
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Britain and Europe's shattered economies in the aftermath of World War 
Two, and military assistance in order to prevent the possibility of any further 
Soviet expansion. Despite a genuine admiration for the USA dating from 
Roosevelt's New Deal in the 1930s, he recognised that anxiety over their 
policy was a major cause of anti-Americanism in Britain: concern that 
increased when the new Republican administration entered office in 1953, 
with the crusading John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State. Differences over 
the Far East, America's bombastic military commanders, McCarthyite hysteria 
over communism, American superciliousness over some economic policies, 
coupled with Britain's increasing subordination to the USA, all fuelled this.8 
By 1954, Gaitskell had little doubt that the relationship had been severely 
strained by American policies in Europe, Asia generally, and China in 
particular.9 While his nationalist instincts held that Britain should retain 
freedom of independent action from the United States, a prime example being 
Britain's nuclear capability, Gaitskell nevertheless regarded the possibility of 
any split in the alliance as potentially disastrous. Indeed, in his first major 
parliamentary speech on foreign affairs, he angered the Labour Left with his 
insistence that their preference for neutralism would result in a rift and 
revive American isolationism.1° 
If Gaitskell's strong views on the United States were subject to the occasional 
doubt, those on the Soviet Union and its particular brand of communism left 
none. Personal experiences in the 1930s had convinced him that democracy 
was an essential precondition of socialist advance and that it was both foolish 
and dangerous for socialist parties to confuse the democratic and 
revolutionary roads to power.11 Gaitskell had been a member of Attlee's 
Government when the Soviet Union had been consolidating its grip on its 
satellites, encouraging communist agitation in western Europe, threatening 
Tito's Yugoslavia and blockading Berlin. He urged the strengthening of 
NATO to deter Soviet expansion, though he remained sceptical about similar 
alliances elsewhere. Despite his loathing of the Soviet system, the realities of 
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power politics convinced him that co-existence with the Soviet Union was a 
necessary part of western diplomacy, a recognition that would not have 
endeared him to Secretary of State, Dulles.12 
While his suspicion of the Soviet Union always remained, even after the 
relaxation following Stalin's death in 1953, he recognised that other 
communist states should not be 'lumped together' in a monolithic collective. 
In eastern and central Europe, though having no time for the 'puppet states', 
like many Labour Party members, he admired Yugoslavia and Tito's 
insistence on his country choosing its 'own path'. Further afield in Asia, he 
agreed with the Government's view, that America's hostility to Communist 
China was seriously flawed, and that it was in the West's interests to exploit 
and encourage their detachment from Russia. He regarded the struggle in 
Indo-China as predominantly nationalist rather than communist, and 
condemned western military intervention in Asia as counter-productive.13 
Gaitskell's view and affection for the Commonwealth mirrored the emotional 
response of many both within and outside the Labour Movement in the 1950s. 
Born in British India, he was a strong supporter of decolonisation from a 
moral standpoint and was anxious to maintain the friendship of the states 
gaining independence from Britain. Gaitskell accepted that the aspiring and 
newly independent states were entitled to choose their own way forward, 
even if this meant adopting a policy of neutralism. In his view, this was 
understandable because of their colonial history and their wish to avoid any 
alliances that would threaten their recently acquired independence.14 Because 
of this, Gaitskell was increasingly worried by Dulles' claim that neutralism 
was immoral, and the Secretary of State's attitude that if third world countries 
did not align themselves to contain communism, they must be anti-West.15 
On this theme, Gaitskell maintained a special interest in Anglo-Indian 
relations. Despite Indian opposition to colonialism, her criticism of Britain's 
role in Malaya and other colonial territories had been muted, aimed instead at 
29 
other colonial powers such as Holland and France. Gaitskell felt that if 
Britain, urged by America, tried to persuade Nehru to abandon neutralism 
and take sides in the Cold War, it could threaten Anglo-Indian friendship and 
shatter Commonwealth unity. Despite the problem of American resentment, 
he felt that Britain should avoid involvement in their ally's proposed South 
Asia policy if India was sharply opposed.16 
1.2 The Appointments: Conciliation or Captivity? 
When he became leader at the end of 1955, foreign affairs replaced economics 
as Gaitskell's main single preoccupation. While domestic politics were 
enjoying a period of relative calm, both major political parties were 
confronted with the problems that faced British overseas interests. In 
Labour's case, increasing tension in the Middle East, relations with the Soviet 
Union and the escalation of the arms race all had to be treated with care in 
order to avoid a return to the internecine warfare of the past few years. 
Without a specialised knowledge on foreign affairs himself, it was essential 
for Gaitskell to surround himself with a team that had. When Attlee 
resigned, the shadow foreign and defence policy team was largely made up of 
the old stalwarts. The most notable were Jarnes Griffiths in charge of 
Colonies, Gordon Walker for the Commonwealth and Richard Stokes for 
Defence. The shadow foreign affairs spokesman was Alf Robens who had 
replaced the ageing Morrison earlier in 1955. Robens' advisors included Denis 
Healey and Kenneth Younger, both acknowledged experts on foreign affairs, as 
well as John Hynd, the leader of the PLP's Foreign Affairs GroupP Jirn 
Callaghan, a comparative newcomer and a former naval officer, was admiralty 
spokesman under Stokes. 
Gaitskell took the appointment of the Shadow Cabinet generally very 
seriously and the foreign affairs team was no exception. In early January 1956 
he began seeing both members, and potential members, of the Parliamentary 
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Committee individually to decide who should be given which post.18 
Without the expertise himself at this stage, Gaitskell had more or less decided 
to leave the foreign affairs team as it was, despite some reservations about 
Robens and Younger.19 In mid-January, Gaitskell told Richard Crossman that 
he wanted a small informal committee to handle foreign affairs, which would 
include Robens, Healey, Younger, and rather to his surprise, Crossman 
himself.20 Despite his wish to keep the same line-up, with Griffiths likely to 
become Deputy Leader (which he did on 2 February 1956, winning 141 votes to 
Bevan's 111), Colonies would become vacant. This left Gaitskell with the 
dilemma of offering it to Bevan or Callaghan. To the amazement of many, 
including Bevan himself, he was offered this post on 14 February and accepted 
it.21 
The fact that Gaitskell wanted to retain the same foreign affairs team inherited 
from Attlee was of little surprise. Griffiths, Gordon Walker, Robens and 
Stokes, as the most important members could all be relied on to support him 
as leader, and as far as foreign affairs were concerned they were all 
'traditionalists'. What appeared more of a surprise is the importance Gaitskell 
attached to having Crossman and Younger as part of it. Even more 
inexplicable, at least on the surface, was his decision to appoint his old enemy, 
Aneurin Bevan, to a key position; especially as Bevan had lashed out at the 
Labour leadership in a speech at Manchester a few days before.22 
In Williams' view, this demonstrated Gaitskell's desire for conciliation, 
because as well as Bevan, Gaitskell appointed a third of the old Bevanites or 
Keep Calmers to the 34 shadow posts, a gesture clearly intended to unify the 
Party.23 Krug believes that it was not so much a gesture of conciliation than 
one of realism: Gaitskell reasoned that he needed Bevan, in spite of their long 
standing mutual dislike, to solidify his leadership and ensure left-wing 
support.24 As well as these reasons, McKenzie identifies another important 
link. In 1955 many of the old 'Heavyweights' had retired from the front 
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benches, which left Gaitskell with a small group of close supporters who 
carried comparatively little force in the PLP. Although it is probable that he 
would have wished to ensure that his front bench team represented a 
reasonable spectrum of opinion, he found it necessary to rely on his former 
rivals, primarily because they were far abler and experienced than the 
moderate or right-wing figures left in the PLP.25 
While Gaitskell may have used these tactics to secure a wide measure of 
support to consolidate his leadership, his opponents in turn appeared willing 
to accept the offer. Two important considerations have been identified to 
explain the rapid acceptance of Gaitskell's leadership from his former rivals. 
The first was that if they persisted in their efforts to overthrow the Party's 
chosen leader, they would almost certainly destroy Labour's electoral 
prospects. The second was that as leader Gaitskell, was in effect the 'Shadow 
Prime Minister': if Labour won an election he would become Premier and 
have 80-odd offices to distribute. These considerations would not have 
escaped Bevan either. With the leadership contest over for the foreseeable 
future, the only way for him to regain influence in the PLP was to join that 
very leadership.26 
These arguments all have their merits. However, bearing in mind Gaitskell's 
personality it is interesting to note how quickly he gained confidence as leader, 
demonstrated by his decision to assign 'shadows' who were only allowed to 
speak in the House on their allotted specialism, and the impatience he 
showed very early on if they did not fulfil his expectationsP The fact that he 
had appointed former political rivals and enemies like Younger, Crossman 
and above all Bevan, to important positions may have appeared sensible and 
conciliatory, but it also imposed restrictions on them in terms of collective 
responsibility. In addition, the crucial positions in foreign affairs were still 
largely in the hands of his trusted lieutenants and political allies, while those 
that still had to prove themselves were placed conveniently where an eye 
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could be kept on them. As McKenzie points out, 'There was no evidence 
during this period that Gaitskell was in any sense the "prisoner" of his left-
wing colleagues'.28 Indeed, to the contrary it appears to have been the other 
way round. 
PART TWO 
Policy & Practice 
Gaitskell's first few months as leader suggested little deviation from the bi-
partisan orthodoxy on foreign affairs adopted since 1945. Within the Labour 
Party itself, two longstanding policy issues had begun to receive greater 
prominence by the end of 1955. One concerned the rising tension in the 
Middle East between Israel and the Arab states, exacerbated by the Baghdad 
Pact and complicated by the deterioration of Western relations with Egypt. 
The other concerned the Soviet Union, and in particular, the 'thaw' perceived 
by some to have taken place since Stalin's death in 1953. 
2.1 The Middle East, 1945-55 
The Middle East had long been regarded as a vital part of British strategic and 
economic interests. When Labour entered office in 1945, Ernest Bevin had 
been advised by his Foreign Office officials that if Britain was to remain a 
world power it would have to continue to exercise political dominance in the 
region and assume responsibility for its defence.29 To achieve this, Bevin had 
hoped to create a British led regional defence organisation. However, beset by 
economic restrictions, the escalation of the Cold War, the creation of Israel 
and their subsequent war with their Arab neighbours, the British could not 
control the region on their own. As stability in the area was vital to Western 
as well as British interests, they were compelled to seek help from their allies. 
Although the Foreign Office and Bevin generally favoured the Arab nations 
over Israel because of historical and economic connections, this led to the 
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inclusion of the United States and France in the Tripartite Declaration of May 
1950: an agreement that was designed so that a balance of power between 
Arabs and Jews would be guaranteed along with their respective borders.30 
Mter their election defeat in 1951, the Labour Party remained committed to 
the provisions of the Tripartite Declaration and were concerned when this 
precarious power balance was threatened by the formation of the Baghdad Pact 
in April1955. Labour criticised the Pact because they felt it alienated the USSR 
at a time when a thaw in relations seemed possible, antagonised the 
Egyptians because it challenged their status in the region and upset France, 
Britain's ally, as they were not invited to participate.31 Most important of all, 
it led to serious concern over the security of Israel and presented a clear danger 
in two ways: first, that the Arab states may feel strong enough to attack Israel 
again; secondly, that Israel, isolated by the Pact, might launch a pre-emptive 
war. This fear increased when David Ben Gurion returned as Premier of 
Israel in November and after Eden's Guildhall speech on 9 November, when 
the Prime Minister implied that Israel should concede a large proportion of 
her territory in return for a general regional peace settlement.32 Labour 
publicly condemned the proposals because of the bias in favour of the Arabs. 
They pointed out that Israel was 'being forced into making all the concessions' 
and that such statements would force them into war.33 
There had been a noticeable shift in Labour Party policy towards the Middle 
East by the end of 1955, away from the pro-Arabist stance of Bevin to a broader 
pro-Israeli line. Gaitskell himself was an enthusiastic supporter of Israel and 
his wife Dora was from a Jewish family. In the Party itself, a large majority 
favoured Israel, far more than the number of Jewish MPs would indicate. Pro-
lsraeli sentiment stemmed from sympathy for the Jewish wartime experience, 
admiration for her progressive democracy and a sense of socialist solidarity. 
Within the group dealing with foreign affairs the split reflected that of the 
Party as a whole, a pro-Israeli majority with a vociferous pro-Arab minority. 
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Bevan and Crossman, two of the most prominent figures, as well as Gaitskell 
took the majority line. On the other side of the divide, Richard Stokes was 
one of the most ardent Arabists and George Brown, although appointed to 
Supply still concerned with foreign affairs, was another.34 
2.2 The Tanks Scandal 
With Arab-Israeli tension rising steadily in the last few months of 1955 and 
full scale conflict threatening, the angry reaction of the Labour Party to the 
news that Britain was supplying Egypt with extra armaments was not 
surprising. For some time rumours had been circulating that disused British 
tanks had been sold for scrap, were reconditioned in Belgium, and then re-
exported to Egypt. Although the tanks were of World War Two vintage their 
addition to Egypt's armed forces, considering the volatility of the region at that 
time, appeared inappropriate. On 30 December 1955, Alf Robens acted on 
these rumours and sent Eden a telegram asking him to suspend all further 
exports of war supplies, new or old.35 Two days later (New Year's Day 1956), 
the 'Tanks Scandal' story broke in the national press. Gaitskell, who had 
simultaneously been informed that a large shipment of arms for Egypt were 
being assembled at Liverpool, called a meeting of Labour's Foreign Affairs 
Group. They arranged that he should see Eden the following day, express 
Labour's concern about this problem and widen it to include Britain's Middle 
East policy generally.36 
At the meeting, the Labour representatives pressed the Government to halt 
the export of arms from Britain and Belgium, and to publish a White Paper 
clarifying the situation. In Gaitskell's view, the Government was clearly 
breaking the 1950 Tripartite Declaration by supplying Egypt with equipment 
denied to Israel. Eden and Lloyd argued that as Israel was militarily stronger, 
they were restoring the balance by sending tanks to Egypt. Eden, rather 
disingenuously, continued that the situation had altered because Russia had 
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supplied Egypt, and that even if Britain sent arms to Israel they could not 
match this. When Gaitskell challenged them over supplying Centurion tanks 
to Egypt, Eden and Lloyd appeared to be more concerned that if they stopped 
British supplies, the Russians would take full advantage and gain 
predominance in the region; a situation Gaitskell thought unlikely. The 
meeting broke up with little resolved, and left Gaitskell convinced that the 
Government had no clear policy.37 
Gaitskell believed that the meeting with Eden was perfectly friendly, if 
unproductive. Yet, in the Times under the headline 'Eden Refuses 
Opposition's Demands', the Prime Minister rejected Labour's request to 
suspend arms shipments, ask Belgium to suspend them, agree to a 
parliamentary debate or publish a White Paper.38 In Egypt itself, the 
newspaper Akhbar reported that Eden had accused Labour of obtaining 
information from Israel's intelligence services, while in the editorial, it 
mocked their views on the Middle East. While the British press reports were 
considered provocative, the Egyptian account was clearly aimed at souring 
Anglo-Israeli relations. Gaitskell had received information from Israel, 
although from their Ambassador in London, not the intelligence service.39 
Disturbed by these events, the Shadow Cabinet challenged the Government to 
publish a White Paper and hold a parliamentary debate. In private, it was 
decided that the whole issue of Middle East policy needed to be questioned. 40 
By mid-January, the quarrel between Eden and Gaitskell in the press was 
partially settled when the Government announced that a White Paper would 
be published, followed by a debate on 24 January. The document regretted that 
surplus arms had found their way 'through third parties' to Egypt, but stated 
that the quantity had been small, the quality poor and that they had been 
balanced by a similar amount reaching Israel (it did not specify where from).41 
Dissatisfied with their explanations, the debate gave Labour their first public 
opportunity to challenge the Government since Gaitskell had taken over as 
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leader. As expected, his speech began over the export of surplus war material 
to Egypt. This was followed by criticism of Conservative Middle East policy 
generally, and then specifically for having tilted the diplomatic and military 
balance against Israel. The Government replied that they would reconsider 
the qualitative balance of arms and that a UN frontier force was desirable. 
However, there were no detailed commitments and Labour hopes of 
involving the Russians were rejected.42 
Although it offered few concessions, the Government's obvious discomfort 
was demonstrated when Selwyn Lloyd accused Labour, and Richard Crossman 
in particular, of 'delighting Britain's enemies'.43 Within the Party it was 
generally felt that the debate was successful, as it earned praise from all 
sections. Crossman's assessment, supported by many, was that the leader had 
mounted a skilful attack on the Government. Gaitskell, in private at least, 
was more reticent. He believed that Labour had been pushed into a difficult 
position, because the surplus arms did not amount to much in military terms 
and made it look like they were making a fuss over nothing. On the wider 
issues raised in the debate, he was far more satisfied.44 
In political terms, Labour's effort could hardly be classed as a victory, because 
the Government did little to ease their concerns. While the Opposition could 
be satisfied at having brought the Middle East situation, and in particular the 
plight of Israel to light, the issue that had initiated it, the 'Tanks Scandal' was 
more of an embarrassment, as Gaitskell himself recognised. Although 
supplies of surplus British war material to Egypt would not help peace, little 
was made of the fact that brand new equipment was still being exported. The 
Centurion tanks and jet fighter aircraft supplied by Britain were far more of a 
threat to the balance of power in the region, than the obsolete World War 
Two equipment cited by Labour. The Government had actually made little 
effort to conceal these exports and justified it as legitimate under the 1954 
Anglo-Egyptian agreement; this, even though it was clearly a breach of the 
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1950 Tripartite Declaration. This information was known to the Labour 
leadership and the way in which they failed to capitalise on it appeared to 
indicate either undue consideration for the Government's position, or an 
appalling gaffe. 
Although the issue itself may not have been very successfully exploited, other 
explanations for Labour's actions can be suggested. There is ample reason to 
suggest that Gaitskell used the situation in the Middle East to raise his own 
profile as Leader. He had only assumed the position a month before and, as 
his biographer admits, was anxious to make his mark. The unprecedented 
visits to Eden during the Christmas recess, in addition to the publicity gained 
by their arguments, appear to substantiate this.45 Gaitskell had also only 
recently overcome the suspicions of many, though not all, within his own 
Party over the taint of 'Butskellism'. What better way of establishing his 
credentials than to take a different line on foreign policy, hitherto an approach 
remarkable for its bi-partisanship between government and opposition. From 
the PLP's perspective, the attack on the Government would also have been 
useful, establishing unity behind the new leadership and diverting attention 
away from the internecine warfare that had raged since 1951. Considering 
Gaitskell's character, a 'pathfinder' who wanted to lead from the front and 
establish an alternative identity, the reaction was even more understandable. 
Yet, his emotional response and the way in which Labour blindly followed his 
lead, missing two key points in their haste to attack government policy, 
illustrated the drawbacks of not having prepared a well thought-out 
alternative. 
2.3 Glubb, Nasser and the Approach of Suez 
While the 'Tanks Scandal' and subsequent debate had little impact, the next 
crisis in Britain's Middle East policy was far more significant and gave Labour 
greater opportunity for effective opposition. On 1 March 1956 Lieutenant 
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General John Glubb was dismissed as the Chief of the Imperial General Staff 
(CIGS) of the Arab Legion, by King Hussein of Jordan. It was widely believed 
that Jordan had been pressurised by members of the Arab League, especially 
Egypt, to get rid of Glubb because of his reluctance to allow hostilities against 
Israel. Although Anglo-Jordanian relations had deteriorated since December 
1955 when the British had tried to persuade them to join the Baghdad Pact, 
Glubb's dismissal came as a surprise to many, not least to those in the Labour 
Party.46 
Aware of the significance of the impending crisis, and how the Government 
could be severely embarrassed by such an important reversal, the Shadow 
Cabinet decided to press for a debate.47 The following day (6 March) Gaitskell, 
Younger and Crossman considered what line to take. Gaitskell's concerns 
centred around the danger to Israel posed by Glubb's dismissal (in case Jordan 
or the Arabs now felt free to attack). To counter this threat, it was decided that 
Israel needed to be provided with arms and the Tripartite Declaration needed 
to be strengthened. Gaits.kell was also worried that the British might consider 
reimposing a protectorate on Jordan. Crossman was more concerned that 
British policy over the Baghdad Pact had led to the problems in Jordan and 
had antagonised Egypt by altering the region's balance of power. As John 
Hynd and Denis Healey were away, Crossman was in charge of the Foreign 
Affairs Group. As a consequence, it was primarily his advice that was given to 
the Shadow Cabinet.48 At their meeting, it was agreed that Labour should 
vote against the Government in the debate the following day.49 
In Parliament, Robens and Gaitskell launched the attack, based on the eight 
main points suggested by Crossman. On Jordan, Gaitskell urged that the 
Government continue to monitor the situation carefully, but let the 
Jordanians choose their 'own path', becoming a neutral ally of Egypt if they 
wished. If this was chosen, all British subsidies and troops should be 
withdrawn. However, if Jordan wished to remain a British ally, the size of the 
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Arab Legion should be reduced and priority given to economic rather than 
military aid. Gaitskell then turned to Israel. He condemned the 
Government's refusal to arm Israel even after the Soviet Bloc's arms deal 
with Egypt. To rectify this he suggested that British troops should defend 
Israel's frontiers, that arms should be sent for her defence and that a treaty 
which emcompassed these points should be agreed. Widening the attack, 
Gaitskell criticised British attempts to bring Jordan and other Arab states into 
the Baghdad Pact. On the economic side, he demanded an end to Anglo-
American oil rivalry and argued that their profits would be better directed 
helping development in the Middle East, rather than just benefiting Western 
oil companies. Winding up, he urged that Russia should be invited to 
participate in the region, along with the original signatories of the 1950 
Tripartite Declaration and within an overall UN framework.50 
Defending the Government, Anthony Nutting argued against a treaty with 
Israel and rejected any Soviet involvement as unnecessary. Eden told the 
House that information on the situation was scanty, and that he could not 
announce a definite policy because it was dangerous and premature to do so. 
However, the end of his speech infuriated the Labour benches because he 
compared Gaitskell's criticism of the Baghdad Pact to a 'faint echo of Radio 
Moscow'.51 Despite the Labour furore that accompanied this (at one stage the 
Speaker came to Eden's aid to restore order) and the muted reception from his 
own side, the Opposition's censure motion was easily defeated by 312 votes to 
252. 
Of course, although Labour had little prospect of defeating the Government, 
contemporary accounts show that the debate was effective and raised Party 
morale. Gaitskell had been concerned beforehand about the content of his 
speech and how the Party would react to it. However, this anxiety was 
unfounded and the speech impressed many Conservatives as well as Labour 
members. Pleased at the positive reception, he was surprised at the support he 
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received, even from prominent left-wingers such as Konni Zilliacus. He felt 
that this was due to the speech's widespread appeal, from die-hard Tories to 
Fellow-Travellers; wisely, he also attributed it to an appalling display by the 
Government, a view supported by one of Eden's prominent advisors.52 
Although both Labour's attacks on the Government's Middle East policy were 
easily brushed aside, a distinction should be drawn between the two. Both had 
differed from Conservative policy, notably over the concern for Israel and 
criticism of the Baghdad Pact. However, the January debate had clearly been 
misguided, concentrating on the surplus arms rather than the new equipment 
as well as overlooking the contravention of the Tripartite Pact. In addition, as 
already discussed, it also appeared to have been a 'bungled' attempt by 
Gaitskell to raise his profile. In marked contrast, the March debate was both 
more measured in tone and effectively delivered, a view supported by the 
non-partisan praise it gained both in and out of Parliament. 
Even more significant, some Labour suggestions received more attention 
from the Government, especially those regarding Israel. In a private meeting 
with Selwyn Lloyd in April, Gaitskell recorded that the Foreign Secretary had 
given him the impression that the Government was changing its mind over 
supplying arms to Israel. Although Lloyd was concerned that this would affect 
Britain's relations with Jordan, Gaitskell thought that it was clear that the 
Government was so exasperated with Nasser and Egypt generally, that they 
were being drawn into accepting Labour's position on supporting Israel. The 
meeting ended with Gaitskell more optimistic that Israel would soon receive 
Centurion tanks from Britain to counter the Russian supplies to the Arab 
states. 53 
Encouraged by the Government's apparent willingness to take a more pro-
Israeli line, Richard Crossman wrote a discussion paper for the PLP, which 
clarified Labour's Middle East policy. Presented at the end of May 1956, it 
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proposed a UN security pact which guaranteed the independence and 
protection of every state in the region. As a first step to a settlement, the 
balance of power would be restored by the supply of defensive equipment to 
Israel. With parity achieved, an embargo would be imposed on arms to the 
Middle East from the Superpowers and their allies. In addition, economic aid 
would be channelled through UN agencies rather than through the Baghdad 
Pact. Finally that, 'the last vestiges of semi-colonial status should be 
ended ... especially in Jordan•.54 
As well as optimism over the Government's apparent change of heart over 
Israel, a reassessment towards Soviet involvement appeared too, despite 
Nutting's rejection of this in March. The NEC, concerned about the escalation 
in the fighting between Israel and Egypt over the Gaza strip in April, had 
repeatedly called for a meeting with the Foreign secretary. Finally, at the end 
of June their request was granted. Since Gaitskell and Griffiths were away, 
Crossman led the Labour delegation. He immediately criticised the 
Government over the terms of a convention agreement that was heavily in 
favour of the Arab states. Lloyd interrupted Crossman and informed him that 
after the Anglo-Soviet meeting in April, the Government had decided to 
bring the Russians into their plans for a Middle East peace settlement after all. 
Lloyd also hinted that they were considering a UN arms embargo to the 
Middle East. Crossman, obviously taken-aback at these changes, retorted that 
they had been the very suggestions made in the March debate, which had been 
derided by the Government.SS 
Although many Labour claims to have influenced government policy over 
the Middle East were delusory, they had some cause for self-congratulation. 
By the end of June, the Government appeared to have considered some of 
their suggestions, although in reality this was due more to external 
circumstances, than to any particular pressure from Labour. Nevertheless, 
Gaitskell's contribution had demonstrated that the Conservatives could not 
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take bi-partisanship over foreign policy totally for granted, and that the 
Opposition's views needed to be taken seriously if public rows were to be 
avoided. Despite the mistakes over the 'Tanks Scandal' in January, Gaitskell's 
subsequent actions won acclaim from all sections of the Party, no doubt 
relieved that unity had been maintained and heartened that they were on the 
offensive once again. Over Labour's Middle East policy at least, Gaitskell had 
some justification for personal satisfaction: it had raised his profile in the 
country, given him the chance to assert himself within the Party and helped 
strengthen his position as leader. 
Yet, subsequent events were to give these incidents an unexpected twist. Only 
three months after the meeting between Gaitskell and Uoyd, the Suez Crisis 
broke. Although Anglo-Egyptian relations had been strained for some time, 
this led to Anglo-lsraeli co-operation in October 1956, unthinkable to the 
Government only six months earlier under any circumstances. The irony 
was, that in January and March 1956 the Labour Party had persisted in its 
attempt to change the Government's Middle East policy, most notably into 
supporting Israel. By October 1956, it was the other way round. Then, the 
Conservative Government was encouraging and supporting Israel's invasion 
of Sinai, with Labour imploring them to stop and at the same time fending off 
accusations of treachery and of supporting Egypt. 
2.4 The Soviet Union. 1945-55 
Besides the Middle East, the Soviet Union loomed long in foreign policy 
during the first few months of Gaitskell's leadership. The death of Stalin in 
1953 had brought a sense of optimism that a 'thaw' in the Cold War was 
possible. The cessation of the Korean War, Russian withdrawal from Austria, 
recognition of the Bonn Government, a relaxation in Soviet anti-Western 
propaganda and Soviet negotiators showing greater flexibility all contributed 
to this. This optimism increased in mid-March when the details of 
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Khruschev's denunciation of Stalin, at the 20th Congress of the CPSU on 25 
February 1956, were released. Within the Labour Party itself these events 
provoked a flurry of activity and set in motion a reassessment of policy 
towards the Soviet Union. 
The social democratic tradition in the British Labour Movement had always 
been divided on its attitude to Russia, with an anti-Soviet majority but a 
vociferous pro-Soviet minority. World War Two had forged an alliance 
between Britain and Russia and widespread admiration for the Soviet Union 
was not restricted to those on the left. The Labour Government, returned in 
1945 with a massive majority, had initially rejected the pre-war National 
Government's hostility towards Russia. Yet, almost at once it adopted a stance 
towards the Soviet Union which equalled in rigour that of any Tory 
administration. As the wartime partnership evaporated and the Cold War 
escalated, the hopes of many in the Labour Party, that left could talk to left, 
were dashed. In the general election of 1950 it was Winston Churchill, the 
Conservative leader and pristine Cold Warrior, who called for summit talks 
with the Russians, while Labour's Clem Attlee frowned on the idea.56 
When the Tories returned to office in 1951 they followed many of the Attlee's 
Governments policies toward the Soviet Union. However, after Stalin's 
death, Churchill again called for high level talks between the Great Powers, 
and this led to the 1955 Geneva Conference. The British proposed a policy of 
disengagement in central Europe. They hoped that this would relax the 
Soviet grip on its east European satellites, lead to mutual armaments 
inspection and result in a larger disarmament agreement, thereby lessening 
the risk of confrontation in Europe. However, these hopes were largely 
derailed by West German demands, with American backing, that the 
reunification of Germany with free elections should be the chief subject of 
negotiation. This worried France, because the de facto division of their former 
enemy reduced their fear of invasion or German revanchism. Of course, the 
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Russians were intractable as they believed that free elections in Germany 
would result in the loss of their Eastern sector. Consequently, the t(llks did not 
live up to expectations and the 'summit' only agreed to cultural exchanges 
between East and West.57 Although the original British policy had been 
thwarted, Soviet calls for further talks led Harold Macmillan to claim that 
Stalin~s death and the advent of the Hydrogen Bomb constituted a 'new look' 
from the Soviet Union. 
m Britain itself, it is generally accepted that the two front benches remained 
remarkably close in this period.58 While acceptance of the British H~bomb and 
the strengthening of NATO urged by the Labour leadership since 1955 had 
attracted some dissent from the left-wing, Gaitskell's view was similar to 
theirs in some respects. He accepted disengagement, although he felt 
(correctly) that the Government's terms for German reunification would be 
unacceptable to the Russians. m addition, he believed that co-existence with 
the Soviet Union was necessary and welcomed any relaxation in international 
tension.59 While many in the Party viewed the Soviet overtures with 
optimism, Denis Healey (an acknowledged expert and .a strident 'realist' in 
defence matters) dismissed Macmillan's September declaration as 'wishful 
thinking'. m an address to the Royal Irtstitute of International Affairs in 
October 1955, Healey conceded that although there had been some evidence of 
a relaxation since 1953, the basic aims of Soviet foreign policy remained 
essentially intact: to detach Germany from N:ATO; to get NATO out of Europe; 
and to persuade the West to abolish its nuclear armoury, a policy which left 
massive Soviet conventional forces in a dominant position.60 
2.5 Labour's Defence Review. the Soviet Visit and 'That Dinner' 
Despite Healey's stance, Labour's defence experts had been considering the 
implications of thermo-nuclear weapons on Britain!s defence capability for 
some time. The Government's annual Defence White Paper, published on 17 
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February 1956, assumed that during the next few years Britain could rely on 
the massive destructive power of the H-bomb and reduce conventional forces. 
Clearly demonstrating their acceptance of the deterrent at this stage, Labour's 
defence team questioned the relevance of conscription and the two year 
national service period. The International Sub-Committee of the NEC pre-
empted the Government's White Paper, and submitted a resolution in 
January 1956 which urged the PLP to secure a reduction in National Service 
and press for an independent enquiry into its conditions.61 
Simultaneously, the perceived relaxation in the Soviet Union encouraged 
internal discussion on how to react and what policy to adopt. When the 
Government announced that the Soviet leaders, Khruschev and Bulganin, 
were to visit Britain in April, preceded by Malenkov in March, the Labour 
leaders were anxious to arrange a meeting with them.62 In his Daily Mirror 
column, Richard Crossman, who had long maintained that the Soviet threat 
to the West was through superior economic achievement rather than military 
power, urged his colleagues to meet the Soviet leaders with an open mind. 
He argued that it would be irresponsible to rule out the possibility that the 
Russians had learned from Stalin's failures and were now sincere in their 
willingness to deal with the West.63 Then on 25 February 1956, Khruschev 
denounced Stalin as an autocrat and the tyrant personally responsible for the 
pre-war purges and post-war liquidations. He went on to condemn the 'cult of 
personality' and disassociated the new leadership from the old. Khruschev's 
speech, the defence review and internal pressure convinced many within the 
Labour Party that a full reassessment of policy towards the Soviet Union was 
necessary. 
The full details of Khruschev's speech emerged in mid-March. This coincided 
with Malenkov's {Soviet Premier until February 1955) visit to Britain and his 
meeting with Labour leaders. While Gaitskell made it clear that negotiations 
could only take place between the two Governments and not the Opposition, 
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he took the opportunity to air his views on Soviet foreign policy. He criticised 
Soviet actions since the war and stressed British fear of Russian expansion, 
though he claimed that the H-bomb's deterrent effect had significantly 
reduced the threat of a major war. Although he was encouraged by the new 
Russian proposals for controls on conventional arms, Gaitskell told 
Malenkov that mutual trust would never be achieved if Russia continued to 
stir up trouble: a direct reference to the Middle East, and in particular the 
recent Czech-Egyptian arms deal. Gaitskell recorded that while the visit may 
have been a public relations exercise, Malenkov's views encouraged some 
hope of a milder Soviet foreign policy.64 
While the talks with Malenkov took place, the NEC was busy assessing the 
implications of Khruschev's speech and whether it constituted a major 
turning point in social democratic - communist relations. This was further 
stimulated by a report from the Socialist International in early March 1956. 
Throughout March and early April, Labour's International Department 
continued to explore whether this provided the background for a general 
reassessment. The result, when it was submitted to the NEC on 10 April, 
concluded that 'no new basis of co-operation between Communism and Social 
Democracy had been created by the 20th Congress of the CPSU'.65 
Although the report's conclusion would have been of little surprise to 
Gaitskell and the vast majority of the PLP, there was no indication of the 
spectacular events that followed. Khruschev and Bulganin had been invited 
to talks with the British Government in April. As Leader of the Opposition, 
Gaitskell had met the Russian leaders at the Soviet Embassy, at 10 Downing 
Street and at Chequers. However, it was at a Labour Party dinner given in 
honour of the visitors on 23 April that caused a sensation, both within the 
Party and the national press. Of more interest was the way in which this 
episode reflected on Gaitskell and how it contributed to the first serious attacks 
on his leadership.66 
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Gaitskell, Griffiths and Robens had already met Khruschev and Bulganin on 
22 April. Beforehand, the Labour leaders had decided to raise two questions 
with the Russians: the plight of social democrats imprisoned in Eastern 
Europe and Soviet relations with British Labour. Gaitskell began with the 
latter point, and explained to the Russians that good relations could never be 
conducted through groups such as the Anglo-Soviet Friendship Society 
(ASFS) or the Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR. This was because 
they were communist front organisations unacceptable to the Labour Party. 
Instead, he suggested that they should work through affiliated groups like the 
Anglo-Soviet Committee of the British Council. In answer to queries from 
Khruschev over whether the head of the ASFS, (Or Hewlett Johnson, the 
Dean of Canterbury) was not approved of by Labour, Gaitskell replied that 
most people considered him a lunatic. This provoked a tirade from 
Khruschev, who condemned Labour representatives and British trades 
unionists who had criticised Russia while visiting his country. He then 
complained about the Party's foreign policy, its anti-Soviet line since 1945, and 
for good measure, finshed with the cutting remark that the Conservatives 
were easier to deal with than Labour.67 
After this frank exchange, the events of the following evening were not as 
surprising as they subsequently appeared. The agenda for the dinner had been 
agreed beforehand with the visitors so that Edwin Gooch (Party Chairman that 
year) for Labour and Bulganin for the Russians would make speeches. After 
this, it had been agreed that a number of pre-arranged questions would be put 
to the Soviet delegation, including one on the social democrats. Although the 
antics of George Brown did not help matters, it was James Callaghan's 
repeated calls for Khruschev to speak, followed by others, that brought the 
Soviet leader to his feet. Although he had not intended or been scheduled to 
speak, Khruschev (by some accounts somewhat the worse for drink) launched 
into a furious attack on the West. Dismissing any hopes for controlled 
disarmament, he followed this up with a defence of the 1939 Molotov-
48 
Ribbentropp Pact (drawing the notorious 'May God forgive him' retort from 
George Brown) and threatened that the Russians may again be forced to come 
to terms with Germany. Without the question time expected because of 
Khruschev's hour long interruption, and due to wind up the proceedings, 
Gaitskell raised the matter of the social democrats and the treatment of Jews in 
central and eastern Europe. This provoked another furious outburst from the 
Soviet leader.68 
During his speech and the questions afterwards, several Labour leaders 
rebuked Khruschev as well as Brown: Sam Watson and Bevan amongst 
them. 69 This did not prevent some Party members complaining about the 
row to Gaitskell the following day. Considering the press reports and the 
concern expressed, it was inevitable that a post-mortem would be held. At an 
NEC meeting two days later, Barbara Castle attacked Gaitskell over the press 
conference that had been held immediately after the dinner, in which the 
Labour leader had criticised the Russians. However, it was George Brown 
who received most of the blame, even from allies like Robens. Although 
Gaitskell felt vindicated and received support for his actions from the 
majority of those present, there were some requests, notably by Edith 
Summerskill, that the Party should apologise to the Russians. This request, 
although rejected at the NEC meeting, was taken up by others. At a meeting 
of the PLP on 26 April Emanuel Shinwell, seconded by George Wigg, pressed 
for a letter of apology to be sent to the Russians on behalf of the PLP, but this 
was heavily defeated.70 
For a while it looked as though dissent had been quelled, only to flare up 
again after a television appearance on 27 April when Gaitskell defended 
Brown, criticised Soviet intransigence, and in particular Khruschev's 
aggressiveness. This forthright statement, which compared a 'moderate' 
Malenkov with a 'fanatical' Khruschev presented Shinwell with another 
opportunity to attack Gaitskell. In the Daily Express, he complained about his 
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leader's treatment of the Russian visitors and claimed that Gaitskell's account 
of Khruschev's provocation at the dinner was false; this, despite the fact that 
he had not attended it himself.71 While Shinwell's longstanding feud with 
Gaitskell was the most likely reason behind these attacks, others took this as a 
cue to air their grievances.72 There is no doubt that the Beaverbrook owned 
press sensationalised and used the dinner incident to attack Gaitskell and 
Labour in an attempt to restore some prestige to the hard-pressed Prime 
Minister, Eden. After all, the Tories had been handed a gift by Khruschev's 
comments that if he were British he would be a Conservative and that the 
Tories were easier to deal with.73 
With the affair beginning to fade, Gaitskell, incensed at the exploitation of the 
'Dinner' incident by Eden and his colleagues, tried to turn the tables on the 
Government over the 'Commander Crabbe affair'. Lionel Crabbe was a naval 
frogman who vanished while diving near the Soviet delegation's cruiser, 
'Ordzhonikidze', in Portsmouth harbour.74 Eden denied any knowledge of 
government involvement, but declared that it would not be in the public 
interest to disclose the circumstances of Crabbe's death, although he promised 
disciplinary action. Gaitskell's speech in Parliament was cautious, questioning 
the role of the security services and asking to whom were they ultimately 
responsible.75 Beforehand, rumours had circulated, partly due to Gaitskell's 
indiscretion, that this was to be a major attack on the Government. When 
delivered, the speech's timidity therefore resulted in an anti-climax. Several 
Labour MPs, including Morrison and Shinwell actually abstained, giving the 
impression that the Party was split and that it had been brought over an 
unnecessary issue. 76 
2.6 Defence Expenditure and National Service 
While the Party was distracted by the visit of the Soviet leaders and the dinner 
debacle, the policy review on defence expenditure and conscription which had 
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begun in January 1956, was nearing completion. The Government's White 
Paper, published in February 1956 (Cmd. 9691), had recommended a reduction 
in conventional forces, in accordance with an international agreement of 1953. 
Labour's assessment of the changes had reached the same conclusion. The 
long-term Labour belief that defence spending was too high was accentuated 
in the mid-1950s with the 'balance of terror' concept created by thermo-
nuclear weapons. Due to this, Labour viewed the production of obsolete 
equipment and the maintenance of conscription as an unnecessary drain on 
economic resources. In a discussion paper 'Manpower and Defence' drafted in 
June 1956, the International Department demanded that the Government 
urgently address the situation. It suggested that: national service should be 
phased out with no further call ups after 1958; that defence expenditure 
should be cut to no more than 6 per cent of national income; that a 
reorganisation of the services and fewer weapon types, particularly aircraft, 
were required. Almost as an afterthought, it included a provision that all 
decisions must conform with NATO cornmitments.77 
Contributions to the draft paper had been provided by Crossman, Bevan and 
Shinwell, and its contents were enthusiastically approved by the Foreign 
Affairs Group. However, because of its lukewarm support for NATO and the 
large reduction demanded in defence expenditure (33 per cent), Gaitskell 
regarded the paper as too radical. Crossman was not surprised by Gaitskell's 
reaction to what he described as a 'very left-wing' paper. While the Labour 
leader supported the abolition of conscription, he ruled out the commitment 
to cut the overall defence budget so drastically as 'out of the question'.78 Due 
to his objections, the 6 per cent limit on defence expenditure in relation to 
national income originally called for, was replaced with more ambiguous 
phrasing. When the final draft was released on 25 June, it gave no precise 
commitment on the amount considered acceptable.79 
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While Gaitskell had voiced concern over the exact wording of the paper, 
Crossman's suggestions on Labour's wider foreign policy went further, 
especially over Western defence strategy. He concluded that NATO (as well 
as the SEATO and MEDO alliances) should be relegated to a secondary role 
under the UN; a view that attracted left-wing support.80 Although 
'Manpower and Defence' had been watered down and no firm commitments 
made, the Left had continually pressed the leadership to force a parliamentary 
debate over one of its objectives, National Service.81 Crossman's paper had 
encouraged discussion and increased this pressure. 
In early July, the Shadow Cabinet agreed two specific proposals. The first 
related to the abolition of National Service, or at least a reduction in the 
period of service. The second concerned limiting expenditure on defence.82 
In a full meeting of the PLP the following day, it was agreed that the 
Government should be 'reprimanded for not contributing to international 
disarmament. . .for not reducing conscription ... [and] their policy towards 
Germany'.83 At the same time the Left, encouraged earlier by the debate over 
defence, were isolated by Crossman's switch when he pledged support for 
NATO and backed Gaitskell. The result was that only a few, including Konni 
Zilliacus and Jennie Lee, objected to the proposals. 84 
By mid-July the Labour Party, united in its determination to raise the issue of 
defence expenditure, prepared to challenge the Government. However, the 
defence debates were overtaken by problems in the Middle East. In May 1956, 
Egypt had recognised Communist China, to the anger of the American 
Government. Eisenhower's administration, exasperated with what it saw as 
Nasser's continued flirtation with communism, withdrew their offer of 
financial aid for the Aswan Dam project on 19 July. The next day Britain 
followed the American lead, and the international Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development was compelled to do the same. Nasser, outraged by these 
actions, promised to finance the Dam without Western help and on 26 July 
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1956 nationalised the Suez Canal Company. As a result, the Labour and 
Conservative attitude towards foreign affairs, remarkable for its bi-
partisanship since 1945, was threatened by the events unfolding in the Middle 
East. 
Conclusion 
Gaitskell had become leader of the Labour Party in December 1955 determined 
to assert his authority within the Movement and publicise the differences 
between Government and Opposition. Nowhere was this determination 
more marked than in foreign affairs. Yet in reality, Labour's policies, despite 
differences in emphasis, remained as close to those of the Conservative 
Government as they had since 1951. 
In the Middle East, Labour had pledged support for Israel, criticised British 
involvement in the Baghdad Pact and pressed for Russia to join the 1950 
Tripartite Pact. By mid-1956 the Government had reconsidered its 
relationship with Israel and moved away from the traditional bias in favour 
of the Arab states, largely as a result of exasperation with Nasser and his 
increased influence over the other states in the Middle East. In addition, the 
Government indicated, after the Soviet visit in April, that the Russians 
should be included in a comprehensive peace settlement. While Labour 
optimists claimed that some of these changes were due to Labour Party 
pressure, in reality the Government's policies were shaped by the volatility 
and realignments in the region. 
Encouraged by the 'thaw' in the Soviet Union, Labour had pressed for 
disengagement in central and eastern Europe, a reduction in defence spending 
and the abolition (or at least a reduction in the period served) of National 
Service. Once again the Government was pursuing similar goals. They too 
sought disengagement in central Europe, encountering American and West 
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German opposition in the process. The Government was also concerned at 
the escalating costs of defence and, as the White Paper of February 1956 had 
shown, were looking at ways to reduce it. This extended to National Service, 
and Labour's demand for this to be abolished was actually achieved by the 
Government, and sooner than Labour had hoped. 
Despite some left-wing dissent, at this stage Gaitskell, the majority of the PLP 
and the wider Labour Movement were as committed to the British H-bomb, 
the 'special relationship' with the United States, NATO, anti-communism 
and 'traditional' British foreign policy goals as any Tory. Patriotism, a sense of 
responsibility and a desire for British political world leadership were all deeply 
embedded in Labour's psyche and restricted any deviation away from putting 
national interests first. With little difference separating the two front benches 
over foreign policy in reality, it is worth considering the reasons why 
Gaitskell's desire to achieve a more partisan approach was unsuccessful. 
In one respect at least, the Labour Party had little control. When Attlee retired 
and Gaitskell became leader in 1955, most of the Party's old guard that had 
served during the war and in the 1945-1951 governments had gone too. 
Attlee and Morrison had worked closely with Churchill and Eden during the 
war, and whether in government or opposition the mutual respect between 
them had meant contacts were still maintained. Morrison, Labour's foreign 
affairs spokesman until 1955, had enjoyed the confidence of Eden, and this 
extended to many in the Foreign office too.85 When Gaitskell took over, this 
confidence disappeared, Eden remarking in his memoirs that this 'was a 
national disaster' and that they 'never seemed able to get on terms'.86 Of 
course, Labour's other foreign affairs 'experts' such as Crossman and Bevan 
were even less likely to receive the confidence of the Government or Foreign 
Office. Thus, Labour in this period lacked the information it needed in order 
to establish its own identity over foreign affairs, and was forced instead to react 
to events and changes in government policy, often without any warning. 
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When Labour produced new policy initiatives, they usually found that the 
Government had either pre-empted them, or considered it politically prudent 
to adopt some of their ideas already. 
Arguably, Gaitskell himself contributed to some of the problems the Party 
faced. His desire to lead from the front, the seriousness in which he took his 
role as Leader of the Opposition and his lack of experience, all contributed to 
this. Although he was very much in the 'traditionalist' mould regarding 
foreign affairs, Gaitskell's impatience and determination to harass the 
Government wherever possible was in marked contrast to his predecessor, 
Attlee, and was undoubtedly linked with his wish to establish his own 
authority within the Party. 
Nevertheless, this understandable desire to pursue a partisan approach led to 
unfortunate tactical errors of judgement in Gaitskell's first six months as 
leader: the 'Tanks Scandal' in January, the 'Dinner' for the Russians in April 
and the 'Commander Crabbe affair' in May are obvious examples. It was not 
just the Conservative Party and the right-wing press that made capital out of 
these incidents; and were to make even more out of the Suez, independent 
nuclear deterrent and EEC disputes. His opponents in the Labour Party, both 
ideological and personal, did too. Of more concern, even his friends and allies 
were aware of the problems that had been created, yet could do little about it. 
Unfortunately, it was the very structure of the Labour Party that allowed 
Gaitskell to make the errors, because it effectively gave the leadership, and in 
particular the leader himself, the opportunity to follow any course he chose. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Suez; Labour's Challenge 
Nasser's decision to nationalise the Suez Canal in July 1956 and the 
subsequent crisis is still widely regarded as representing a watershed in 
British post-war history. To many, it pinpoints the moment when Britain 
effectively ceased to be a world power of the first order and was relegated to 
the sidelines. Despite the passage of time, Suez still provokes heated debate. 
With the release of the official records since 1986 a mass of material has 
appeared examining the crisis and its implications.1 Although the volume of 
work is impressive, very little consideration is given to the political divisions 
it caused in Britain at the time, and especially the role of the British Labour 
Party in mobilising opposition to Eden's Suez policy.2 
Labour's stand over Suez appeared to mark the effective breakdown of the bi-
partisanship which had characterised British foreign policy since 1945. 
Labour justified this by claiming that the Government had gone to war 
without international agreement, in defiance of the United Nations, 
threatening the unity of the Commonwealth, straining the Atlantic Alliance 
and provoking fears of Soviet intervention. When the ceasefire was 
announced on 6 November Labour welcomed it as a moral victory, claiming 
that their opposition had played a leading role in halting hostilities and 
repairing Britain's reputation abroad.3 
As well as the moral indignation, Suez presented Labour with an early 
opportunity to attack the Government and even raised hopes of a return to 
power. Although Eden's popularity had begun to slide before the Crisis, his 
resignation and replacement by Macmillan in January 1957 was more a result 
of the Conservative instinct for self-preservation than the role of the 
Opposition. Whether Labour had any real effect on the Government's policy 
during the period is doubtful too, even though some Conservatives blamed 
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them for the failure. In Parliament, Labour had little chance of overturning 
the Government's majority without a Conservative revolt, an unlikely 
outcome, despite many reservations about Suez within the Tory hierarchy. 
In the country as a whole, opinion polls demonstrated support for 
government policy, especially after the troops had been committed, and even 
after the humiliating withdrawal. In the 1959 general election three years 
later, little was made of Suez, even though Gaitskell pledged that an enquiry 
would be held into the debacle.4 It appeared that the voters were far more 
concerned with domestic factors rather than with an adventure that had 
misfired and was best forgotten. 
Despite the failure of Labour's attempts to bring about the Government's fall 
over Suez, their actions provoked an angry response from Conservative 
supporters. Charges were levelled against Labour members, from questions 
over their patriotism to accusations of outright treason. Gaitskell in 
particular was singled out because of his condemnation of government 
policy, and accused of performing a political somersault for political gain.5 
These interpretations have not diminished with time and two partisan 
myths have been firmly established. The Conservative version is that 
Gaitskell and Labour were inconsistent in their response to Suez, at first 
supporting the Government, then changing their position to outright 
opposition due to left-wing pressure.6 The Labour version is that this 
argument cannot be sustained and that they had been consistent in 
denouncing any military intervention without the sanction of the UN.7 
To those sympathetic to Labour's cause, the Suez Crisis represented a period 
where the Labour Party's different factions forgot the internecine warfare of 
the preceding years and achieved a remarkable degree of unity.8 Evidence to 
substantiate this view was to be found in the reconciliation of Hugh Gaitskell 
and Aneurin Bevan. Yet this hypothesis is an over-simplification. Many on 
the Left felt that the leadership's actions, especially in the first weeks of the 
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Crisis, supported the Government. They believed that they were responsible 
for countering this and for persuading the leadership to challenge the Tories. 
Conversely, on the extreme Right of the Party, there were those who believed 
that the Government's actions were justified. Although small, this group 
included several prominent members and tended to have more influence 
than the Left, who were usually dismissed as rebels. To complicate matters 
further, both groups contained those who seized on Suez in order to discredit 
Gaitskell personally. 
Suez also forced the Labour Party into a dilemma over other issues. One of 
these was how to balance opposition to government policy while supporting 
legitimate British interests and avoiding charges of being unpatriotic. For a 
Party committed to internationalism and understandably anxious to 
maintain the moral highground, yet well aware of the partisan unpopularity 
such a stand could cause, this was an important consideration. In addition, 
there was a question mark over Labour's Middle East policy. Under Gaitskell, 
Labour had moved decisively in favour of Israel, despite objections from a 
vociferous pro-Arabist lobby. As Israel and the British Government became 
increasingly allied against Egypt, this placed Labour in an unenviable 
position for obvious reasons. This was compounded with the outbreak of 
hostilities in October 1956, when Israel invaded Sinai as a prelude to the 
Anglo-French intervention and the suspicion of collusion was raised. This 
situation not only appeared to threaten Labour's pro-Israeli sentiments but 
also placed Labour's 17 Jewish MPs in the uncomfortable position of 
condemning Israel's attack. 
Beginning with Labour's initial reaction to the Crisis, this chapter traces the 
development and extent of the Party's opposition to government policy. In 
particular, it examines the issues of bi-partisanship, Gaitskell's consistency 
and Labour Party unity. It will show that while Eden's Government ignored 
the international community, Labour adhered to the principles laid down by 
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Bevin and cannot be convincingly blamed for the breakdown in bi-
partisanship with which they are often charged. It also demonstrates that 
while Labour's internationalist credentials partly explain their reaction to the 
Crisis, Suez also provided an early opportunity to harass the Tories and unite 
the Party after years of internecine warfare. Nevertheless, the evidence 
shows that internal management and public opinion were low on the 
leader's agenda in this case, and the myth of Gaitskell's 'political somersault' 
advanced by political and personal enemies, can be dismissed. More than 
anything else, the mutual distrust that developed between the Labour and 
Conservative benches over Suez was to linger on over the next few years and 
prove that on foreign policy issues at least, close co-operation could no longer 
be taken for granted. 
1. The Crisis Breaks 
Gaitskell first heard of Nasser's nationalisation of the Canal while he 
attended a dinner at 10 Downing Street on 26 July. The following day, after 
discussing the situation with Griffiths and Robens, he raised the subject in 
the House of Commons. Deploring Nasser's actions, Gaitskell enquired 
whether the Government had referred the matter to the UN Security Council 
and suggested that if the Egyptian Government did not clarify the vague 
statements it had made over compensation, the Sterling balances to Egypt 
(£130m) should be blocked.9 
Gaitskell and Griffiths requested a meeting with Eden on 30th July, hoping to 
find out the Government's intentions. Satisfied that they were still assessing 
the situation before deciding on what action to take, the Labour leaders 
summoned a meeting of the Shadow Cabinet for the next day to discuss the 
Crisis and the line to be taken in the parliamentary debate scheduled for 2 
August. Aneurin Bevan attacked the preoccupation with narrow national 
interests and raised the idea that all essential international waterways, 
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including the Suez Canal, should be placed under international control. 
Gaitskell rejected this and warned that care should be taken over criticising 
government policy too severely in case Labour was charged with acting 
irresponsibly; a warning the rest of his colleagues agreed with.10 
Despite agreement in the Shadow Cabinet, several members of Labour's 
Foreign Affairs Group, concerned at Gaitskell's initial response on 27 July, 
requested an emergency meeting of the PLP to discuss the situation. 
Although this request was refused, Gaitskell and Robens met them to explain 
the leadership's line on 1 August. The records of this meeting show that the 
Foreign Affairs Committee, which included John Hynd, William Warbey 
and Tony Benn, were much more sympathetic to Nasser's actions. After 
Gaitskell had briefed them on the line that he intended to take in his speech, 
Hynd warned him that military action against Egypt was imminent and 
demanded that a tougher line should be taken against the Government. 
Gaitskell believed that this was out of the question without full consultation, 
ridiculed the Group's pro-Nasser inclinations and rejected their request; an 
ominous sign of things to come.11 
While Gaitskell had dismissed the committee's advice, Douglas Jay warned 
him that the military preparations currently under way went far beyond the 
scope of the precautionary force the Government had deemed necessary. As 
this gave Hynd's warning more credibility, Gaitskell agreed to conclude his 
speech, drafted by Kenneth Younger, with an appeal for caution over any 
military action by Britain.12 Gaitskell also met Eden alone (at the latter's 
request) on the morning of the debate. He again pressed the Prime Minister 
over his intentions, and although they agreed on some military preparations, 
Gaitskell was satisfied that force would not be used unless Nasser took 
further action against British interests.13 Despite the apparent satisfaction 
with Eden's assurances, the warning, now drafted into the speech, remained. 
67 
2. The 2 August Speech 
It is the Opposition's conduct in Parliament on 2 August 1956 that has 
fuelled the debate over the Labour Party's, and in particular Gaitskell's, 
consistency. Used by supporters and detractors alike, it is worth examining it 
and the different interpretations it has received in greater depth. 
Eden opened the Suez debate with a condemnation of Egypt's actions: that 
they had caused anger and alarm around the world, threatened the free 
navigation of the Canal and effectively torn up the international agreement 
that had guaranteed this. Attacking Nasser personally as a man who could 
not be trusted, he announced that Britain was taking precautionary military 
measures in the eastern Mediterranean in order to deal with any 
contingency .14 
Gaitskell's speech followed. He attacked the Tories' Middle East policy, 
criticised their ambivalence and mistakes in the region, although he pointed 
out that this did not excuse Egypt's actions. Gaitskell then condemned 
Nasser for his declared intention of destroying Israel and encouraging 
subversion in Jordan and neighbouring states. In his view, Nasser had seized 
the Canal for propaganda purposes and to raise Egypt's prestige, an act worthy 
of Mussolini and Hitler before the war. However, Gaitskell ended on a note 
of caution. In a reference to some press reports which indicated that force 
would be justified under the circumstances, he warned that while certain 
military preparations might be necessary, 
' .. . we must not allow ourselves to get into a position where we 
might be denounced in the Security Council as aggressors, or 
where the majority of the assembly were against us .. .lt is important 
that what we do should be done in the fullest possible co-operation 
with the other nations affected. While force cannot be excluded, 
we must be sure that the circumstances justify it and that it is, if 
used, consistent with our belief in and our pledges to, the Charter 
of the U.N. and not in conflict with them.'ts 
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As Gaitskell finished, Charles Waterhouse (leader of the Tory Suez Group) 
commended the Labour Leader for having made a courageous speech, and 
one that showed that the Opposition were firmly behind the Government on 
this issue. The Liberal leader, Clement Davies, also remarked that he agreed 
with just about everything Gaitskell had said.16 Labour reaction to their 
leader's speech was mixed. Although Denis Healey expressed alarm at the 
bellicose way the press had reacted to the Crisis and had stressed the 
importance of a peaceful international solution under the auspices of the 
UN, other Labour speakers took a harder and more nationalistic line. 
Reginald Paget, Stanley Evans, Frank Tomney, Jack Jones and Herbert 
Morrison all attacked Egypt's past actions, the seizure of the Canal, and the 
failure of the UN to act decisively. Morrison went as far as to pledge the use 
of force if circumstances warranted it. He concluded that the Government 
should not be afraid to 'stand up' to acts of this sort, as failure to do so could 
have dire results for world peace. These speeches received an enthusiastic 
response from the Tories and drew praise from the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn 
Lloyd, who claimed that the debate had demonstrated a large measure of 
approval and agreement in the House.17 
The first outright denunciation of this line came from the left-wing Labour 
MP, William Warbey. Warbey's scathing speech made it clear that while he 
did not condone Nasser's methods, he believed that Britain and America had 
provoked Egypt into nationalising the Canal. On the British side, he blamed 
the antics and pressure of the Tory Suez Group for forcing the Government 
into a more militant stand than might otherwise have been taken. Like 
Healey, Warbey concluded that the only chance of settling the dispute was 
through an effective UN settlement.18 
To many commentators, the 2 August debate demonstrated a clear 
parliamentary consensus in condemning Egypt's action. The press reports 
the next day, with the exception of the Manchester Guardian and the 
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Observer. believed that the Government could rely on the full support of 
Gaitskell and Labour: the Times reported that on the Suez issue ' ... there has 
seldom been a higher level of agreement.'19 The Conservative leaders and 
most MPs, especially those in the Suez Group, certainly appeared to think 
this. Some later observers also take the view that Government and 
Opposition were united at this stage.20 Eden's official biographer, Robert 
Rhodes James, points out that Gaitskell's words were largely responsible for 
this, adding that his condemnation of Nasser's actions and the comparison 
with the pre-war dictators were not only passionate but bellicose.21 
The notion that Labour's initial line resembled that of the Government was 
not restricted to Tory supporters either. Contemporary reaction in some 
sections of the Labour Party was extremely hostile. They believed that the 
Leadership, particularly Gaitskell, had fully supported the Government's 
condemnation of the nationalisation. Tony Benn recorded that Gaitskell's 
speech had been disastrous and had given the impression that Labour was 
only concerned with the affront to national prestige and influence.22 The 
reaction of the Labour Left was epitomised by Tribune's severe criticism of 
Gaitskell, which denounced his speech and commented that he ' ... outdid the 
(Tory) Times in supporting ways of putting pressure on Egypt.' Instead, it 
suggested that, 
'Labour's duty is clear. It must oppose the hysterical campaign 
against Nasser and his nation, to which at present some Labour 
politicians and the Paily Herald are making a disgraceful con-
tribution ... Gaitskell's reactions to the Crisis resemble those of 
the most orthodox Tory .'23 
William Warbey pursued this line a few days later and argued that Gaitskell's 
speech put too much emphasis on national unity and had ' ... given the 
impression that the British people stand united with the Government, to 
bring Nasser to his knees.'24 
From a purely partisan position, it is not surprising that the Tories would 
quote the sections of the Labour speeches they agreed with and gloss over, or 
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ignore completely, the parts they did not. Eden, who had followed the 
principles laid down by Bevin and of bi-partisanship in foreign policy since 
1945, would be expected to suppose that this arrangement would be 
reciprocal. The Suez Group, who had opposed any withdrawal from Egypt 
and the Canal base in principle in the first place (and had been a persistent 
thorn in the Government's side over any concessions) were even more likely 
to seize on any opportunity that appeared to reverse the conciliatory policies 
towards Egypt between 1954-56. The apparent agreement uniting 
Government and Opposition against Nasser, fuelling calls for action against 
Egypt, presented just such an opportunity as far as they were concerned.25 
While the later Conservative myth over Labour's treachery was built from 
this, the Left's initial disquiet was quietly forgotten. 
Yet the concept of Parliamentary unity is problematic. As Keith Kyle has 
written, 'Up to this point - and his speech was nearly over- Gaitskell might 
as well have concerted his presentation beforehand with the Prime Minister, 
so closely did the public positions coincide .. . But then came a passage at the 
end .. .'26 The point is, Gaitskell's speech had concluded with a warning that 
force should not be contemplated without the sanction of the UN. As the 
Manchester Guardian reported on the day after the speech, this was quite 
clear, even though the Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, had chosen to ignore 
it. Even the Times, despite its vision of 'Parliamentary agreement' in the 
same issue, reported that Gaitskell had given 'a solemn warning against the 
use of force and of the charge of Britain being denounced as an aggressor'.27 
Labour critics of Gaitskell's speech, such as Johnson and Benn, had also noted 
this, though both felt that it had had the appearance of an afterthought.28 
Gaitskell's biographer concedes that Gaitskell should have realised that the 
first part of the speech would attract far more attention than the latter part 
expressing his reservations over the use of force. He views this simply as a 
lapse in Gaitskell's communication skills, an occasional unfortunate 
professional weakness.29 Not surprisingly, Eden's biographer dismisses this 
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excuse and takes the view that Gaitskell's speech had misled not only Eden, 
but parliament, the press and public alike.30 
As Leader of the Opposition, whose speech had directly followed that of 
Eden's, Gaitskell's statement was bound to attract attention from all sides. 
This was inevitable because of the coverage given to it in the press the 
following day. As the warning concerning the use of force was not until the 
last four paragraphs (out of 34) it is also clear that the focus would remain on 
the first part, especially as this had contained the memorable comparisons 
with Mussolini and Hitler's fascist methods. Frank Allaun, a Labour MP, 
admitted that although he had been present throughout the debate, he had 
not even noticed the warning at the end.31 Johnson and Benn's assertion, 
that the last part resembled an afterthought has some justification. On the 
other hand, Gaitskell's defenders would point to the fact that he could not be 
seen to be acting against the Government in a purely partisan manner. In 
addition, as he could not contemplate them actually using force unilaterally, 
he would not have thought the warning necessary anyway. 
While Gaitskell's speech is at the centre of the controversy, the contributions 
made by other Labour speakers in the debate, with the exception of Warbey, 
were far more likely to have given an impression of support for the 
Government. As Kyle points out, even Denis Healey, one of Eden's 
shrewdest critics who had taken the Premier to task during the debate over 
his Suez policy, had endorsed the military preparations announced by 
Eden.32 Paul Johnson, while maintaining the view that Gaitskell was the 
main culprit, grudgingly conceded that Morrison's support had exaggerated 
the impression.33 Morrison's emotional response in the debate, with his 
experience over the Mossadeq affair still fresh, can partially be understood. 
However, his close support for the Government, his advocacy of unilateral 
action by Britain if necessary, and his mutual regard for Eden (as highlighted 
by his biographers) would not have helped differentiate Labour's policies 
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from those of the Tories.34 Apart from Morrison, the speeches of Paget, 
Evans, Tomney and Jones were even more strident, both in their 
condemnation of Nasser's actions and their calls for retaliation. 
Although Gaitskell has to accept some responsibility for the confusion, close 
examination of the 2 August debate reveals that later Labour speakers must 
bear a higher proportion of the blame. Whatever the arguments for or 
against his speech being misinterpreted, the warning was explicit. If it had 
the appearance of an afterthought, as some thought, this was not surprising 
considering the circumstances under which it had been written. Without 
full domestic and international support, Gaitskell was not alone in 
dismissing any notion of British unilateral armed force against Egypt, despite 
the rumours circulating. In addition, the Labour Party was well aware of the 
danger of being branded as unpatriotic, so it was not unusual for the Labour 
Leader to refrain from launching a full scale partisan attack on the 
Government. This is even more understandable when they had not had the 
information or time required to fully assess the situation at that stage; to do 
so would have been foolhardy and counter-productive.35 If Gaitskell's 
speech had given the Government's supporters, hearing what they wanted to 
hear and discounting or ignoring the rest, the notion that they had Labour's 
full and unconditional support, the events of the next few days should have 
caused them to reconsider. That it did not, was mainly due to the 
parliamentary recess from 3 August. The result of this was that they knew 
nothing of Gaitskell's, and some of his close colleagues', attempts to clarify 
their position with Eden. 
3. The Leadership's Response 
On the evening of the speech Douglas Jay, acting on information from W. N. 
Ewer, contacted Gaitskell to warn him that the Foreign Office had told 
journalists that Egypt would face invasion if they rejected Anglo-French 
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demands.36 According to his diary account, Gaitskell did not take this threat 
very seriously at first, due to his previous meetings with Eden and because he 
felt that the course of the earlier parliamentary debate had not revealed any 
military strategy.37 However, the following day (3 August) almost all the 
newspapers carried apparently authoritative statements of the Government's 
intentions to use force against Egypt.38 
Because of the press statements and Jay's concern, Gaitskell wrote to the 
Prime Minister just before he left for a holiday in Wales with his family. The 
Labour leader reminded Eden that both he and Griffiths had queried the use 
of force before the debate, and expressed their doubts over whether they could 
support it; as far as they were concerned Nasser had as yet done nothing that 
would justify force.39 Simultaneously, Douglas Jay had decided that the 
Government should be publicly warned against the use of force, and he and 
Denis Healey wrote to the Times on 5 August, warning of the 'stupendous 
folly' of any such action.40 James Griffiths and Morgan Phillips, concerned 
about the Government's hostile intentions as well as the danger of 
Gaitskell's words being misinterpreted, had the leader's speech reprinted in 
full and sent to Labour MPs, prospective candidates, CLPs and affiliated 
groups.41 Gaitskell, still on holiday, received a reply from Eden on 7 August, 
which he felt made it clear that the Prime Minister as well as the Tory press, 
were taking Labour support for granted. He responded by writing to his 
secretary in London, asking her to show Eden's letter to Jim Griffiths, and 
urging his deputy to see the Prime Minister as soon as possible in order to 
clear up the misunderstandings that had arisen.42 
The concern shown by Gaitskell, Griffiths, Jay, Healey and Phillips appeared 
justified after the Prime Minister's BBC broadcast on 8 August. In this, Eden 
furiously denounced Nasser and compared him with the pre-war dictators. 
After he had continued with an analogy of Chamberlain's appeasement 
policies and their failure, Eden warned that this must never be allowed to 
74 
happen again.43 The Manchester Guardian's reaction was suspicious, 
recording that there had been no mention of any attempt to negotiate 
through the UN and that nothing had been done to remove the impression 
of impending military action.44 More recent views are divided. Eden's 
biographer regards the Prime Minister's speech as a measured statement, and 
that it is beyond comprehension that some Labour MPs saw the broadcast as a 
prelude to invasion. But as Keith Kyle points out, Eden had now publicly 
drawn up the battle lines, and even some Conservative members were 
dismayed by the tone of his speech.45 
There is no doubt that Labour leaders were anxious over this development. 
Griffiths certainly believed that military preparations were on an extensive 
scale and contacted Gaitskell in Wales to confirm that he and Robens would 
see Eden. 46 Gaitskell also wrote to Eden again, emphasising that force should 
not be used under the present circumstances, that he fully endorsed the letter 
from Jay and Healey that had appeared in the Times on 7 August and that 
Griffiths would be seeing him shortly.47 Griffiths and Robens did in fact 
meet Eden on 10 August. As well as expressing concern over the military 
preparations and the possible consequences, they also enquired whether there 
had been any agreement between Britain, France and America over the 
Crisis. Eden's reply was distinctly evasive. On the preparations, he told them 
that he was relying on contingency plans drawn up by his military advisers. 
As to the use of force, he would not go beyond what he had said in 
Parliament on 2 August: that although he would not rule it out altogether, 
he would not use it unless provoked by Egyptian aggression. Equivocal over 
discussions between Britain, France and America, he asked the Labour 
leaders to issue a press release stating that they had seen him.48 
According to Jay and Griffiths, Gaitskell was so concerned over the reaction 
and misrepresentation of his speech that he interrupted his holiday and 
returned to London on 12 August. At a special Shadow Cabinet meeting the 
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next day, Griffiths and Robens gave a full report of their meeting with Eden. 
They also urged Gaitskell to have the 2 August speech endorsed and after an 
hours discussion this was agreed unanimously, along with a decision to issue 
a press statement.49 As well as the endorsement, this statement was the 
Shadow Cabinet's first official reaction. It included a call for the International 
Conference (assembling in London and due to convene on 16 August) to 
prepare a plan with the UN for: the efficient operation and development of 
the Canal; a fair financial return to Egypt; no interference with the right of 
free passage; and no discrimination against those using it. It also suggested 
that Parliament should be recalled immediately after the conclusion of the 
London Conference, and that the Government should emphasise that the 
military preparations were solely precautionary. It finished with the warning 
that, ' .. . armed force ... could not be justified except in accordance with ... the 
Charter of the UNO' [and that] ' ... Nasser had not done anything so far which 
justified the use of armed force.'so 
At a meeting with the Premier and the Foreign Secretary the next day (14 
August) Gaitskell, Griffiths and Robens presented the statement and called 
for the recall of Parliament. Gaitskelllater wrote that although Eden and 
Lloyd were ambiguous over the use of force, he felt that this meeting had left 
the Tories in little doubt over Labour's policy.51 In an interview on ITV 
television later that same day, Gaitskell was quizzed over whether his 2 
August speech had given an image of complete agreement with the 
Government. He replied that the agreement had been over the 
condemnation of Nasser's method of seizure and not over the use of force.52 
4. A Left-wing Rebellion? 
By mid-August, Gaitskell and his Shadow Cabinet colleagues had some 
justification for believing that Labour's Suez policy was clear. The private 
correspondence, the meetings between Labour Party and Government 
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representatives, Healey and Jay's letter to the Times. the endorsement of the 
speech and press statement, along with Gaitskell's television interview, all 
support this. However, because of the summer recess which began on 3 
August, many Labour MPs (and Conservatives) were not aware of the actions 
behind the scenes and appeared to take little notice of the public 
announcements.53 Instead, they were left with the recollections of the 2 
August debate and Gaitskell's speech, which many on the Left believed 
disastrous. 
Although Gaitskell's speech had attracted most of the attention, he was not 
alone in earning left-wing wrath. Aneurin Bevan, their champion for many 
years, had written an article for Tribune on 3 August (in the same issue that 
contained the scathing reaction to Gaitskell's speech) which was also highly 
critical of Nasser's actions, and condemned the nationalisation as a classic 
propaganda exercise.54 To some of his most loyal supporters, Bevan's 
vigorous condemnation of Nasser caused alarm.55 Combined with 
Gaitskell's speech and the press reports of 3 August, some left-wing MPs and 
activists called a meeting in order to change the leadership's perceived 
support, into an attack on the Government. 56 A few days later 24 Labour MPs 
including Mikardo, Warbey, Castle, Brockway, Lee and Orbach sent a letter to 
the NEC and the press which denounced the Government's reaction against 
Egypt. The letter also carried an announcement that a meeting would be held 
in London on 14 August to fight the Tories' Suez policy.57 
The Daily Telegraph called this a major challenge from the Left.58 In fact, the 
letter differed little from the leadership's preferences, although its signatories 
were not aware of this at the time. They also condemned the 'high-handed 
behaviour and language of Colonel Nasser' and the threat to the free passage 
of the Canal. There was no criticism of Gaitskell, and the letter stressed that 
the intention was not to 'formulate Party policy', but to raise the issue with 
the Government at the earliest opportunity because Parliament was in recess 
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and the NEC was not due to meet until after the London Conference.59 
Although Gaitskell expressed little concern, some of his senior colleagues 
initially appeared alarmed at the prospect of a revolt.60 However, the press 
statement of 13 August and its emphasis on the warning, as well as a clear 
summary of Labour's policy, appeared to dispel any perceived threat. Bevan, 
writing in Tribune on 17 August, stated that it was clear that the Labour Party 
had left Eden in no doubt that it would not support the Government if their 
policy was to use force. In the same issue, the editorial commented that the 
'sound and sensible' statements of the Shadow Cabinet on 13 August had 
responded to the mood of the rank and file. Only a fortnight after its 
condemnation of the Labour leadership, Tribune even allowed itself some 
cautious praise for Gaitskell.61 
For approximately two weeks a small group of left-wing MPs, activists and 
Tribune had attacked Gaitskell and the Shadow Cabinet over their handling 
of the Crisis. This had been greatly exaggerated by the Tory press, especially 
the Telegraph. with the obvious intention of splitting Labour. As the 
leadership's condemnation of Government policy became public and more 
frequent, this situation began to alter. Meetings organised by the Left went 
ahead as planned, but the harsh criticism faded. Of course, there were still 
some exceptions: Barbara Castle remained highly sceptical and continued to 
blame the 2 August speech for letting the Movement down.62 While 
Tribune's contribution to the attack had died down on the whole, an article 
by A. J. P. Taylor severely criticised the Labour leadership for giving Eden the 
wrong impression and he urged the radicals to 'Kick the Labour Leaders back 
into line'.63 However, the facts suggest that Taylor had missed the boat. By 
mid-August the concerns of the Left had largely been reassured and their 
support had begun to swing towards the leadership. By the beginning of 
September, any dissent from that quarter was all but over as Labour moved 
firmly towards opposition: as one prominent Labour activist, eager for 
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confrontation with the Tories remarked, ' ... Suez buries bi-partisanship in 
British foreign policy'. 64 
5. The London Conference and a New Threat? 
While the Left's criticism died away, Gaitskell was preoccupied with other 
developments. On 16 August an international conference convened to 
discuss the Suez situation.65 As the Foreign Ministers and their advisors 
arrived in London, Gaitskell met the French, Australian and Norwegian 
representatives. To each, he emphasised Labour's position: that force could 
not be used without UN approval. In his meeting with Pinneau (the French 
Foreign Minister), Gaitskell was informed that although the French did not 
actually want war, they wanted Nasser to think that they would attack if he 
did not back down. Gaitskell's diary shows that he was sure that this was 
Eden's policy too, not just for the benefit of Nasser but also to appease his 
right-wing Tory critics.66 
Towards the end of August, the London Conference (out of 22, 18 supported 
the British) concluded that an international board representing the maritime 
powers and Egypt should jointly manage the Canal and replace the 
nationalised company. On the last day of the Conference (23 August) it was 
decided that Robert Menzies, the Australian Premier, should lead a 
delegation to Egypt in early September to see if Nasser would negotiate along 
these lines. 67 
On 24 August Gaitskell met John Foster Dulles, presented Labour's policy and 
told the American that this view was supported by at least half the nation. 
The Labour leader proposed that the West should boycott the Canal if Nasser 
refused to negotiate on the London proposals and suggested that alternative 
pipelines, transport and increased American supplies of oil to western 
Europe could counter the problem.68 In Reynolds News two days later, 
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Gaitskell claimed that the London Talks had persuaded the British and 
French Government's that they would receive little support from the 
international community if they resorted to force. Although he conceded 
that they had never publicly declared that this was their intention, the press 
releases from the Foreign office and other departments had implied this was 
the case.69 However, Gaitskell's apparent optimism over the Conference's 
success was short-lived. The following week there were further reports that 
the Government intended to impose a solution by force.70 In response, 
Gaitskell visited R. A. Butler, the Lord Privy Seal, to press for the recall of 
Parliament. This request was refused on the grounds that until the outcome 
of the Menzies mission was known, the Government would not be able to 
come to any conclusions.71 
While the leadership was concerned over the Government's intentions, they 
could at least have taken comfort from intra-party unity, now the fears of the 
Left had been allayed; this, despite the efforts of the Tory press to the contrary 
and the start of a campaign to discredit Labour as unpatriotic.72 However, 
another internal political threat was developing, not from the Left, but from 
the extreme Right of the PLP, and also briefly from the TUC. One of the most 
prominent Labour MPs who had backed the Government in the August 
debate was Herbert Morrison. It appeared that Morrison's memories of Iran, 
resentment of Gaitskell's promotion to the leadership over his head and 
confidence in Eden's judgement, resulted in a less than cautious view of the 
Government's handling of the Crisis.73 According to Eden's biographer, 
Morrison met Eden on a regular basis during the Crisis and offered whatever 
help he could. In mid-August, Morrison had urged Eden to keep in close 
contact with Gaitskell, obviously believing that a bi-partisan approach was 
possible. In September, he told the Prime Minister that he should not retreat 
from the tough stand he had taken.74 
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Gaitskell himself recorded that Morrison was following a pro-government 
line after the latter had informed him of his meetings with Eden in August. 
He observed that under the circumstances this was rather odd, especially 
when Morrison revealed that Eden had sent for him. Gaitskell concluded 
that Eden had some vague notion of obtaining Labour support through 
Morrison and was using him. Although he felt that this was a 
miscalculation on Eden's part considering Labour's stand, he was aware of 
the problems it could lead to.75 Gaitskell's concern was justified to some 
extent. Morrison's meetings with Eden, though not in an official capacity, 
could easily have led to more rumours of a split in the Party. The very fact 
that an important Labour figure was supporting the Government against his 
own Party's policy presented obvious dangers. This could have been far 
more dangerous than any left-wing split, as Morrison's reputation might 
have attracted more support in the Party and country. However, any 
potential conflict was averted when Morrison left Britain in September for a 
lecture tour in the United States. Because of this he was abroad during the 
Suez invasion, much to Eden's dismay.76 
Morrison was not alone in the Labour Movement at this stage i n pressing 
for tough action against Nasser. Before the TUC's annual conference at the 
beginning of September, Eden had sought the support of its President, 
Charles Geddes. Prompted by many union members, Geddes began to 
mobilise the General Council's International Committee behind the 
Government. Like many other traditional Labour voters, the trades unions 
contained a large number of people who supported government policy. This 
can partly be explained in purely patriotic terms and partly out of the anti-
Egyptian prejudice of many of those who had served in the area during and 
after the war. However, Alan Birch (General Secretary of USDAW) and other 
members of the General Council persuaded Geddes to alter course. They 
argued that Suez provided an opportunity to bring down the Conservative 
administration, an opportunity which no loyal representative of the Labour 
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Movement should resist.77 By 6 September, the TUC announced that it fully 
supported Labour Party policy. When Geddes closed the Suez debate, he 
criticised the Government's handling of the Crisis and warned that military 
action would split the nation.78 With Morrison's departure and the TUC's 
change of heart, Labour solidarity appeared assured, at least until the 
outbreak of hostilities at the end of October. 
6. The End of Bi-partisanship? 
As the TUC Conference ended, the Menzies Mission - to persuade Nasser to 
place the Canal under international control - ran into difficulties. On 9 
September, after President Eisenhower had publicly denounced the military 
option, Egypt broke off the negotiations confident that without American 
support the use of force could not be considered. Eden's policy up to this 
point had been relatively straightforward, based on three premises: first, there 
was the London Conference; if that failed there was to be an appeal to the UN 
Security Council; in the last resort, and having been seen to exhaust all 
reasonable diplomatic accommodation, the military expedition was to set sail. 
When the Menzies' Mission failed, Eden told the Americans that Britain and 
France intended to use the Security Council to force an agreement on Egypt. 
However Dulles, aware of the dangerous split this could cause between 
America's allies and Third World opinion, wanted to prevent this. Stalling 
for time, he suggested a new scheme for controlling the Canal, the 'Suez 
Canal Users Association' (SCUA). This envisaged a consortium who would 
sail their ships through the Canal, using their own pilots and paying dues to 
a central office, not Nasser. If Egypt tried to stop the ships, this would break 
the 1888 Convention and thereby justify tougher measures. Eden reluctantly 
persuaded his British and French allies to accept the plan, hoping that Nasser 
would obstruct it and thus force America to act against Egypt.79 
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Of course, Gaitskell and the Labour Party knew nothing of these events or of 
SCUA. Labour's demand for the recall of Parliament had been agreed and a 
debate set for 12 and 13 September. In a special Shadow Cabinet meeting the 
day before, the Committee discussed Suez and decided that their actions 
would depend on the Government's statement. In a full PLP meeting on the 
morning of the debate, Gaitskell recalled the events of the previous six 
weeks. This was the first full meeting of the PLP since the 2 August debate, 
and therefore the Committee's first chance to outline the private 
correspondence and meetings between Labour and Government 
representatives. Gaitskell concluded that a compromise was possible after the 
London Conference and that negotiations must be pursued.so 
Eden presented the SCUA Plan to Parliament on 12 September. He began 
with the claim that this would allow a substantial volume of traffic to pass 
through the Canal. After this, he issued a thinly veiled threat that if there 
was any obstruction, the warships escorting the convoys would be allowed to 
force their way through. Having known nothing of the plan, Gaitskell 
protested. He claimed that the Government had divided the nation with 
these threats, which had grave implications. Because of this, he warned that 
the usual restraint shown regarding international affairs could not be 
maintained and, ' ... on such occasions it is the duty .. . of the Opposition to 
speak out loudly and clearly. That is what. .. we feel we must do today.' 
Gaitskell criticised the Government's actions on 2 and 3 August: that the 
Foreign Office leaks over the use of force had been scandalous and led to the 
misleading press reports of Opposition support, when they had actually 
known nothing about it. Gaitskell concluded his attack with a demand for 
the Government to give a pledge not to use force and to settle the dispute at 
the UN. Eden was unwilling to give such a pledge and the debate ended with 
constant interruptions and heated exchanges.81 
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The following day, Labour continued the attack. Alf Robens argued that 
Nasser's refusal to accept Menzies' proposals was understandable because 
they were couched in such humiliating terms, and that Eden's threats were 
provocative. Then, to Labour's obvious delight, came a remarkable 
intervention by Sir Lionel Heald (a former Tory Attorney General). He stated 
that it was inconceivable for the British Government to use force in support 
of the London Plan without reference to the UN, and that a pledge should be 
given to this effect. Gaitskell, encouraged by the appearance of a Tory split, 
demanded that such a pledge be given. He was still speaking when he was 
told of Dulles' press conference statement, that American ships sailing in 
convoy under the envisaged SCUA Plan would not dream of 'shooting their 
way through the Canal', and that if they encountered any difficulties they 
would be advised to sail round the Cape. This was a serious setback for Eden, 
because he had relied on American support. In the last five minutes of the 
debate and amid continuous barracking, Eden appeared to change tadc, 
replying that if Egypt did not give in ' ... [HMG] should take them to the 
Security Council-[Interruption].'82 Although the sentence had been drowned 
out by the uproar and he continued afterwards, the Prime Minister had 
appeared to accept Labour's demand: that Britain would go to the UN rather 
than force passage through the Canal. 
Some Labour members regarded the debate as a victory, which left Eden 
without the option of a military solution; this, despite the Government's 
comfortable majorities of 70 and 71 in the divisions afterwards.83 Gaitskell 
also seemed relieved: despite some misgivings he recorded, 'I may be 
optimistic, but my feeling is that we are probably over the hump now. 
Certainly the immediate danger provoked by trying to break through the 
Canal seems to have been averted'.84 
As later events proved, this optimism was short-lived. However, Eden's 
problems with Dulles and his obvious reluctance to take the dispute to the 
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United Nations enabled Labour to claim that it was in favour of international 
law, while Eden was not. Of course, as Epstein's study clarifies, in reality 
there was little chance of persuading the UN, in the face of a Soviet veto and 
Afro-Asian opposition, to approve the use of force against Egypt, so to some 
extent Labour's stand amounted to 'the advocacy of inaction'.85 
Nevertheless, it allowed Labour to claim the moral highground and, victory 
or not, the September debate left little doubt over Labour's Suez policy.86 
The reaction of the Tory press was hostile, and new reports of splits within 
Labour ranks were mounted to confuse and disrupt the Party.87 If the reports 
had been accurate, then the Labour conference held in Blackpool between 1-5 
October could be expected to confirm Tory expectations. This was Gaitskell's 
first conference as leader, and as Suez had aroused passionate emotions 
within different factions of the Party earlier, this was the most likely place for 
any breach to occur. 
The first day opened with an Emergency Resolution on Suez (Composite No. 
38): this condemned the Government, complimented Party policy and 
reaffirmed Labour's commitment to the UN Charter. Philip Williams has 
written that all the signs pointed to the Labour leader suffering a difficult 
time, the opening speeches so pro-Nasser that it appeared as though Gaitskell 
would be overwhelmed; that despite these difficulties, he had turned the 
situation to his advantage and won a considerable victory.88 The Conference 
documents do not sustain this interpretation. The first four speeches all 
supported the motion and none were openly pro-Nasser, while the fifth, 
from a member of the Jewish Socialist Labour Party was understandably anti-
Nasser. John Hynd was the first to mildly criticise Labour's stand, because he 
wanted stronger condemnation of the Government. Although a Manchester 
delegate supported Nasser, the majority of speakers closely followed the 
leader's line. Gaitskell seemed surprised at the reception, beginning his 
speech, 'I find myself as Chairman of the PLP, in the rather unusual position 
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of supporting a motion which compliments the PLP'. After he had outlined 
the reasons behind the attack on government policy, he urged the delegates 
to support the motion, and stated that Labour should be 100 per cent united 
on this issue.89 
The diaries and recollections of some contemporaries, admirers and critics 
alike, demonstrated satisfaction with the outcome and Gaitskell's 
performance. Douglas Jay and Denis Healey were both pleased with the way 
things had gone, perhaps more out of relief that a split had not materialised 
than anything else. More significant, was the praise Gaitskell received from 
his former critics. Crossman recorded that while conference had been a real 
test for a new, untried and suspect leader, Gaitskell's performance had been 
remarkable. Tony Benn, highly critical just a few weeks before, also thought 
that the outcome had been excellent and that the Party's Leader deserved 
applause.90 
With Labour united and growing public apprehension to Eden's policy, it is 
not surprising that Tory reaction was so hostile. At the Conservatives' 
annual conference (Llandudno 11-14 October) Labour, and particularly 
Gaitskell, became the focus for ConServative retaliation. Peter Walker 
accused Labour of having divided the nation and that their stance, ' ... must 
surely rank as the most treacherous action of any political Party in the history 
of our country'. Playing the patriotic card, Walker turned on, ' .. . that group of 
frustrated journalists and barristers who are always eager to applaud the 
actions of foreign nations and to decry the actions of their own countrymen'. 
Anthony Nutting pursued the theme of Labour's political somersault 
between 2 August and 12 September. He then blamed Gaitskell for 'breaking 
the bi-partisanship that had characterised British foreign policy since Ernest 
Bevin's day' .91 
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7. The Outbreak of Hostilities: Labour's Fury 
At this time, unknown to Gaitskell, the Opposition, or even half the Cabinet, 
the British and French were about to enter the final stage of the episode. 
Between 16-24 October, the British, French and Israeli Governments took the 
fateful decision at Sevres for Israel to attack Egypt in Sinai, thus presenting 
the Anglo-French alliance with the excuse to separate the combatants by 
reoccupying and taking control of the Canal Zone. On 29 October Israeli 
troops invaded Sinai on the pretext of destroying commando bases used by 
the Egyptians for cross-border raids into Israel. The following day the Anglo-
French ultimatum, for the Israeli and Egyptian forces to withdraw, was 
issued; while this was accepted by Israel, it was rejected by Egypt.92 
Up to 30 October 1956, no one on the Labour benches had any clear indication 
that an attack was imminent. The previous day, Alf Robens had met Eden 
and Uoyd to voice Labour concern over Israel's invasion. At a Shadow 
Cabinet meeting at noon on 30th October, Robens told his colleagues that his 
talks with Tory leaders had not revealed their intentions.93 Gaitskell and 
Griffiths decided to see Eden themselves and approached Butler to arrange a 
meeting later that afternoon. Butler informed them that as talks with the 
French were in progress, their request for a private notice question could be 
put at 3.30pm, the Prime Minister would see them at 4.00pm and make a 
statement in the House half an hour later. Eden and Lloyd met the Labour 
leaders at 4.15pm and gave them a copy of the ultimatum. Griffiths reaction 
was one of astonishment, saying "Good God, this is war!"94 
After Eden had read out the declaration in the House, a full meeting of the 
PLP was called. Gaitskell, Griffiths and Robens recommended that the 
Government should give an undertaking that no British forces would be sent 
into Egypt until Parliament had considered the matter and the UN Security 
Council (meeting at that moment) had made its decision. If they refused, 
Labour would have no alternative but to divide the House.95 In the debate 
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that followed, Eden's refusal to grant Labour requests to wait for the UN 
decision, despite constant pleas to do so, were followed by scathing attacks 
from Gaitskell, Alf Robens, Denis Healey and other Labour MPs. This 
provoked an angry response from Lloyd, who ridiculed Labour's complaints 
of not being informed, ' .. . really, the idea that the government of the day can 
take action only after prior agreement with the Opposition'.96 
Meanwhile at the Security Council, an American resolution which called for 
an Israeli withdrawal was vetoed by the British and French. This was the first 
time that Britain, one of the founders and leading proponents of that 
organisation, had exercised her veto. The following day (31 October) the 
British and French air forces began their bombardment of Egyptian airfields. 
Although the Shadow Cabinet and the PLP had no idea of the decision or 
timing of these attacks, the belief that an invasion was imminent made the 
meetings held that morning particularly tense. The outcome was that the 
Labour Party should, ' ... utterly oppose the war which has been forced on this 
country by the Government...that it was now necessary to carry this campaign 
to the country ... and arrangements for demonstrations would take place.'97 
At 4.00pm that afternoon Gaitskell told the Prime Minister that in Labour's 
view, the Government were committing an act of 'disastrous folly', the tragic 
consequences of which would last for years, causing irreparable damage to 
Britain's prestige and reputation. This, he claimed, abandoned the three 
principles that dominated British foreign policy: Commonwealth solidarity; 
the Anglo-American alliance and adherence to the UN Charter. It was also 
particularly ill-timed, considering the situation in Hungary and eastern 
Europe. He concluded that Labour could not support the action that had been 
taken, that they felt bound to oppose it by every means possible and appealed 
for Tory dissidents to fight it too. As the debate continued, Labour MPs were 
not impressed with Eden's statement that Britain was going in to ensure the 
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'separation of the combatants' or Lloyd's claim that there was no prior 
agreement between Britain, France and Israel.98 
If the atmosphere in the House of Commons was tense on 31 October, then it 
descended into chaos on 1 November. The new Minister of Defence, Antony 
Head, (Monckton's replacement) attempted to make a statement about the 
military situation in Egypt. When he announced the bombing raids on 
Egyptian airfields and the sinking of a frigate by the Royal Navy, he was 
constantly shouted down. Gaitskell, Silverman and Shinwell all demanded 
to know why the British Government were acting in defiance of the UN, why 
there had been no declaration of war and whether there was any intention to 
use land forces next? Eden's reply, which evaded the issues of Britain's war 
status or if the Geneva Convention applied, infuriated Labour MPs. After the 
Prime Minister defended the attack on Egypt and condemned Labour's lack of 
support for British troops going into action, the furore forced the Speaker of 
the House to suspend the sitting for half an hour; the first time that this had 
occurred since 1924. After it reconvened, Gaitskell's attempts to clarify the 
situation were ignored by Eden and Head. As the Government were 
unwilling to respond, James Griffiths moved Labour's official motion, which 
condemned, 
' ... the actions of HMG in resorting to armed force against Egypt 
in clear violation of the UNO, there-by affronting ... a large 
section of the British people, dividing the Commonwealth and 
gravely damaging the foundations of international order.'99 
The following day, after Eden claimed that many other nations supported 
Britain, (in fact the UN General Assembly voted 64 to 5 against Britain) Denis 
Healey, in effect called him a "liar". On 3 November, Gaitskelllaunched 
another passionate attack on the Government and again appealed for anti-
Suez Tories to vote against Eden's policy.10° 
Throughout the debates between 31 October and 6 November, Parliament 
was subjected to scenes of unprecedented anger.101 Tony Benn recorded that 
89 
he had never seen the House in such uproar, or the members so angry as on 
1 November 1956. Four days later, hearing from a colleague that Gaitskell 
had almost come to blows with the Conservative MP, Sir Robert Gray, Benn 
believed that fighting between MPs was inevitable. Benn's fears were 
confirmed the following day when he met the Labour MP, George Wigg. His 
contemporary account provides a graphic picture of the emotions affecting 
both sides of the House, 
'George came in breathing heavily and sat down beside me. "I've 
done a bloody silly thing," he said. "I've walloped a Tory." 
"You've done what?" I asked. "I've walloped a Tory." he repeated 
"A few minutes ago in the members cloakroom. I was reading the 
ticker tape when he came up, and read an item about Gaitskell. It 
was Leslie Thomas. [A Conservative MP] He said, 'Gaitskell's a 
bloody traitor.' I said I'd rather be led by a bloody traitor than a 
f...ing murderer. He asked me to come outside and as we left the 
cloakroom he swiped at me. So I gave him one in the belly and 
two or three more and he went down like a felled ox.'102 
The memoirs of Douglas Jay also demonstrate the atmosphere in Parliament 
during that period, 
'From the morning of 31 October right through to Saturday 3 
November the House debated Suez almost continuously, with 
repeated divisions and unprecedented sittings throughout Friday 
and Saturday. The first climax came, when as Eden again refused 
to call off the invasion, the whole Opposition side of the House 
stood up and called on him to resign as he walked out. The indig-
nation and uproar were spontaneous, and behind the Speakers 
chair accusations of 'murderer' were thrown to and fro .. .'103 
Denis Healey has written that in the whole of his political life he had never 
been so angry for so long as he was during the Suez affair.104 
Anger over Suez was not restricted to Parliament. Labour's stand was 
supported by the Manchester Guardian and Observer as well as, rather 
belatedly, the Daily Mirror and Daily Herald.105 Tribune was as outspoken as 
usual: under the headline, 'A Crime Against the World', Michael Foot called 
the Suez venture a disaster, demanded the destruction of Eden's 
administration and called for demonstrations to take place against Tory 
policy.106 On 4 November (the same day as Soviet forces crushed the 
Hungarian uprising) a 'Law, Not War' rally was held in Trafalgar Square. 
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Addressed by Labour speakers including Aneurin Bevan, it attracted 
thousands of protestors. Although the rally, one of the largest ever 
assembled in London, passed off peacefully, 27 arrests were made when a 
section of the crowd marched on Downing Street. 
During the next few days, Labour and Conservative leaders presented their 
respective cases on television. In response to the Prime Minister's broadcast 
on 3 November, Gaitskell called the plans to invade Egypt an act of 
aggression, and ridiculed Eden's excuse that the situation could not wait for a 
UN decision because it was actually Britain's veto that had caused the delays. 
He chastised the Government for having split the country, brought about 
international condemnation and forfeited Britain's moral standing in the 
world at the very moment of Soviet aggression in Hungary. The Labour 
leader demanded that the invasion should be abandoned, the UN ceasefire 
accepted and troops diverted to the Arab-Israeli borders. He ended with an 
appeal to Tories who did not support the policy to vote against it, and called 
for Eden's resignation.107 
After the ceasefire was announced two days later, Selwyn Lloyd appeared on 
television. He condemned Labour's refusal to support the troops and went 
on to claim that British intervention had made it possible to assemble an 
international police force to control the area. James Griffiths replied for the 
Labour Party the following evening. Dismissing Tory excuses, he pointed out 
that the UN General Assembly had voted by 65 votes to 1 for the withdrawal 
of British troops as Lloyd was speaking. In Griffiths' view, the ceasefire was a 
victory brought about by the common sense of the British people.108 
The Labour broadcasts, especially Gaitskell's appeal to Tory dissidents, 
provoked an angry backlash and as his biographer points out, were actually 
counter-productive.109 Even though many Conservatives were alarmed at 
Eden's actions (as Monckton, Nutting and Boyle clearly were), the possibility 
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of Eden being overthrown and the Government collapsing, and worse still 
the propect of a Labour administration, made such an outcome unlikely. 
Compounded by what had happened in Trafalgar Square and a feeling that 
Egypt should be punished, it was hardly surprising that Gaitskell's speech and 
Griffiths' exposure of the Tories' failures should have caused such a reaction 
against the Labour Party. 
Labour continued to press the Government in Parliament on 12 November, 
deploring the economic effects of the Crisis. On the same day, Nasser 
accepted an emergency UN force into Egypt, which prompted an Israeli 
withdrawal from most of Sinai. Despite the UN Secretary General's visit to 
Egypt on 16-17 November and the American refusal to offer Britain financial 
help unless they withdrew, the British and French were still not prepared to 
pull their troops out. In the hope that their situation would improve, they 
replied that this would only be considered if the replacement international 
force was capable of completing the tasks set for it, including the clearance of 
the Canal. On 19 November it was announced that Eden was suffering from 
'severe overstrain' and four days later he left to convalesce in Jamaica, 
replaced temporarily by Butler. It was not until 30 November that the 
Cabinet concluded that unconditional withdrawal of British forces was 
inevitable.110 
The Government, faced with a humiliating climb down, would not admit 
this. As pressure mounted, Butler gave the first signal of conforming with 
the UN when he referred to its progress as an 'effective intervention.' He 
added, rather desperately, that this had been made possible by the Anglo-
French action.111 On 3 December Selwyn Uoyd stretched this theme even 
further, with the claim that the Arab-Israeli war had enabled the Soviet 
Union to interfere, supply arms to Nasser and threaten a large scale war. It 
was against this deterioration that the Anglo-French forces had intervened 
on 30 October and prevented a resumption of hostilities. Incredibly, he 
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claimed that this had resulted in the aversion of a general war and allowed 
an international peace-keeping force to be placed in position.112 
This 'version' allowed Labour further opportunity to attack the Government. 
Lloyd's justification was greeted with derision by the Opposition benches, 
even more so when they were accused of having contributed to the 
withdrawal by a leading member of the Suez group. Aneurin Bevan, 
Labour's foreign affairs spokesman, led the attack in the Commons two days 
later. Picking apart the Tory claims of 'separating the combatants', their 
justification of 'ensuring safe passage of the Canal' and 'preparing the way for 
the UN', Bevan condemned the Government's successive excuses for the 
attack on Egypt. In what has been described as both a brilliant and witty 
performance, Bevan savaged the Tories relentlessly, followed closely by other 
Labour speakers.113 
8. Widespread Unity. Negligible Dissent 
With their credibility subjected to increased scrutiny and exposure, it was 
perhaps inevitable that the Government and their supporters would attempt 
to divide their Labour opponents. Although Labour had suffered from these 
attacks since the Conservative's Llandudno Conference, this tactic grew 
increasingly vicious after the ceasefire. In both the Tory press and 
Parliament, attempts to divide the Labour leadership were pursued 
relentlessly. While Gaitskell was accused of treachery and reacting with 'pure 
hysteria', Bevan was applauded for his 'controlled and statesmanlike 
approach' .114 
Despite the campaign to exaggerate and promote differences within Labour 
ranks, this largely failed. Within the Shadow Cabinet, unity against the 
Government's Suez policy appeared solid.115 The most likely clash would 
have been expected to have come from Gaitskell's old rival, Aneurin Bevan. 
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However, after some initial doubts, this did not materialise and the years of 
emnity appeared forgotten when Bevan replaced Robens as the Party's 
foreign affairs spokesman on 28 November.116 The arguments over a 
'rapprochement' continue: while Michael Foot insists that Bevan was 
impressed by Gaitskell's performance and that Shadow Cabinet solidarity was 
genuine, David Howell points out that ' ... the spirit of reconciliation within 
the Party was facilitated by the Government's difficulties over Suez and the 
economy, with Bevan settling for influence on the inside'. John Campbell 
holds a similar view: in his opinion the prospect of office was a powerful 
incentive to keep on pulling together, one which Bevan himself, once he had 
the promise of a job worth having, would not miss.11 7 
While the Shadow Cabinet appeared immune to the Tory manoeuvres, one 
source of dissent closer to home was a cause for concern. Despite 
overwhelming unity within the PLP as a whole, some dissent returned once 
the military action began. The most conspicuous revolt against the Party's 
line came from Stanley Evans, the Labour MP for Wednesbury.118 In August, 
Evans had closely followed Morrison's line and, while his constituency party 
were unhappy about this, he did not receive an official reprimand until 
September. Nevertheless, Evans continued to criticise Labour's official 
policy. On 30 October, when Labour condemned Eden's ultimatum to Egypt, 
Evans argued against the decision to divide the House over the issue, and 
abstained in the vote which the Government won by 52 votes. In Parliament 
two days later, he attacked Labour's decision to oppose the use of force, and 
declared that he found it ' ... neither improper nor immoral to defend British 
interests'. He then criticised the Party's support for the American policy, and 
claimed that they had obstructed British interests in the Middle East. 
Turning to Labour's faith in the UN, he claimed that this was misguided, as 
the organisation was totally ineffective in helping Britain. While Labour 
MPs were shocked and dismayed by this outburst, it delighted Eden and the 
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Conservatives, even more so when Evans defied a three-line whip and 
abstained on Labour's censure motion.119 
Evans' antics on 30 October and 1 November singled him out as the leading 
maverick. On 17 November he was summoned to a meeting of his CLP, who 
unanimously voted for his removal as their MP. Although this course of 
action was not technically enforceable, Evans resigned anyway. At a PLP 
meeting five days later, John Hynd asked the NEC to persuade Evans to leave 
the Party altogether. Herbert Bowden, the Chief Whip, replied that he and 
the other Committee members had decided that the matter should not be 
taken any further, so Evans was allowed to remain a member of the Labour 
Party.120 Although very few in number, the pro-Suez Labour MPs were 
certainly a source of embarrassment. The reluctance to act against rebels such 
as Evans, was mainly due to a desire to keep any divisions out of the 
limelight. After all, media coverage of any dissent would damage the image 
of unity that Labour leaders were anxious to project, and provoke further 
mischief from their opponents. Because of this Morrison, Paget and Evans 
continued to criticise Labour's policy well into the following year, without 
censure. 
Apart from this, the only other anticipated opposition in the PLP was that 
from the 17 Jewish Labour MPs.121 There was an understandable inclination 
amongst many Jews in Britain to support Israel and the same tendency 
extended to some, though not all Jewish MPs. Labour's opposition to Tory 
policy appeared to present them with a dilemma: the choice of supporting 
their own Party, with its long-standing sympathy for Israel, or a Tory 
Government which had become openly hostile to Egypt and was now Israel's 
ally. This problem became even more complicated when the attack on Sinai 
was launched. Despite the dilemma, almost all of them supported the official 
line and voted with their colleagues in the divisions of 1 and 8 November.122 
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The notable exception was Emanuel Shinwell. Although he voted against 
the Government on 1 and 8 November, his vote on 30 October was not 
recorded. After the cessation of the military action, it became clear that 
Shinwell's position had shifted. Despite his support in the later divisions, he 
publicly indicated that he had deliberately abstained in the 30 October vote. 
He added that the Anglo-French intervention was justified because the UN 
had failed to take prompt action.123 At the time, his abstention was not 
regarded as a serious breach of Party discipline. Six other Labour votes went 
unrecorded on that day, and was not a clear violation of Party rules as 
Epstein's study makes clear.124 Had it happened once the military action was 
under way, and Shinwell had taken the same action in the later votes against 
a three-line whip, it would have been a different matter. Shinwell later 
wrote that he approved of the Government's policy, that Eden had taken the 
right course of action under the circumstances and should have seen it 
through. His motivation appears to stem mainly from his resentment of 
Gaitskell, as vividly reflected in his later memoirs.125 
Of course, these isolated incidents concerned the Labour leadership, although 
it is equally clear that the vast majority of Labour MPs supported their policy. 
By the ceasefire on 6 November, out of 218 Labour MPs, only Evans had 
openly defied the whip, a remarkable achievement over such a divisive 
issue. Epstein has called the degree of PLP solidarity during the Crisis 
impressive, because the leadership received virtually unanimous support.126 
Of course, there were doubts, but these only emerged after the middle of 
November, and reflected the change in British public opinion once the 
military action against Egypt had begun. 
9. The Aftermath: Public Opinion. Doubts and Resolution 
While Gaitskell's appeal to Conservative dissidents had failed to achieve the 
desired effect, just the opposite in fact, then Griffiths' claim - that the fiasco 
96 
had been ended by the common sense of the British people- was also 
somewhat optimistic. There is little doubt that many people in Britain 
opposed the Tories' Suez policy, but many approved of it too. In a British 
Institute of Public Opinion (BIPO) survey in September 1956, a sample had 
been asked whether they supported the way in which Eden had handled the 
Suez situation: 42 per cent of those questioned replied that they did. By the 
beginning of December, when the military action was over and a humiliating 
withdrawal only days away, the same question was posed and 51 per cent 
approved. Even some traditional Labour supporters had rallied to the 
Government, many of them as eager to teach Nasser a lesson as Eden. When 
these Labour voters were polled in early November, 16 per cent approved 
which rose to 22 per cent in early December.127 Although the Government 
never received an absolute majority, public support actually increased once 
the action was over. Many of those who had opposed military action at first, 
changed their minds once the troops were committed. 
These poll results concerned some Labour MPs. Richard Crossman, who had 
praised Gaitskell's earlier attacks on the Tories up to 6 November, now 
changed his mind. Two weeks later, he wrote that the Party had not received 
the full support over Suez for which it had hoped: instead, Gaitskell's 
continued harassment of the Government had had a negative effect on 
public opinion.128 Although Denis Healey regarded the policy as correct, he 
expressed concern about the adverse effect that Suez was having on 
traditional Labour supporters, rather than the 'floating' votes that worried 
Crossman. When these concerns were aired, Gaitskell's reaction was 
unrepentant. He angrily replied that the policy was morally correct and could 
not be abandoned simply because it was unpopular.129 
Although the Labour Party felt vindicated, the ultimate aim, to defeat and 
oust the Government, was never really feasible even though they had 
suffered such a humiliating defeat. On 22 December, two days after Eden had 
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denied collusion in Parliament, the evacuation of British troops from the 
Canal Zone was completed. Macmillan replaced Eden on 9 January 1957 and 
soon restored the Government's fortunes, both at home and abroad. In April 
the Suez Canal reopened. Somewhat ironically, Egypt accepted a settlement 
based on the 'six principles' for international management, which had been 
negotiated the previous October between the Egyptian, British and French 
Foreign Ministers. In May 1957, the Government advised British shipping to 
return to the Canal, a decision which especially dismayed members of the 
Suez Group, because they had to accept Nasser's terms. 
As these events unfolded, Labour continued to chastise the Government and 
pressed for an inquiry whenever the opportunity arose, which in turn 
provoked Tory anger.130 However, after May 1957, the Suez episode quickly 
faded into the background, despite some Labour efforts to revive it. During 
public meetings in the following two years, and especially during the general 
election campaign of 1959, Bevan continued to denounce the Suez fiasco, 
while Gaitskell promised to hold a full inquiry if Labour won.131 Despite 
these efforts, the Suez Affair hardly featured at all . As with most other forei~n. 
policy issues, the electorate preferred to relegate it to the background in 
favour of domestic considerations. 
Conclusion 
In October 1956 the British Government had resorted to force in order to re-
establish control over the Suez Canal, a decision that the Labour Party 
believed was disastrous and which they tried to stop. As a consequence, 
Labour has been blamed for breaking the bi-partisan approach to foreign 
policy followed since 1945. In the sense that the two main British political 
parties parted company over Suez, this is undoubtedly true. However, while 
Labour remained committed to the principles laid down by Bevin, the Tory 
action threatened the Atlantic Alliance and Commonwealth unity, two of the 
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three main tenets of British post-war foreign policy. In addition, Eden's 
Government actually used their veto for the first time in the UN in order to 
obstruct the very organisation that the British had helped establish. In these 
circumstances it is hardly surprising that the Opposition's dismay erupted 
into the fury witnessed, in and out of Parliament, when the attack on Egypt 
began in October 1956. 
The Labour leadership and many of its supporters felt justified in attacking a 
government that had lost its senses, which had simultaneously divided the 
nation and threatened Britain's international reputation. Labour's 
opposition had little immediate or long term effect in forcing the Tories out 
of office, and in the short term it probably lost them more support than they 
gained. Although the PLP was virtually united against the Government, 
they were never able to obtain a mass following for their policy. Suez was 
hardly mentioned during the 1959 general election campaign, when the 
Tories retained power with an increased majority. If Labour's aim had been 
to use Suez for partisan gain, as many of their opponents chose to believe, 
then it was a dismal failure. 
Labour leaders had not condoned Nasser's actions and were as anxious as the 
Government to place the Canal under international control, but they were 
not prepared to use the 'gunboat tactics' of the British and French 
governments. Instead, they insisted that the dispute should be settled 
through the United Nations, a demand that reflected the long-term belief in 
internationalism and collective security. In theory, Labour was prepared to 
use force, but only if the United Nations sanctioned it. In practice, the 
composition of the UN made this particular eventuality extremely unlikely. 
This has led some to question Labour's motives: in the words of one 
historian, 'the appeal to the UN, like the earlier reliance on the League [of 
Nations], provided an ideal escape from the world of painful choices'.132 
Whatever the merits of this argument, Labour was certainly not alone in 
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their support for the UN over the issue: most of the international 
community followed the same line too. 
Whether Labour's policy and strict adherence to the UN Charter was realistic 
in the uncertainty of the post-war world, the question of Labour's consistency 
over the use of force has been a battlefield ever since. Critics of their Suez 
policy, both then and since, have claimed that Labour originally supported 
the Government but had turned against them because of left-wing pressure. 
This case rests largely on Gaitskell's parliamentary performance in the 2 
August debate. Yet, closer examination of the speech reveals that, while he 
condemned Nasser's actions and accepted the need for military preparations, 
he also urged caution over any armed response. It has also been suggested 
that the 'warning' towards the end of his speech was an afterthought. Under 
the circumstances, this is understandable for two reasons: first, concern over 
Labour being branded as unpatriotic and irresponsible; second, that right up 
to the ultimatum of 30 October 1956, neither Gaitskell nor any other Labour 
MPs really believed that force could be contemplated without full domestic 
and international support. In this they were far from alone. 
Gaitskell and some of his close colleagues were alarmed over the press 
reports that the Government was determined to force Egypt into concessions 
by whatever means necessary and that Labour would support this policy. 
They had written and visited Eden privately several times in order to clarify 
the Government's position and express this concern. Because of the 
parliamentary recess from 3 August, these doubts were not in the public 
domain. By the end of August and certainly by mid-September, even the 
harshest of Labour's critics would have known of the Party's total 
condemnation against the use of force. Whether a leader of the Opposition 
had any right to be consulted during the Crisis or not, it goes a long way to 
explain why Gaitskell and Labour reacted in such an angry manner when the 
invasion was launched. 
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Eden never mentioned these initial warnings, which were quite clear and to 
which his replies were vague. His memoirs also reveal little regard for 
Gaitskell, and as Anthony Nutting has written, Eden did not care what 
Labour wanted or said during the Crisis. Later critics have also ignored these 
warnings and persistently rely on the the August speech and Gaitskell's 
'volte face', either not knowing, or choosing to ignore the full facts. The 
proponents of this 'myth' claim that the Labour Left had forced the 
leadership to change course. It was true that Gaitskell was a new leader, still 
suspected by the left-wing of pushing the Party to the right. The Tory press 
and some of their MPs, did everything they could to provoke a split in the 
Party in order to discredit Gaitskell and divert attention away from their own 
disastrous policy. The Labour leader's usual cool temperament had lapsed 
because of his desperation over the Suez affair, and this was ruthlessly turned 
against him. 
After Eden's resignation, continuous taunts from his supporters did nothing 
to heal the rift between the Labour and Conservative benches, and for nearly 
a year after the Crisis Gaitskell found himself the object of bitter abuse every 
time he rose to speak in Parliament. Harold Macmillan, eager to repair 
Anglo-American relations, divert attention from the Government's record 
and launch a counter-attack, made no attempt to regain the confidence of the 
Opposition or its leader. As a result, the mutual distrust that had developed 
between the Labour leadership and Eden during the Crisis continued to sour 
relations between Gaitskell and Macmillan. While Gaitskell remained 
bound to 'traditional' British overseas interests, he no longer felt bound to 
follow the policies of a Prime Minister and administration that he considered 
reckless, opportunist and irresponsible. Suez constituted a major turning 
point because above all else, Labour support for the Government's foreign 
policy could no longer be taken for granted, as later events proved. 
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Labour radicals also believed grass roots pressure had forced a change, but the 
evidence refutes this. Left-wing pressure certainly existed, but was 
insufficient (not more than 30 MPs, even in early August) to force any change 
that could be regarded as a somersault. While some Labour leaders expressed 
concern about threats to unity, Gaitskell's own rigid commitment to any 
particular policy is well known and makes it most unlikely that he would 
have changed course without overwhelming pressure. As most Labour MPs 
were away because of the recess, and would have followed the leadership's 
direction anyway, this threat never arose. By late August, many on the Left 
had been reassured, and by mid-September virtually the whole of the Labour 
Movement was firmly behind the leadership. While the radical s' case was 
understandable due to their recent lack of success in shaping policy, it was 
nevertheless exaggerated. 
Where opposition was prolonged, it came more from the far Right of the 
Party, and especially from those with an axe to grind. Five spokesmen from 
this wing contributed to the 2 August debate and all supported the Tory line 
to a degree: one even criticised other Labour colleagues. Whereas left-wing 
opposition evaporated very quickly, the Right's continued, fading in mid-
October but re-emerging when the military operation began. More problems 
arose from former prominent Labour figures who held personal grudges 
against Gaitskell, and who used Suez in an effort to embarrass and challenge 
him. However, Morrison was away through much of the Crisis and 
Shinwell's opposition only became known much later. Like the Left, both 
groups were negligible and unlikely to influence the bulk of the Party or 
threaten the leadership. More concern centred on the swing of public 
opinion away from Labour after the military defeat and the later withdrawal 
from the Canal; but even here, and despite the reservations of Crossman and 
others, Gaitskell would not alter course. 
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In essence, Labour believed in a bi-partisan approach to foreign policy, but 
Suez was not conducted in this manner. None of the Labour leaders were 
informed of the Government's intentions, and what information was 
received, persuaded them that war would be averted. The Government, its 
supporters then and sympathisers since, well aware of the damage they had 
caused, were not prepared to take the blame and needed a scapegoat. 
Resentment of Gaitskell, frustration over Labour's moral indignation as well 
as their repeated attempts to thwart government policy, provided the Tories 
with an opportunity to retaliate: thus, the myth of Labour's treachery and 
Gaitskell's 'political somersault' was born. Yet the evidence suggests that the 
prime factor in their argument, left-wing pressure, was minimal, short-lived 
and certainly never enough to have caused a major U-turn. If there was a 
'threat' from within, it came from the far Right, not the Left. Overall, 
Labour's unity during the Suez affair was impressive. Whatever the 
arguments over the realism of their adherence to the UN, or the charge that 
they had pursued a partisan attack in order to bring the Government down, 
they at least demonstrated a commitment to Britain's international 
reputation, which Eden's administration did not. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Fuse is Lit: The Bomb 1956-59 
The end of the Suez conflict witnessed Eden's resignation as Premier: the 
Conservative Party in disarray, in danger of being ousted from power; and the 
Labour Party united under the leadership of Hugh Gaitskell. In some 
respects, Suez appeared to mark the end of the bi-partisanship in foreign 
affairs that had existed since the end of World War Two. Labour had taken a 
different course from the Conservative Government, attracting strong 
criticism and accusations of treachery from the political right, and even 
dismay among some of its own supporters. However, the prospect of 
defeating and driving the Conservatives from office had had a galvanising 
effect and the unity in place at the end of 1956 looked set to continue with 
nearly all factions fully behind the Party leadership.1 
After Suez, and before the general election of 1959, antagonism on foreign 
affairs between the two front benches focussed on several issues: continued 
concern over the Middle East; an escalation of violence in Cyprus; and the 
struggle for independence from British colonial rule in east Africa. However, 
these paled into insignificance with the onset of the nuclear dispute, an issue 
which dominated foreign and defence policy between government and 
opposition for years to come. Concern over nuclear tests and their effects 
were compounded by the Defence White Paper of April 1957. With its 
primary reliance on 'massive nuclear retaliation', even against conventional 
attack, the Sandys review provoked a wave of apprehension.2 
In an attempt to benefit from this groundswell of opinion, the Labour 
leadership rather hesitantly challenged aspects of the Tories' nuclear policy. 
However, by doing so they were placed in a dilemma. Firstly, the principal 
motive for the Government's reliance on the H-bomb was based on 
economic considerations. Suez had convinced them that Britain's defence 
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capability and influence would be enhanced by possession of thermo-nuclear 
weapons, and that spending on costly conventional forces could be cut. Thus, 
Labour found themselves criticising a policy which had two goals that they 
had long advocated on grounds of economy, moral and political necessity, 
cuts in existing conventional forces and an end of conscription. 
Secondly, there was the problem of taking a partisan approach on nuclear 
policy too far. The Labour administration of 1945-51 had taken the decision to 
go ahead with nuclear weapons in the first place. In 1955 they had approved 
the Conservative Government's decision to manufacture thermo-nuclear 
weapons, albeit with some dissent.3 In fact, many Labour leaders were just as 
enthusiastic about the Bomb as the Tories. They thought it maintained 
Britain's influence in world affairs and, however mistakenly, demonstrated a 
degree of independence from the United States. Until 1960 at least, despite 
some differences in emphasis, Labour's official nuclear policy was virtually 
indistinguishable from that of the Tories.4 
This led to the third and most compelling problem to face Labour. Between 
1955-61 nuclear weapons grew from being a policy sideshow to nearly 
splitting the Party altogether.5 While they later rejected an independent 
British nuclear deterrent (on economic grounds rather than moral 
considerations) Labour's official policy adhered to two basic principles: that 
nuclear weapons deterred aggression and their possession guaranteed 
influence in future disarmament negotiations. While disarmament was the 
desired goal, they believed that this could only be attained multilaterally. 
These principles were in stark contrast to growing hostility against nuclear 
weaponry as immoral, too expensive and as a threat to, rather than a 
guarantor of, world peace. With increasing concern over the possibility of a 
nuclear Armageddon, many on the Labour left (as well as many outside 
political party affiliation) believed that Britain should renounce nuclear 
weapons unilaterally, in order to retain Britain's moral leadership. Although 
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it was not initially restricted to an ideological position, the nuclear issue soon 
became enveloped in the struggle for power between left and right and 
provided the means with which to challenge Gaitskell and the leadership at 
Labour's annual conference in 1960. 
This chapter examines the controversies surrounding Labour and the Bomb 
from Gaitskell's accession to the leadership until the 1959 general election. 
The leader's influence will be considered along with an assessment of 
Labour's official nuclear policy. The shift in the Party's attitude to nuclear 
weapons will be contrasted to the Government's defence policy, along with 
internal and external pressures on the Labour leadership. The view, that 
1957-59 witnessed a period of conciliation and intra-Party unity, only to be 
shattered after the 1959 general election defeat will be challenged on two 
levels.6 Rather than conciliation, it shows that on nuclear weapons, Gaitskell 
was not open to the compromises taken on other issues. Instead, he was 
inclined to bulldoze his way through, discounting other viewpoints and only 
shifting when it became clear there was no choice. On unity, it demonstrates 
that in this period the threat to the official policy was not just confined to 
CND, Frank Cousins of the T&GWU or other peripheral elements. Rather, it 
was spread across the whole Movement and included a surprisingly large 
number of MPs and Shadow Cabinet members. Although Labour approached 
the 1959 general election united and the leadership never lost control of 
nuclear policy, this was out of a desire for office and the way in which the 
Party's structure benefited the leadership (supporting the McKenzie - Haseler 
thesis), more than anything else. Whatever, the increasing pressures of these 
years gave more than a taste of the trouble to follow. 
For convenience, the chapter is divided into three main sections. The first 
examines the origins of the nuclear dispute under Gaitskell's leadership 
through to its rise to prominence at the 1957 annual conference. The second 
considers the aftermath of the Brighton conference through to Scarborough 
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the following year. This demonstrates that although the leadership believed 
that the dispute had been settled for the foreseeable future, anti-nuclear 
agitation had increased markedly and made attempts to side-line it 
impossible. The third, charts the period from Scarborough through to the 
general election of 1959. This shows the leadership's anxiety, and how their 
initial concessions looked unlikely to prevent defeat until the announcement 
of the general election drew the warring strands back together in an ill-
concealed image of unity. 
1. Keep the Lid On! From Suez to Brighton 
The internal debate over nuclear policy had caused serious concern to the 
Labour leadership, ever since Bevan had attacked Attlee in Parliament over 
the question of 'first use' in March 1955. From this point on, in international 
affairs at least, the H-bomb replaced German rearmament as the Left's focal 
point in their battle with the leadership. However, the beginning of the Suez 
Crisis in July 1956 diverted attention away from the nuclear issue. Gaitskell's 
diary demonstrates that he recognised the illogical compromise in Labour's 
position, and how he was obviously relieved to see it side-lined. He privately 
admitted, 
'We have been in a jam on the H-bomb tests. We have supported 
producing the bomb and, obviously, if you want to produce it, 
you must be able to test it. At the same time we demanded the 
abolition of all tests.'7 
Anxious to avoid embarrassment, Gaitskell had persuaded his front bench 
colleagues to call for 'control, rather than the abolition of tests' and that it was 
'clearly a subject which ... the leadership ought to avoid raising in parliament 
due to our vulnerable position'.8 Further evidence to illustrate the 
ambiguity of Labour's nuclear policy was demonstrated at Labour's annual 
conference in October 1956. Vague calls for the abolition of all nuclear 
weapons received support from all sides. On specific issues however, 
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although there was opposition to the 'continuation of nuclear explosions', 
there was no outright demand for the abolition of tests.9 The NEC, concerned 
about the lack of coherent policy on nuclear weapons decided to set up an Ad 
Hoc Sub-Committee on Disarmament in early 1957.10 
While this new sub-committee struggled to find a suitable policy for the next 
conference, three major events in early 1957 ensured that the Bomb would 
become a central issue within the Movement. The first was the 
Government's announcement in March of its intention to hold thermo-
nuclear tests on Christmas Island in the Pacific: the second was the 
publication of Sandys' Defence White Paper in April; and the third was the 
adverse publicity over the hazardous effects of nuclear testing and Strontium 
fall-out. Combined with the anti-nuclear publicity, many Labour supporters 
believed that the sharp decline in Conservative fortunes after the Suez fiasco 
would mean the imminent return of a Labour administration. However, 
after Eden was replaced by Macmillan in January 1957, the new Prime 
Minister was quick to exploit Labour divisions over nuclear policy.11 
In March, Macmillan and Eisenhower met in Bermuda to repair Anglo-
American relations, badly strained during the Suez Crisis. During the talks, 
the Americans agreed to supply Britain with guided missiles that could carry 
British nuclear warheads. Anxiety over the health implications of the 
recently announced British tests in the Pacific had prompted some Labour 
back-benchers to call for their postponement.12 Aneurin Bevan, Labour's 
Foreign Affairs spokesman, had called for the Government to take the 
initiative and stop the test programme as an example to the rest of the world. 
On tour in India later that month he had gone further still, and declared that 
he could see no reason for Britain to arm herself with that 'useless 
weapon' .13 However, splits in Labour's front bench were clearly evident 
when George Brown (Labour's Defence spokesman) publicly insisted that 
Britain must retain the deterrent to counter any threat, and that they had to 
118 
be tested.14 Brown's comments confirmed his preference for the 
manufacture and testing of the British H-bomb, while Bevan's remarks were 
applauded by the growing ranks opposed to the Bomb on moral grounds.15 
While Labour's principal Foreign and Defence spokesmen appeared at 
loggerheads, worse followed in Parliament. During the Bermuda Conference 
debate, Macmillan, eager to restore Tory morale, diverted attention away 
from Suez and concentrated on the nuclear issue. He exploited the divisions 
in Labour's ranks by challenging the Party's attitude over the Bomb, and 
demanded to know whether Gaitskell would cancel the tests. Gaitskell was 
caught in an acute dilemma, between criticising the Tories and opening up 
internal divisions. He replied that only the Government had all the facts 
with which to make a decision, but admitted that he did not feel Britain 
should stop testing 'unilaterally and unconditionally' .16 This reply prompted 
a number of Labour MPs to criticise Gaitskell's performance and lack of 
leadership.17 Macmillan's memoirs make it clear that he had fully intended 
to trap and confuse Gaitskell, expose the inconsistency in Labour's policy and 
above all, exploit the split. Philip Williams admits that Gaitskell's actions 
had 'deeply troubled' the PLP, but denies that it threatened his position.18 
The confusion in Labour's position had been revealed both in and out of 
Parliament and clearly needed clarification. In an attempt to achieve this, 
several meetings were held by the Shadow Cabinet and the PLP on 2 and 3 
April. The outcome resulted in a compromise resolution which called for a 
temporary suspension of British tests and for the two superpowers to cancel 
theirs.19 Gaitskell was not satisfied, because he had had to accept the 
compromise in order to avoid a split in the Party, despite the fact that that it 
made them 'look rather silly'.20 Williams believes that Gaitskell's 
conciliatory manner and willingness to accommodate the Left's demands had 
actually helped the Government and inadvertently led to a Tory revivaL21 
However, the Manchester Guardian's contemporary account, that the 
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leadership had yielded to general rank and file pressure, appeared more 
accurate.22 It was not just the Left but a large section of the PLP, including 
several Shadow Cabinet members (around 80 supported the resolution-
approximately 30 per cent) who expressed concern over the effects of thermo-
nuclear tests. 23 
Gaitskell had little choice but to back down. Without a clear policy and the 
fear of a major split developing, not to do so would have been foolhardy. Yet 
the furore caused by the resolution was quite unnecessary. The 'compromise' 
had simply requested that British tests be suspended temporarily, giving the 
USA and USSR the opportunity to follow suit. Gaitskell's preferred option 
was that Britain should only suspend tests at the same time as the other 
powers did so. A temporary suspension of British tests, even if undertaken 
unilaterally, hardly represented a major shift in policy. In order to achieve a 
meaningless compromise, four difficult meetings had been needed to avert a 
serious internal split. Labour had been exposed to ridicule from the press and 
their political opponents, and all for clarification of a policy which they had 
no chance of putting into practice anyway. In Gaitskell's defence, it could be 
argued that his reluctance to take a line in opposition which he would not 
take in government demonstrated his responsible attitude. However, 
Macmillan's comment in January 1959, that the Labour leader took his role 
far too seriously, appears nearer the mark.24 As David Cross argues, it was 
not Gaitskell's eventual acceptance of the compromise policy that led to the 
Tory revival, as Williams believes, but his failure to respond to the 
widespread Labour concern or attack the Government.25 
A fortnight later, Sandys' Defence White Paper was debated. The doctrine of 
'massive nuclear retaliation', even against conventional attack brought swift 
objections. Labour's amendment regretted ' ... the undue dependence on the 
ultimate deterrent' and called for the British tests to be postponed 'for a 
limited period' while international agreement was sought.26 George Brown 
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and John Strachey both questioned the details of Government policy, but 
neither criticised the principle of a British deterrent. The only deviation 
from Labour's official view was from Richard Crossman, who attacked the 
policy of massive retaliation and questioned the very retention of nuclear 
weapons.27 
This debate highlighted the problems of Labour's nuclear policy, or rather 
lack of it. The leadership were in a difficult position, forced to adopt a delicate 
balancing act. Their underlying support for the British deterrent made it 
virtually impossible for them to attack the Tories effectively. At the same 
time, they were desperately trying to appease a large body of anti-nuclear 
opinion within the Party and prevent a split.28 Britain's first thermo-nuclear 
test took place in the Pacific on 16 May, followed fifteen days later by a second. 
Both Bevan and Gaitskell protested, though Gaitskell's reluctance to press 
home the attack was demonstrated by his care in stressing the difficulties 
involved in obtaining agreement over the nuclear issue.29 
Although Labour's parliamentary spokesmen demonstrated a clear 
reluctance to press the Government, there was no such reticence in the rest of 
the Labour Movement. In February 1957 the National Committee for the 
Abolition of Nuclear Weapons Tests (NCANWT), a forerunner to CND, had 
been founded to co-ordinate opposition to H-bomb tests.30 In March Tribune. 
followed closely by the New Statesman. had demanded an immediate end to 
nuclear tests and for Labour to reverse its position on thermo-nuclear 
weapons.31 At a speech in Reading on 5 May, Bevan provoked further fears 
of a split within the Shadow Cabinet when he called on Britain to give moral 
leadership, 
'If Britain had the moral stature she could say: We can make 
the H-bomb, but we are not going to make it. We believe that ... 
the human race needs leadership in the opposite direction away 
from making the bomb and we are going to give it.'32 
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The unilateralist overtones in this speech and the two British tests in May 
again prompted Tribune to attack the rest of the Labour leadership, and urge 
nation-wide protests against nuclear weapons.33 
In an effort to fend off the growing agitation against nuclear weapons, the 
NEC and its sub-committees began a frantic search for a solution that would 
halt the criticism and gain approval at Labour's annual conference. 
Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that although the PLP and the extra-
parliamentary groups played their part, the nerve centre of policy-making 
was the NEC. This in turn was dominated by the Party leadership and by 
Gaitskell. This made any attempt by the committees or other groups to 
radicalise policy virtually impossible.34 
The Ad Hoc Sub-Committee for Disarmament, set up in December 1956, had 
met five times by March 1957. Despite other defence issues, such as 
manpower levels and budgets, the controversy over thermo-nuclear tests 
dominated their agenda. The committee produced a draft which suggested 
that a control agency should be set up by the UN which would provide a 
framework under which disarmament could be achieved.35 Simultaneously, 
the NEC's Defence Sub-Committee considered Sandys' defence review, and 
by early June had produced a discussion paper, Defence and Disarmament. 
The first of two parts detailed the existing official Labour policy. The second, 
contained schemes by Labour's three main defence strategists, Brown, 
Strachey and Crossman. Brown's contribution simply restated Labour's 
existing policy. John Strachey challenged the accepted orthodoxy by 
suggesting that better equipped and trained western conventional forces 
could withstand a numerically superior Soviet attack and thus reduce the 
'menace of nuclear warfare'. Richard Crossman suggested that western 
Europe should abandon the idea of having nuclear weapons altogether and 
instead leave the deterrent solely to the USA.36 
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By July, after further drafting and meetings between these sub-committees, 
the proposals by Strachey and Crossman had been deleted and only Brown's 
preferences were considered. The new document, imaginatively entitled 
Disarmament and Defence, called for a two-stage disarmament agreement 
open to international inspection. The first stage included a suspension of all 
nuclear tests by international agreement, followed by a ban on production of 
nuclear weapons, and linked to reductions in conventional weapons. The 
second stage envisaged the destruction of all stocks of nuclear weapons 
combined with further conventional disarmament.37 
In fact, both Strachey's and Crossman's ideas had had little chance of success 
as they challenged the basis of Labour's official policy. In effect, this was a 
clear victory for Brown and Gaitskell, neither of whom were prepared to 
separate nuclear from conventional disarmament. Gaitskell's careful control 
of the drafting process allowed alternatives to be put forward, only to be 
swiftly rejected in favour of moving as little as possible from his preferred 
line. This determination had also been clearly demonstrated in speeches at 
Newcastle on 16 June, to the Socialist International on 3 July and in a series of 
disarmament proposals presented (with Philip Noel-Baker) to the PLP a week 
later.38 
Despite Gaitskell's confidence in the new document, the International Sub-
Committee decided to delay its publication until after the resolutions on 
disarmament submitted to conference had been examined.39 This delay 
appeared to be in response to further divisions that had surfaced. In July, the 
T&GWU had debated the nuclear issue and its General Secretary, Frank 
Cousins, called for the Labour Party to launch a crusade against the Bomb. 
Although Cousins believed that Britain should cease manufacture 
unilaterally, he was unable to obtain his union's support and the resolution 
they approved did not follow his line.40 In September, the TUC also 
approved a resolution that was clearly multilateralist.41 
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The NEC was doubtless relieved that the T&GWU and the other unions had 
not swung to the unilateralist cause with conference looming, but other 
trends did not look so promising. Tribune had continued its attack on official 
Labour policy throughout the summer, and called for national protests to 
force change on the leadership. By September, the paper shrilly described the 
British Bomb as futile, dangerous, a drain on resources and morally 
reprehensible.42 In addition, 30 MPs had formed the Labour H-bomb 
Campaign Committee and their first rally in Trafalgar Square attracted a 
crowd of 4,000.43 Although the unions had not been converted to 
unilateralism and attacks from Tribune were nothing new, the dissident MPs 
were a source of concern. With such public hostility to the official policy 
within the PLP, it was certain that it would also exist in the wider Movement, 
and might cause problems at conference reminiscent of the Bevanite revolts 
of the early 1950s. As 127 resolutions had been submitted to the NEC for 
discussion, many of them clearly unilateralist in intent, this apprehension 
appeared justified.44 
Yet the Pear of such a split was not shared at this stage by Gaitskell. At 
meetings of the International Sub-Committee on 17 and 26 September, the 
demand for Britain to unilaterally suspend thermo-nuclear tests was absent 
from the latest version of Disarmament and Defence, drafted by Phillips and 
amended by Crossman. Instead, there was a vague pledge that Britain might 
suspend future tests if a 'suitable opportunity' arose.45 In effect, pressure 
from Gaitskell had ensured that there were no concessions to any unilateral 
action by Britain whatsoever, even though most of the resolutions 
considered by the NEC had advocated this in one form or another.46 The 
Leader's determination to issue this statement to conference as it stood 
provoked a major disagreement at the NEC meeting on 26 September, 
especially between him and Bevan. However, Gaitskell and his supporters 
regained control with Crossman's help, and with the promise that the final 
statement would make it clear that no final decision had been made.47 
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Although the NEC had agreed that a revised statement for conference should 
be prepared by Gaitskell, Bevan and Watson, this never materialised. Instead, 
at the meeting of 29 September, the NEC examined the composite resolutio~ 
submitted and decided that Bevan should present Labour's official policy at 
conference.48 Gaitskell's belated decision, that no definitive line be taken on 
the nuclear issue, was obviously taken in order to avoid a damaging split on 
the eve of conference. Bevan's conversion to the leadership's cause by Sam 
Watson and the subsequent result at conference is too well rehearsed to be 
examined here. Nonetheless, its significance was far-reaching. Bevan had 
spoken on behalf of the NEC and endorsed the official policy, favoured by 
Gaitskell all along. Thus, Bevan had publicly sealed his reconciliation with 
the leadership and the Left had effectively lost its most powerful exponent.49 
The nuclear issue dominated the proceedings in the disarmament and 
foreign affairs debate at the Party's annual conference at Brighton on 3 
October. The leadership's case against unilateralism was supported by Tony 
Benn, Philip Noel-Baker and John Strachey, while Judith Hart and Frank 
Cousins opposed it. Then Bevan delivered the speech in which he urged 
acceptance of the official policy and rejected unilateralism. His caustic 
criticism, especially that over the unilateralists' naive approach to foreign 
affairs, shocked and antagonised many of his supporters. Subsequently, 
Composite No.23 (which supported official policy) and No.25 (if altered to 
postponement rather than total cessation of British tests) were accepted, while 
the unilateralist motion (No.24), backed by Cousins but thwarted by his 
union's delegates, was rejected.50 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
The 1957 Brighton Conference was regarded as a victory for the Labour 
leadership because it prevented any deviation from the multilateralist line 
they preferred.51 In reality, the policy in place since 1955 remained intact and 
Labour's official support for the British Bomb closely imitated that of the 
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Government's. Half-hearted attempts by the leadership to establish their 
own stamp on the nuclear issue w~m negligible, and demonstrated the desire 
to keep Labour united, rather than provide any radical critique of 
government policy. After six months of tortuous discussion and draft policy 
statements, no clear line acceptable to the Party as a whole had emerged. 
While Gaitskell's preferences had clearly prevailed through his control of the 
NEC, the leadership had realised how important it was to convince their 
opponents that their concerns had been noted. 
In order to maintain this fragile unity, the NEC and Party leadership had 
endorsed a statement which contained idealistic platitudes on disarmament, 
but which avoided the unilateralist's fundamental concern: the future of the 
British H-bomb. In April 1957, Gaitskell had accepted the temporary 
suspension of British tests, but even this had been withdrawn five months 
later. At the end of September, after he had consistently argued for a 
forthright statement on disarmament, Gaitskell suddenly changed his mind 
and agreed that no final decision on nuclear policy had been made. While 
this was clearly a device to prevent a split and save the leadership from any 
embarrassment at conference, they were saved by an unexpected source. 
Rather than present the statement and provoke left-wing anger, Bevan was 
persuaded to extol its virtues. The attractions of this option to Gaitskell and 
his supporters are not difficult to imagine. If Bevan, still the most prominent 
left-wing leader, could persuade conference to swallow the official line, 
victory had been achieved. If he failed, it was his credibility that would be 
shattered, leaving the Left leaderless while Labour's elite could escape 
unscathed. 
Although Bevan's 'defection' was a severe shock to his supporters, the 
assumption that this marked the end of Bevanism, suggested by some 
contemporary reports and in various studies since, should be treated with 
caution.52 In reality, support for left-wing fundamentalism had increased 
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steadily in the CLPs and trades unions since the early 1950s. With Bevan's 
departure, those dedicated to this cause not only survived but became 
increasingly influential in all spheres of the Labour movement. The furore 
over thermo-nuclear weapons and the dominance of a revisionist leadership 
propped up by right-wing union barons, convinced the unilateralists that 
only with the conversion to their cause of the trade unions, would their 
success be ensured in the future.53 Gaitskell and the Party leadership may 
have postponed the battle over the nuclear issue in October 1957, but many of 
Labour's natural supporters, dismayed by the leadership's adherence to the 
Bomb, looked elsewhere for ways in which to express their dissatisfaction. 
2. Challenges and Control: From Brighton to Scarborough. 1958 
To some, Brighton represented a 'complete victory' for Gaitskell. With 
Bevan on board, Labour well ahead in the opinion polls, the nuclear issue 
settled for the foreseeable future and unity intact, all appeared well.54 
However, as Macmillan astutely observed, the H-bomb was the real test: if 
this issue could be exploited successfully, Labour unity would evaporate. 
Macmillan had a point, for within a few weeks of conference the Labour 
leadership was under pressure once again. According to Michael Gordon, 
this was precipitated by fears of a future nuclear holocaust, disillusion with 
the Cold War and frustration over Labour's acceptance of Tory foreign 
policy.55 
After conference, Gaitskell had actively discouraged any specific alterations to 
Labour's nuclear policy beyond the conditional suspension of British tests.56 
Nevertheless, several events towards the end of 1957 ensured that attention 
would return to the nuclear issue. The implications of the successful launch 
of the Soviet 'Sputnik' (which made the West's fixed-wing bombers obsolete) 
and the doubts raised by George Kennan over Western nuclear strategy (too 
inflexible as a response) were two examples.57 On a more local level, concern 
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grew over revelations that British-based American patrol aircraft regularly 
carried thermo-nuclear weapons and that NATO had decided to construct 
American fixed missile bases in Britain. Despite Macmillan's assurance that 
the latter would be under strict joint Anglo-American control and presented 
no danger, public apprehension was widespread.58 In Parliament, and in 
Gaitskell's absence, George Brown demanded that the Government should 
guarantee political control over these bases.59 
The Labour attacks were largely the result of increased public awareness and 
the need to maintain Party unity.60 As the Party's lead over the 
Conservatives in the opinion polls had fallen (from a 16 per cent lead in 
September to 5 per cent in December), Gaitskell became the target for 
increased criticism within the Party. While the Left resented the lack of 
radicalism in defence policy, even Labour's moderate centre pressed for more 
vigorous opposition.61 
In some respects, the criticism was valid. Although Labour had criticised the 
Government, there was little difference in principle of allowing American 
ballistic missiles to be based in Britain, when American nuclear bombers had 
been accepted during Attlee's administration. In addition, Labour demands 
for strict British control over such sites was virtually identical to the 
Government's stated position. In Gaitskell's defence, he was faced with a 
difficult dilemma: as a prospective Prime Minister expected to uphold British 
interests and as Labour leader, anxious to maintain internal unity.62 In order 
to retain Labour's commitment to multilateralism and simultaneously 
prevent a split, Gaitskell and the leadership had to perform a unenviable 
balancing act. Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that that they 
were anxious to keep nuclear policy off the agenda as much as possible. 
Because of this it was the TUC, not the parliamentary leadership, that 
initiated discussions over the nuclear question with the Government.63 
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Shortly afterwards, at the suggestion of Sir Victor Tewson (General Secretary 
of the TUC) several meetings took place between the TUC and NEC 
International sub-committees. The first meeting, on 13 February 1958, was 
dominated by Crossman, Bevan and of course Gaitskell. Apart from general 
agreement- that nuclear-armed patrol aircraft were dangerous and 
unnecessary and that the construction of missile bases should not precede 
summit talks- progress was limited to the ideas put forward by the Labour 
leader. These were little different to those Gaitskell had presented to the PLP 
the previous July.64 
While the joint TUC I NEC discussions took place, impatience with the lack 
of action against nuclear weapons led to increased disquiet: disquiet that was 
soon to have a direct impact on Labour's policy. Within the Movement, 
Bevan's denunciation of unilateralism had persuaded many left-wingers that 
Labour's official policy had failed to take the initiative and was wholly 
inadequate.65 The apolitical anti-nuclear stance reflected by a large section of 
public opinion was running parallel to the Left's desire to fill this vacuum. 
Linked by their common abhorrence of nuclear weapons and their similar 
aims and objectives, the two strands converged in the formation of the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in January 1958.66 Initially, the 
Campaign's line resembled Labour's official policy, but almost immediately 
became more radical and demanded that Britain should 'unconditionally' 
renounce the use, production or reliance on allies with nuclear weapons.67 
As CND challenged Labour's claim for political and moral leadership, 
another group from within the Party, Victory For Socialism (VFS), re-
emerged. VFS had first appeared in 1944 and briefly resurfaced at the 
beginning of Gaitskell's leadership in early 1956. Under the leadership of Ian 
Mikardo, Hugh Jenkins and Stephen Swingler, and with the organisational 
skills of Jo Richardson as its secretary, VFS was far more formidable when it 
was relaunched in February 1958. Concerned that the 'revisionists' had 
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diverted Labour from its socialist principles, VFS was committed to revive 
socialism and to organise opposition to the H-bomb.68 When it announced 
that it was to operate within the constituency parties, it provoked fears of a 
Bevanite 'party within a party' and alarmed the leadership.69 
Apart from CND and VFS, another blow to the Labour leadership came in 
early 1958 from the normally loyalist Daily Herald. On the eve of the 
parliamentary debate on the new Defence White Paper (which reaffirmed the 
commitment to the British deterrent and the doctrine of massive retaliation), 
the paper savaged Labour's failure to take a clear lead over the nuclear issue. 
It was appalled at the lack of progress by the joint TUC I NEC meetings and 
accused the leadership of 'dragging its feet'.7° The following day, the editorial 
demanded that Britain cease the testing and manufacture of its H-bombs and 
rid itself of all existing stocks, in order to break the international deadlock 
over disarmament. To add insult to injury, the Daily Herald also published a 
letter from 65 Labour MPs which supported its stand.71 Although criticism 
from the newspaper was serious in itself, the fact that so many MPs backed 
this view, and were prepared to say so publicly, showed that the issue could 
not be easily dismissed. 
The challenges to the official line from CND, VFS and the Daily Herald 
ensured that nuclear policy dominated the NEC meeting held at the end of 
February. This had been convened to discuss the latest joint TUC I NEC draft 
policy document. Nevertheless, Gaitskell's control over policy-making was 
demonstrated in the way in which he managed to retain Labour's official 
policy (i.e. multilateral disarmament, suspension of British tests, the 
cessation of nuclear-armed patrols, and the postponement of American 
missile base construction prior to summit talks) on track.72 Although the 
Labour leader had been concerned over Bevan's reaction (unfounded as it 
turned out), his preferences were accepted by 25 votes to three. Gaitskell then 
persuaded the meeting to issue the statement, after TUC approval, without 
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further reference back to the NEC.73 Counting on support from the TUC, this 
was clearly designed to avert further arguments and delays and ensured that 
Gaitskell's preferences could not be challenged by the NEC. 
After this had been endorsed, the NEC turned to the Daily Herald and VFS. It 
was agreed that a letter should be sent to the newspaper which condemned its 
'misleading comments', the support for unilateralism and its 'interference in 
the private discussions of the Labour Party and TUC'.74 Over VFS, Gaitskell's 
determination to stamp out any factional dissent in the constituencies as 
quickly as possible was clear. VFS had already received a letter from Morgan 
Phillips which 'reminded' them of the constitutional restrictions imposed on 
political organisation within the Party.75 Although there were arguments 
over what disciplinary measures should be taken, at a meeting with the VFS 
leaders on 4 March, Gaitskell warned them that the creation of a 'party within 
a party would not be tolerated'.76 
While the Daily Herald quickly yielded, VFS were not as compliant as some 
contemporary and later reports suggest, despite Gaitskell's threats.77 It is true 
that VFS had retreated to some extent by March, and this coincided with 
Gaitskell's warnings. Nevertheless, if their constant condemnation of the 
leadership and the rapid reaction taken against them is considered, they were 
obviously assumed to represent a serious threat.78 The fact that 65 Labour 
MPs, many of whom were either members or associated with VFS, had 
supported the comments in the Daily Herald demonstrated the scale of the 
problem. For those Party members opposed to the leadership's strict 
adherence to multilateralism, VFS provided a platform. In addition, the 
overlap in membership of VFS and CND was considerable and ensured that 
agitation would be widespread and prolonged. Even if the leadership could 
restrict and counter the operations of VFS within the Parliamentary Party, the 
elements that supported them in the constituencies and trade unions were 
much harder to deal with.79 
1 3 1 
Most of the problems that faced the leadership had been due to their sluggish 
attitude and the reluctance to modify their nuclear policy since October 1957. 
What little progress had been made was only achieved because of TUC 
anxiety earlier that year. However, the rapid preparation of the new policy 
document (6 March 1958) demonstrated the way in which the leadership had 
been stung into action by CND, VFS and the Daily Herald's criticism. On the 
day that the NEC met to discuss the nuclear problem, Labour spokesmen 
debated the Defence White Paper in Parliament. Their performance 
illustrated the difficulty of mounting an effective attack on Government 
policy without a coherent alternative strategy, and where the views of their 
own 'experts' differed sharply. 
While Brown and Strachey both criticised the Government's over-reliance 
on the H-bomb, neither questioned the concept of the British deterrent. 
Instead, they suggested that improved conventional forces and the use of 
tactical nuclear weapons were viable alternatives to any acts of aggression.80 
Nevertheless, Richard Crossman's comments revealed the serious divisions 
that existed between Labour's front-bench colleagues. Although he began 
with a scathing attack on the Government, Crossman believed that Brown's 
suggestion, that Britain could bridge the gap between police action and 
thermo-nuclear war with tactical nuclear weapons, was nonsense. He argued 
that Britain and her European allies should halt their reliance on nuclear 
weapons and instead, improve their conventional forces.81 Outside 
Parliament, the row escalated further when Gaitskell publicly defended the 
British Bomb because it guaranteed a measure of independence from the 
United States, and Brown warned that unilateralism would cause American 
isolationism and the break up of NATO. In response, 19 Labour MPs 
demanded that Britain unilaterally abandon the H-bomb, and that Labour 
should give its full support to the planned CND London-Aldermaston march 
at Easter.82 
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At this stage, Labour's nuclear policy was under attack from all sides. The 
Tories condemned Labour, entirely characteristically, for opposing British 
national interests. Of more significance, was the way in which internal 
pressure had forced the leadership onto the defensive in an effort to maintain 
unity.83 Gaitskell had previously persuaded his NEC colleagues to accept the 
joint statement on 26 February, subject to TUC approval. However, when the 
talks resumed, the draft included a new provision for 'an international 
declaration banning the use of all nuclear weapons'. The widely different 
interpretations placed on this caused further disagreement. Bevan, who had 
accepted the earlier draft, demanded that a future Labour Government would 
never use nuclear weapons first; a view supported by Castle, Summerskill, 
Cousins and Willis. Gaitskell argued that such a pledge would be disastrous 
because, ' .. .if the Russians believe us ... the power of deterrence is removed'. 
Responding to criticism over how Labour's official policy resembled that of 
the Government, Crossman suggested that Britain should consider 
abandoning its nuclear weapons entirely if this ensured non-proliferation. 
When the meeting ended, they had only agreed to defer 'first use' and to 
organise a national campaign to publicise the new statement.84 
As Gaitskell pointed out, Labour policy differed from the Government's over 
the cessation of tests, nuclear patrols and the construction of American 
missile sites. Nevertheless, the wider issue - the future of the British 
deterrent- was not discussed and the leadership's commitment to 
multilateralism remained intact. Disarmament & Nuclear War, seen as an 
attempt to ward off the challenge from the anti-nuclear lobby, did not settle 
the dispute.85 As the leadership were unwilling to make any further 
concessions, and while the Left remained oblivious to anything less than the 
total renunciation of the British Bomb, the gulf between the two sides could 
do little but widen. 
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Although Gaitskell had maintained control of policy-making through the 
NEC, he held a series of secret meetings with senior colleagues in March, 
with the obvious intention of heading off further problems.86 These 
discussions concluded that tactical nuclear weapons could counter 
conventional attacks, rather than an immediate resort to thermo-nuclear 
retaliation. Although there was no pledge on 'first use' (in case it was 
misunderstood), H-bombs would only be used against thermo-nuclear 
attacks. Despite Crossman's misgivings and his argument for a non-nuclear 
club, he and Bevan accepted the majority's preferences.87 According to 
Williams, Gaitskell's objective had been to restore his relationship with 
Bevan and reach agreement on the nuclear problem, while the balanced 
membership ensured that the different views would be represented.88 This 
may have been the case. Nevertheless, Crossman's recollection that Bevan 
had been persuaded to support Gaitskell beforehand, is worth considering.89 
With the convinced multilateralist majority and Bevan on board, the 
meeting had been heavily weighted in Gaitskell's favour before it had even 
begun. 
On 26 March, the NEC discussed the forthcoming Labour Campaign for 
Disarmament and a draft pamphlet by John Strachey. Entitled Scrap All The 
H-Bombs, this document argued that Britain must retain thermo-nuclear 
weapons until multilateral disarmament could be achieved. Strachey warned 
that any concession to unilateralism would lead to neutralism, as the United 
States might return to isolation and cause NATO's disintegration. Although 
Gaitskell and the multilateralists wanted the document published as a 
clarification of official policy, there were objections from the anti-nuclear 
lobby.90 Although it was not actually endorsed, Gaitskell's forceful support 
for Strachey's pamphlet indicated his determination to win over the 
waverers. Like his colleague, he had presented them with the stark choice: 
adherence to Labour's official policy or the consequences of unilateralism. 
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In the following weeks, while Gaitskell continued to spell out the political 
dangers of unilateralism, the Labour sponsored disarmament campaign 
competed with the London to Aldermaston Easter march, organised by CND. 
Many CND supporters attended the Labour rally in Trafalgar Square which 
attracted a crowd of nearly 12,000. Labour speakers, including Gaitskell and 
Bevan, concentrated on the issue of H-bomb tests and appealed for unity 
within the Labour Movement.91 While reaction to Disarmament & Nuclear 
War and Labour's Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament had provoked 
outright hostility from CND, the unilateralists within the Party who hoped to 
use Labour's campaign to radicalise official policy, were disappointed. As 
Michael Foot wrote, ' .. .in April 1958 the [Labour Party's] appeal jarred 
hopelessly with the spirit of Aldermaston'.92 
As long as the leadership remained impervious to their pleas, there was little 
that the Labour unilateralists could do, other than try to win over the trade 
unions and rank and file to their cause and thus exert pressure through that 
avenue. However, two important factors prevented this. The first was 
Gaitskell's insistence that the only choice was between Labour's official 
policy and unilateralism. The second was that CND's impact within the trade 
unions was slight at this stage. Related to both, were the leadership's appeals 
for unity and the in-built conservatism of most Labour supporters; many of 
whom believed that possession of the Bomb was as much in Britain's 
interests as any Government supporter. The trades union conference round 
of 1958 confirmed this. In April, USDAW set the scene when it approved 
Labour's official policy and consigned a unilateralist resolution to a heavy 
defeat. Throughout the rest of the summer, all the other major unions 
followed suit. In September, the TUC conference also overwhelmingly 
endorsed the official policy. With the block vote lined up behind them, this 
meant that the leadership was certain of victory at the forthcoming 
Scarborough conference. 
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Three official defence and foreign policy resolutions (the most important of 
which was Disarmament & Nuclear War) recommended by the NEC were 
considered at the 1958 Scarborough conference.93 Official policy was 
challenged by four composites, notably No.27, an explicit unilateralist 
resolution, which demanded that the next Labour administration cease the 
manufacture and testing of nuclear weapons and prohibit their use from 
British territory.94 During the debate the leadership, including Bevan, all 
stressed Labour's differences with government policy, reiterated their case 
against unilateralism and appealed for unity in the lead up to the general 
election. 
George Brown defended the deterrent because it guaranteed influence in 
disarmament negotiations. He argued that if it was surrendered, Britain 
would be wholly dependent on the United States. Brown warned that if ill 
nuclear weapons were abandoned, as the unilateralists wanted, the 
advantages of tactical nuclear weapons over conventional forces would be 
diminished. Gaitskell also rejected the unilateralis t case, although his speech 
indicated that disagreement was about means rather than ends. He warned 
that a unilateral stand by Britain would be ineffective, as it would not 
persuade the USA and USSR to follow suit, and leave Britain unprotected. 
He also believed that it was impossible to decide at this stage what a future 
Labour Government could do. On nuclear proliferation, Gaitskell 
acknowledged that the idea of a 'non-nuclear club' was a 'powerful 
argument', but only if it could be policed effectively and included all other 
countries apart from the USA and USSR. Despite some dissent, the appeal 
for unity won the day, the NEC recommendations were accepted and all four 
composite resolutions rejected.95 
There is no doubt that the 1958 conference provided little more than a rubber 
stamp for the leadership's preferred policy. Nevertheless, Gaitskell's 
acknowledgement of the non-nuclear club was interesting. This implied that 
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non-proliferation might take precedence over political and strategic 
considerations; if adopted, this would signal a clear departure in Labour's 
existing policy. However, as it was highly unlikely that either China or 
France would miss the opportunity to become nuclear powers (well known to 
defence specialists like Healey and acknowledged by Gaitskell himself earlier 
in 1958), this tacit acceptance suggests that the idea represented a tactical move 
to maintain unity rather than a bold gesture. Indeed, any conversion by 
Gaitskell to this particular alternative and the motives behind it was 
dismissed by Alastair Hetherington (Editor of the Manchester Guardian) 
because it appeared 'almost too sudden'. After an 'off the record' 
conversation with Gaitskell, Hetherington recorded that although the Labour 
leader expressed some sympathy for the idea, he was actually 'completely 
against the proposal•.96 
Although conference success was certain because of the union block vote, 
Gaitskell and the leadership were well aware that anti-nuclear agitation could 
cause serious problems. With the challenge from CND and VFS throughout 
1958, Labour was indeed in danger of 'leading from behind' and Gaitskell was 
anxious to reverse this situation and regain the initiative. Under these 
circumstances it is quite feasible to suggest that the non-nuclear club was used 
to dampen the left-wing challenge and promote unity, in the safe knowledge 
that it could never be put into practice. 
In 1957, with Bevan's help, the Labour leadership had extricated themselves 
from the embarrassment which an equivocal policy statement would have 
encountered if released. A similar option was not available in 1958 because 
by then, anti-nuclear agitation had increased dramatically. To many, Labour's 
official acceptance of the deterrent concept and their rigid adherence to 
multilateralism had undermined their claim to the moral highground. As a 
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result, 1958 witnessed the growth of groups wholly committed to the anti-
nuclear cause within and outside the Labour movement: VFS and CND. 
Although the TUC had recognised this mood, the leadership only reacted 
when the issue threatened to split Labour altogether. In a belated attempt to 
ward off the challenge, they had attempted to regain the initiative by 
attacking Conservative policy. However, the leadership were hampered by 
their own rigid commitment to the Bomb, and their opposition was restricted 
to that of detail rather than substance. Labour's policy presentation, whether 
private or public, was regarded as confused and open to misinterpretation. 
Divisions, not always restricted to a straight left-right split abounded, whether 
in the Shadow Cabinet, the PLP, the constituencies or unions. Disarmament 
and Nuclear War and Labour's Campaign for Disarmament had been 
introduced in an attempt to reconcile the factions, but while the leadership 
remained committed to the principle of multilateral disarmament, the gulf 
remained. 
If the leadership had been as anxious to maintain unity as they so often 
professed, there was little evidence of the authentic compromise needed in 
order to achieve it. Instead, although alarmed by the divisions that surfaced, 
they supported a nuclear policy that was bound to exacerbate the differences. 
The main reason for this, was Gaitskell's determination to present Labour to 
the British people as a party that could be trusted with Britain's defence. 
With tight control over the policy-making process, allied to the trades union 
block vote, Gaitskell was assured of dragging Labour along without the need 
for compromise.97 If dissent threatened, appeals for loyalty and solidarity 
along with cosmetic additions to policy served to maintain control. Similar 
appeals had worked in 1958, but with increased anti-nuclear agitation, and 
while Gaitskell's commitment to the deterrent remained solid, Labour was 
set on the road to collision sooner or later. 
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3. The Fuse is Lit: From Scarborough to the General Election 
Like Brighton in 1957, the Scarborough conference appeared to convince the 
Labour leaders that the nuclear issue had been settled. They had not 
deviated from their allegiance to multilateralism and only some superficial 
changes had been necessary in order to fend off the pressure exerted by the 
unilateralists. Nevertheless, after several months of inactivity, the spread of 
anti-nuclear feeling in the trade unions forced the leadership to reassess their 
defence policy. The result, on the surface at least, appeared to represent a 
significant change, as Labour turned to the non-nuclear club. However, this 
concept was rejected by the unilateralists because it was too modest and 
contaminated by the leadership's endorsement.98 When Frank Cousins 
persuaded the T&GWU to reject the official defence policy, the leadership 
faced a serious challenge. If the other unions followed suit, the block vote 
could be turned against them making an unprecedented conference defeat 
possible. However, the proposed non-nuclear club and the imminence of a 
general election worked in the leadership's favour . In the end, Gaitskell and 
his colleagues were saved by Macmillan's decision to call this in October 1959. 
Having defeated the unilateralists at Scarborough, Gaitskell quickly 
reinforced Labour's official policy. In a statement prepared for the NEC at the 
end of October, he also attempted to widen the argument between Labour and 
Tory policy. He reiterated the pledge to suspend British nuclear tests and 
attacked the Government's 'dangerously one-sided reliance' on nuclear 
weapons. Despite the harsh words, the statement still conceded little, as it 
emphasised the link between conventional and nuclear disarmament, the 
retention of British nuclear weapons and the commitment to NAT0.99 
Further evidence that Labour policy still mirrored that of the Government 
was revealed in February 1959 when the new Defence White Paper was 
published. In the parliamentary debate, Sandys' admission, that the policy of 
'massive retaliation' was too 'inflexible' and that tactical nuclear weapons 
were of considerable value, was virtually identical to the arguments put by 
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Brown and Strachey.100 Although Labour continued to criticise the Tories 
over strategic weapons, these two instances actually demonstrated closer bi-
partisanship. At least one Shadow Cabinet member expressed his horror at 
this.lOl 
U convergence of Labour policy with that of the Tories worried many in the 
Party, the NEC did not appear to share the same concern when it met to to see 
if it needed revision.102 At the meeting, Anthony Greenwood proposed that 
a future Labour Government should end production of the H-bomb and 
transfer British nuclear stocks to NATO or an alternative specialist authority. 
This was quickly ruled out, with what Greenwood privately described as a 
'witheringly discouraging reaction' .103 The rejection of Greenwood's motion 
illustrated the gulf between Labour's elite and unilateralist sentiments in the 
wider Movement. After CND's second Aldermaston march at Easter 1959, 
approximately 25,000 people attended the final rally in Trafalgar Square. The 
presence of Michael Foot, Robert Willis (Chairman of the TUC) and Frank 
Cousins prompted renewed fears of a split.104 David Ennals (Secretary of the 
International Department) warned Gaitskell that the leadership had slipped 
too far behind the rest of the Movement, and had placed themselves in a 
dangerous position.10s 
Macmillan's public admission in April, that radio active fall-out levels had 
doubled in Britain since May 1958, compounded the problem. When the 
International Sub-Committee met on 12 May, Bevan again insisted that 
Labour would 'end' British tests which clashed with Gaitskell's preference for 
'suspension'.106 This was exacerbated on 3 June when the NEC approved a 
TUC memo, which demanded the end of nuclear tests and suggested a non-
nuclear club to prevent proliferation. Crossman believed that Gaitskell had 
not recognised the implications of the memo, and thought that it followed 
official policy.107 In fact, the memo had reinforced David Ennals' earlier 
warning, that the official policy was losing the Party support within the 
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Movement and the trade unions especially. The day after the NEC approved 
the TUC document, this was confirmed when the National Union of General 
and Municipal Workers (NUGMW}, one of the big six and of which Gaitskell 
himself was a member, voted to abandon nuclear weapons unilaterally.108 
The vote was a sensational reversal and convinced Bevan and some of his 
colleagues that a change in policy was urgently required if the other trade 
unions were to be diverted from following the NUGMW lead. When the 
International Sub-committee met on 9 and 18 June to discuss the issue, 
although Gaitskell and Bevan agreed on the non-nuclear club, they again 
argued over whether tests should be suspended or halted. According to 
Crossman, Gaitskell realised his earlier mistake and tried to alter the TUC 
statement.109 After further wrangling, Gaitskell's amendments were accepted 
and appeared in this form at the joint TUC I NEC meeting the next day.110 
In one respect at least, the non-nuclear dub, the draft marked a departure 
from Labour's previous policy. This proposed the abandonment of British 
nuclear weapons if the other (prospective) powers, apart from the USA and 
USSR, abandoned theirs. Nevertheless, Gaitskell's cautious approach was 
evident as the draft stressed that any decisions taken would not bind a future 
Labour administra tion. In addition, the draft's preamble, which claimed that 
recent international developments had made clarification of policy necessary, 
was without doubt a response to the NUGMW vote.111 
When the NEC and TUC International sub-committees met on 23 June, both 
Willis and Cousins attacked the draft document. Cousins questioned the 
ambiguity over the 'suspension' of tests, 'first use' and dismissed the non-
nuclear club as China was bound to refuse to join it. Bevan dismissed 
Cousins' criticism out of hand, ridiculed the policy-making capacity of the 
TUC and warned them that such objections would bring about Labour's 
electoral defeat.112 While the PLP accepted the draft, it provoked another row 
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at the separate meetings of the NEC and TUC convened to ratify it on 24 
June.113 In the NEC, while the unilateralists had been persuaded to accept the 
policy, some of the right-wing members (notably Bacon and Watson) opposed 
the non-nuclear club because they felt it conceded too much to the Left. 
However, when put to the vote, which the unilateralists had been urged not 
to force, Gaitskell and Bevan's preference were accepted by 28 votes to 4.114 
At the TUC the ratio against the policy, though slightly higher at 23 to 6, was 
also defeated.115 
The new document, Disarmament and Nuclear War: The Next Step was 
released on 24 June 1959. Reactions to the document's main focus, the non-
nuclear club, were mixed. While the Times and Guardian favoured the idea, 
the left-wing press was generally critical. Tribune. which had endorsed 
unilateralism early on, was understandably hostile. The New Statesman. 
which had initially supported the concept as an advance on the previous 
policy, called it unrealistic. Like the Guardian. it raised reservations over 
how a Labour administration would persuade other prospective nuclear 
powers to follow their lead. It felt that the policy left the leadership open to 
charges of making proposals which they knew would be rejected. The Daily 
Herald also considered the plan untenable and reverted to its earlier position, 
that Labour should break the nuclear deadlock by abandoning nuclear 
weapons altogether.116 
Within the Party, the document suffered heavy criticism. Some right-
wingers had already criticised it, but of course the biggest threat came from 
the Left. Many Party activists who had hoped for a more radical shift, 
believed that the new policy was simply a ploy to win their support. 
Prominent members of VFS such as Sydney Silverman attacked the non-
nuclear club as nonsensical, and most remained committed to 
unilateralism.117 Richard Crossman, although a long-time advocate of the 
idea, wrote that 70 per cent of activists were against the policy and that if it 
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was presented to Conference under these circumstances, the effect would be 
disastrous.118 
While the left-wing press, party activists and some members of the PLP had 
all criticised the new document, the leadership's paramount concern centred 
on the reaction of the T&GWU's leader, Frank Cousins. He had already 
opposed the document throughout its consultative stages. With a general 
election near and the possibility of a dangerous split developing if the 
T&GWU went over to unilateralism at their July conference, some Labour 
leaders believed that they needed Cousins' co-operation. According to 
Goodman, Bevan went out of his way to win the union leader over, but to no 
avail as Cousins was 'prepared to see the whole thing through ... and would 
not give up' .119 
Gaitskell did not appear to be as concerned as some of his colleagues. Cousins 
had written to the Labour leader on 26 June and expressed serious 
reservations over the non-nuclear club, the nuclear tests and 'first use'. 
Gaitskell's long reply argued that unilateralism was not an option and he 
warned Cousins against any commitments that could seriously embarrass a 
future Labour Government. He also dismissed the idea of a 'first use' pledge, 
because 'NATO armies are heavily outnumbered in conventional forces' by 
the Soviet bloc and that such a pledge would 'run ... the risk of encouraging 
them to act first'. According to Williams, Gaitskell's reply was tactful and 
conciliatory.120 Nevertheless, as the Labour leader had actually conceded 
little, this view lacks credibility. 
Gaitskell's lack of concern about Cousins was illustrated in a private 
conversation with Hetherington, during a discussion on the same day (9 July) 
that the union leader attacked him at the T&GWU conference. Disparaging 
the union leader as ambitious, a demagogue and shallow, Gaitskell told 
Hetherington that while Cousins' motion (published the previous night) had 
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gone further than he had expected and 'would certainly carry the T&GWU 
with him', it would not carry the rest of the Party because they would back its 
leader.121 No doubt encouraged by the NUM and NUR decisions to reject 
unilateralism at their annual conferences on 8 July, Gaitskell's attitude, along 
with Cousins' comments before he left for his union's conference, made a 
clash inevitable. During the defence debate at the T&GWU conference, 
Cousins openly challenged Gaitskell. After a fierce condemnation of the 
Party's official policy, the T&GWU leader concluded that it was not just 
crucial ' ... to elect a Labour government. The most important thing is to elect 
a Labour government determined to carry out a socialist policy'. Despite 
heated exchanges with loyalists beforehand, the T&GWU unilateralist 
resolution was carried by 760 votes to 50.122 
Although Gaitskell and his close colleagues must have realised the threat 
posed by this, the Labour leader initially played down the differences. The 
day after Cousins' speech (10 July), Gaitskell admitted that although there 
were 'disagreements' over policy, they would be settled at the Party's annual 
conference.123 Nevertheless, bolstered by NUR and NUM support and the 
recognition that the leadership could benefit from meeting the left-wing 
challenge head-on, Gaitskell responded in a speech at Workington. In this, 
he defended the proposed non-nuclear club as the only means to halt 
proliferation. After he had dismissed a declaration over 'first use' and 
refused to rule out tests completely, he ridiculed the unilateralists. He 
warned that the logic of their case would result in a British withdrawal from 
NATO, which would be 'escapist, myopic and positively dangerous to the 
peace of the world'. Gaitskell then turned to Cousins' T&GWU speech and 
the question of conference sovereignty, 
' ... our Party decisions on these matters are not dictated by one man 
whether he be the Leader ... our spokesman on Foreign Affairs, or 
the General Secretary of the Transport & General Workers Union. 
They are made collectively ... but it is not right that a future Labour 
Government should be committed by Conference decisions one 
way or the other on every matter of detail for all time ... A Labour 
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Government will take into account the views of the Conference, 
but ... annual conference does not mandate a government.'124 
This speech was significant because it confirmed Gaitskell's determination to 
concede nothing to the unilateralists, and made it explicit that any decision 
taken at conference in support of unilateralism could be ignored. 
The Workington speech received a mixed reception. To those on the centre 
and right, worried that Cousins and the Left would damage Labour's electoral 
prospects, Gaitskell had acted in a 'positive manner'.125 In contrast, earlier 
left-wing jubilation at Cousins' T&GWU speech was tempered by Gaitskell's 
response, then smashed by the news that the other union that had swung to 
unilateralism, the NUGMW, was to reconsider Labour's official policy 
statement. It had been this union's vote to support unilateralism in June, 
that convinced many on the Left that the block vote could be turned against 
the leadership at conference. At a special meeting on 21 August, the 
NUGMW indeed changed their previous stance. This vote, which supported 
the official line by 194 to 139, effectively destroyed the Left's confidence of 
defeating the leadership.126 
The NUGMW's 'conversion' left Cousins and his support for unilateralism 
isolated. With the NUM, NUR and (by August) the NUGMW behind the 
official policy, the T&GWU had little chance of success at the TUC's 
September conference. Four separate resolutions were debated: one from the 
AEU which supported the official policy; from the Engineering and 
Shipbuilding Draughtsmen, which demanded that the American nuclear 
missile bases be halted; the T&GWU resolution, which rejected the non-
nuclear club and finally, the Fire Brigades Union, which wanted the total 
abolition of British nuclear weapons. Most of the results were of little 
surprise: the AEU's resolution was carried overwhelmingly, the T&GWU's 
and the Fire Brigades defeated. Nevertheless, the Shipbuilders resolution, 
supported by the NUM, the two Post Office unions and the T&GWU was 
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passed, albeit with a narrow majority. Despite the success against 
unilateralism, this left the TUC committed to oppose American missile bases 
in Britain, a line clearly at odds with official Labour policy.127 
This vote posed a problem for the Party leadership. Prior to the 1958 
conference, Labour's official policy had been endorsed by the trade union 
block vote on virtually every issue. With the approach of the 1959 annual 
conference, the resolution on missile sites threatened to become a rallying 
point for dissent. In addition, over 120 resolutions had been submitted to the 
NEC, many of which were explicitly unilateralist.128 While many Labour 
MPs had refrained from openly criticising the official policy because of the 
possibility of a general election and the appeals for unity, others, especially 
those in VFS, were not so reticent. They also argued that Labour should be 
united, but only in fighting the election on the issue of unilateral 
disarmament.129 
With such a large number of trade unionists, constituency parties and MPs 
opposed to the leadership's policy, it was almost inevitable that a major row 
over the Bomb at conference would occur. However, as Gaitskell had 
suspected, Macmillan announced that a general election was to take place on 
8 October.130 Not surprisingly, a strong desire to regain office persuaded the 
warring factions to unite behind the leadership and, for a while at least, the 
differences were put to one side. Labour's election pamphlet, Britain Belongs 
to You, concentrated on domestic matters and foreign policy was relegated to 
the back page. It is noticeable that the defence section was phrased so as to 
avoid anything contentious, and ambiguous enough to appeal to all the 
various factions. This emphasised Labour's commitment to Britain's 
international leadership and attacked the Tories' 'dangerous' reliance on 
nuclear weapons. It claimed that Labour 'set the pace', had advocated 'the 
only concrete proposals' designed to halt nuclear proliferation and left 'the 
way open to world wide disarmament'.131 Apart from this, the H-bomb 
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hardly featured in Labour's election campaign, despite CND's 'special week' 
in mid-September and their list of 72 Labour candidates who supported 
unilateralism.132 
Although the election was fought mainly on domestic issues, Macmillan had 
already astutely exploited foreign policy issues since the spring of 1959. He 
had been assisted over the nuclear issue by the temporary suspension of tests 
by both superpowers and his adoption of popular Labour policies, such as 
European disengagement and summit talks.133 In addition, the Prime 
Minister also benefited from Labour's divisions over nuclear policy and had 
presented them to the electorate as a party unfit to be trusted with Britain's 
defences. In the event, Labour was never given the chance to show what its 
policies for nuclear disarmament could achieve, as the Tories won the 
general election held on 8 October 1959, and once again increased their 
parliamentary majority. 
Until mid-1959, Labour's official defence policy remained firmly committed 
to the concept of deterrence and multilateral disarmament. Despite 
differences in emphasis and Gaitskell's claims of a distinct policy, it 
effectively mirrored that of the Government. This bi-partisanship appeared 
to end with the release of Disarmament and Nuclear War: The Next Step in 
June 1959. In many ways the central plank of this new policy, the non-
nuclear club, as Michael Gordon caustically observes, was a form of 
conditional unilateralism which allowed the Labour leadership to regain the 
moral highground. As Haseler suggests, this maintained 'the overall 
framework in which multilateralism operated for it rejected any unilateral 
action by a British government ... without the agreement of others'.l34 
Whatever its merits in theory, the plan was unlikely to succeed in practice as 
France and China, both eager to become nuclear powers, would almost 
certainly have rejected it. Nevertheless, the scheme had temporarily headed 
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off the unilateralist pressure within the Movement, enabled Labour to 
present a united front and prevented what might have been a catastrophic 
split just before a general election. 
The evidence certainly suggests that the scheme's principal aim was to fend 
off the unilateralist challenge and promote unity, rather than any genuine 
attempt to achieve world disarmament. Although the joint NEC I TUC 
policy statement had originally been planned for release in July, it was 
brought forward, ostensibly because of 'recent international developments'. 
It appears more than likely that it was released early because of the 
NUGMW's swing to unilateralism, and the knock-on effect that this could 
have on the other unions. Gaitskell and the leadership only reluctantly 
adopted the non-nuclear club (proposals for which had been constantly 
rejected between February 1958 and March 1959) as the most effective option 
with which to maintain unity, preserve multilateralism and prevent the 
slide towards unilateralism. In this respect, Anthony Greenwood's 
contemporary assessment of the non-nuclear club a month after Labour's 
election defeat is worth noting, 
' .. .I believe that the Party failed to carry conviction about the non-
nuclear club because they were not themselves convinced. It was 
so obviously a compromise policy, reluctantly accepted in order 
to avoid facing the real issues ... but that is off the record.'135 
Conclusion 
Apart from Bevan's outburst against Attlee over the question of 'first use' in 
April 1955, the H-bomb did not achieve political prominence until 1957. That 
it did so then was largely due to increased awareness over: the dangers of 
radio-active fall-out; the admission that nuclear armed patrols were using 
British airspace; the announcement that American fixed rocket sites were to 
be based in Britain; the doctrine of 'massive nuclear retaliation'; and the 
escalation of the arms race. These issues convinced many that the possibility 
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of a nuclear catastrophe could not be ignored, and led to the formation of 
CND at the beginning of 1958. 
In political terms, there was little to choose between the Conservative and 
Labour front benches over the Bomb. The Labour leadership had been as 
anxious to preserve Britain's influence and prestige as any Tory and assumed 
that possession of nuclear weapons confirmed this. The Attlee 
administration had decided, in great secrecy and at high cost, that Britain 
should manufacture nuclear weapons in the first place. Back in opposition, 
Labour quite willingly accepted the Tory Government's decision to produce 
thermo-nuclear weapons. While continually expressing support for 
disarmament, the Labour leadership believed that the nuclear deterrent was 
the only way to maintain British defences while the Warsaw Pact had such an 
advantage in conventional forces. Although they wanted to reduce the arms 
race, they believed that this could only be achieved through multilateral 
negotiations which must include conventional and nuclear forces. 
There were of course, some differences with the Government. The policy of 
'massive retaliation', which raised the spectre of all-out nuclear war even if 
the West was subjected to a conventional attack, was of concern; as were 
nuclear tests, nuclear armed patrols and the American missile sites. 
Nevertheless, the Labour leadership was caught in a dilemma when they 
tried to establish alternative policies. Economic considerations had been the 
prime motivation behind Duncan Sandys' adoption of 'massive retaliation', 
and was intended to reduce expensive conventional armaments and cut 
manpower. Labour had long pressed for such cuts but could not suggest an 
effective alternative which preserved Britain's defences, prestige and 
influence. On nuclear tests they wanted their suspension, but recognised that 
if they had the Bomb, it had to be tested. The siting of American missile bases 
was also a problem, for a Labour administration had agreed to British based 
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American nuclear-bombers in the first place. In principle, there was little 
difference between this and the proposed missile sites. 
In 1959, bi-partisanship appeared to slide as Labour turned to the non-nuclear 
club: a scheme whereby Britain would renounce her nuclear weapons if the 
other (prospective) powers, apart from the Soviet Union and United States, 
renounced theirs. Yet even here, the commitment to multilateralism still 
remained, as the proposal was conditional on international agreement and 
the understanding that Britain would nQ1 act alone. Even so, Labour had 
appeared to part company with government policy in detail, if not principle. 
There is little doubt that there was increased concern over the escalation of 
the arms race along with a genuine desire for disarmament. It is also 
conceivable that the Labour leadership wanted a distinctive policy in 
international affairs and that the nuclear issue provided this, without 
questioning Britain's overall world role. Nevertheless, the evidence suggests 
that the over-riding consideration was defensive, and had been adopted in 
order to counter the dramatic increase in anti-nuclear agitation. 
Like the Labour leadership, the Left had taken little notice of the nuclear issue 
until 1955. They had been preoccupied with other matters such as Korea and 
German rearmament. Nevertheless, the escalation of the arms race, 
exacerbated by the development of thermo-nuclear weapons, increased the 
profile of this danger in left-wing circles. The attraction of this issue was not 
simply a desire to rid the world of the horrors of nuclear weapons, although 
of course many genuinely wanted this. Like the rest of the Party, the Left 
wanted Britain's world leadership, but on a moral level rather than the 
political one preferred by Gaitskell and his colleagues. Of more significance, 
and as with most other issues, the Bomb was also closely bound to the Left's 
desire to challenge the revisionist leadership. 
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With the moral crusade coupled to the wish to mould the Party in their own 
image, the Left took up the cry of 'Ban the Bomb' with a vengeance. The 
agitation against British nuclear weapons in all sections of the Party and 
wider Movement caused serious problems for Labour's elite. The formation 
of CND and re-emergence of VFS in early 1958, the critical left-wing press 
throughout and the T&GWU's conversion to unilateralism in July 1959, all 
forced the leadership on to the defensive. Between 1957 and 1959 this was 
demonstrated by the succession of policy statements and the proposal for the 
non-nuclear club. Yet, no matter how much the leadership attempted to 
regain the initiative and plead for unity, the Left rejected their advances. 
Nevertheless, any notion that the Left dictated the pace is also problematic. 
The leadership never conceded anything of real substance even though unity 
was so obviously threatened. Unilateralism was rejected time and again, 
despite the forlorn compromise formulae devised by Crossman and others. 
While the Left's demands had forced the leadership to react, it was Gaitskell's 
control over policy that held the unilateralists at bay, at least until after the 
1959 general election. Philip Williams maintains that between 1957-59 
Gaitskell went out of his way to be conciliatory and unite the Party, even over 
the nuclear issue. Yet, the furore over nuclear tests, American missile bases 
and the non-nuclear club suggests the contrary: that Gaitskell and his close 
colleagues were unwilling to concede anything until absolutely forced to do 
so, even if it threatened unity. Not until the summer of 1959, when they 
recognised the consequences of the unions turning to unilateralism and 
causing a conference defeat, did the leadership really respond. Even here, 
Gaitskell warned that conference decisions might well be ignored. In the 
event, the leadership was saved from this embarrassment when Macmillan 
called the general election. This brought the factions together in the interests 
of presenting a united front to the electorate and a thirst for regaining office. 
1 5 1 
While Gaitskell was not alone in his commitment to British national 
interests, it was his close control over the decision-making process that 
dominated Labour's nuclear policy in this period, and one which 
demonstrates the strength of the McKenzie - Haseler thesis. With this and 
the support of the individual trade union 'barons' and their block vote (the 
Kavanagh thesis), Gaitskell was assured of success. His control over nuclear 
policy between 1957-59 was only lost when he ignored the attachment of 
many of his supporters to Clause IV after the October election defeat. With 
his under-estimation of this sentimental attachment, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, Gaitskell inadvertently left himself open to defeat over defence 
in 1960. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Balloon Goes Up! The Bomb 1959-62 
The 1959 general election was a disaster for the Labour Party. Not only had 
the Conservatives won their third successive election victory, they had also 
increased their overall parliamentary majority. For Labour supporters this 
was all the more crushing as many of them, including Gaitskell, considered 
that this had represented their best opportunity of returning to power.1 After 
the defeat, the fragile unity that existed up to the election swiftly evaporated 
and was replaced by a phase of internal warfare that surpassed almost 
anything in the period 1951-59, and culminated in the 1960 conference defeat. 
In the immediate aftermath of the election a split quickly grew over the 
reasons behind the defeat. To many on the right-wing of the Party, Labour 
had lost because it no longer reflected the hopes and aspirations of the British 
electorate. Gaitskell and some of his close colleagues concluded that Labour 
should reject class-based dogmas and unpopular measures like further 
nationalisation.2 At the Party's annual conference, Gaitskell angered the Left 
and alarmed the moderates when he argued that Labour's continued 
adherence to Clause IV misrepresented the Party's aims and objectives and 
caused a negative effect on potential supporters.3 Conversely, many on the 
Left believed that the defeat had been caused by the similarities of the 
'revisionist' leadership to the Tory Government: that Labour had not lost by 
being too left-wing, rather that they had not been radical enough. The 
revisionists' appeal to the electorate and the critique of nationalisation was 
therefore greeted with hostility, as the Left believed this challenged the very 
fundamentals of Labourism. 4 
In fact, the attack on Clause IV, although unsuccessful, was an error of 
judgement that proved to have profound consequences for Gaitskell's 
leadership. Against the advice of even his closest revisionist supporters, he 
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had left himself vulnerable to attack from his traditional opponents on the 
Left, but of more significance, he had attracted suspicion from many of his 
erstwhile supporters amongst the trade union leadership, few of whom were 
prepared to break with this symbolic commitment.5 The distrust that 
Gaitskell's actions caused, inadvertently forced them into an uneasy alliance 
with the fundamentalist Left. This meant that the union block vote could no 
longer be guaranteed to support the leadership. Not only had Gaitskell 
seriously undermined his own position over domestic policy, but he had 
chosen to do so at the most inopportune moment possible, just as the nuclear 
dispute escalated. 
The Left, usually marginalised by right-wing trades union support for the 
leadership, were quick to exploit this situation. The rift over nuclear policy, 
which had widened since 1957, was increasingly superimposed on to this 
struggle between the warring factions and provided the means with which to 
challenge the leadership. Disillusion over attempts to change Clause Nand 
growing unilateralist sentiment in the trades unions forced Gaitskell on to 
the defensive and worked, albeit briefly, to the Left's advantage. Although 
the leadership abandoned the principle of a British independent nuclear 
deterrent in April 1960, they were defeated at the Party's annual conference in 
October 1960. Samuel Beer, Michael Gordon and Lewis Minkin have used the 
left-wing success here to demonstrate the limitations of the primacy of the 
leadership argument put by McKenzie and Haseler. 
However, the left-wing victory was smaller than anticipated and short-lived. 
Despite widespread misgivings with his leadership and opportunistic 
challenges from some of his senior colleagues, Gaitskell's pledge to fight the 
conference decision, a strong desire for unity and the retreat from 
unilateralism all contributed to reversing the Scarborough defeat at Blackpool 
the following year. With unilateralism on the wane and the leader's position 
consolidated, the Government's decision to begin negotiations for entry into 
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the European Common Market helped heal the rift between the Left and 
Gaitskell. The result, was that the fierce opposition that Labour's nuclear 
policy had provoked melted away. 
Michael Gordon maintains that the main reasons for Gaitskell's victory at 
Blackpool was because the Labour leadership had already stolen most of the 
clothes of the original programme of CND.6 Philip Williams concedes that 
Gaitskell did accept commitments that he had previously rejected, but had 
done so as a prospective Prime Minister trying to keep a free hand for 
unlikely but unforseeable contingencies. He also suggests that on matters of 
principle, Gaitskell's actions were laudable? Stephen Haseler feels that there 
is little doubt that it was Gaitskell's leadership that was at stake in 1960-1961, 
rather than any particular defence strategy.8 
This chapter examines the tumultuous period following the 1959 general 
election to the defusing of the crisis in October 1962. At the time, this was cast 
as the point where bi-partisanship over the Bomb between the Government 
and Opposition came to an end.9 While the Tories had retreated from the 
1957 policy of 'massive nuclear retaliation', they clung to the concept of an 
independent British deterrent. In this sense, Labour's official defence policy 
had parted from that of the Government, though not without a struggle. Yet 
overall, the evidence suggests that the breach in bi-partisanship was 
negligible, as Labour's official adherence to multilateralism and the Atlantic 
Alliance remained as strong as ever. The result of Labour's reluctance to 
adopt a more radical stance was reflected in the bitter internal warfare that 
threatened to tear the party apart during this period. 
The chapter also demonstrates that while Gaitskell's position was seriously 
undermined because of the dispute over public ownership, he consistently 
refused to countenance the unilateralist demands. Indeed, as the McKenzie -
Haseler thesis argues, with control of Labour's elite intact, the Left had little 
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chance of turning their Scarborough success into long-term victory. It is also 
clear that far from upholding fundamental principles, the furore over the 
nuclear issue was actually a struggle between two factions eager for power. 
The 'rigid' stances taken by both sides were soon forgotten after Blackpool 
with the recognition that the unpopularity of the Tory Government might 
well result in Labour's return to power. This chapter is divided into three 
main sections: the first covers the period from the 1959 General election to 
the conference defeat in 1960; the second traces the recovery to victory at 
Blackpool the following year, while the third examines the dilution of the 
nuclear issue up to the Brighton conference of 1962. 
1. The Drift to Defeat: The General Election to Scarborough. 1960 
The general election defeat in October 1959 threw the Labour Party into a state 
of turmoil. While the Right advocated widescale revision of aims and 
objectives, the Left argued that fundamentalism had been vindicated. The 
arguments took on a new ferocity, and linked to the nuclear question, 
resulted in the drift to defeat for the leadership at Scarborough in 1960. 
Although arguments over defence policy had been cloaked during the 
election campaign, they re-emerged in February after the release of the 
Government's Defence White Paper.10 In the debate that followed, both 
Labour's official spokesmen, Brown and Strachey, questioned the 
Government over their decision to proceed with the Blue Streak ballistic 
missile system. Nevertheless, their concern centred on the operational 
drawbacks of Blue Streak compared to the advantages of the American Polaris 
system, rather than any wider reassessment of an independent British system 
in principle. In contrast, Crossman argued (as he had in 1958-9) that a British 
deterrent was unnecessary because of its economic, strategic and political 
disadvantages. Instead, he again suggested that the nuclear umbrella should 
be left to the Americans, which would allow Britain to concentrate on 
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building up its conventional forces. Gaitskell accepted the validity of some of 
Crossman's suggestions but believed, like Strachey, that Britain should retain 
its independent nuclear status so that 'excessive dependence upon the United 
States' could be avoided.11 
Despite Gaitskell's attempt to steer a middle course during the debate, the 
leadership's implicit acceptance of an independent British deterrent sparked 
off a revolt. Although a three-line whip had been imposed, 43 Labour MPs 
abstained from voting for the official amendment which opposed 
government policy .12 Of course, left-wing opposition to Labour's official 
defence policy was not new and had often been on a similar scale. 
Nevertheless, this particular revolt was significant, because the expected 
unilateralist and pacifist elements were joined by several of Labour's defence 
experts: Crossman, Shinwell and George Wigg. 
Philip Williams has conceded that on this occasion Gaitskell missed an 
opportunity to repudiate the independent British deterrent, 'to which he had 
never given more than tentative support'; that while there was growing 
evidence that the far Left were not the only ones attacking the independent 
deterrent - Liberals and some Conservatives were also voicing their doubts -
Gaitskell missed these signs, as he believed [mistakenly] that a change of 
policy would be resisted by Brown and Strachey.13 By the time Gaitskell 
realised his mistake in not making his reservations more explicit, it was too 
late. 
On 13 April, Gaitskell told the PLP that Labour's nuclear policy was to be 
reassessed. In a memo to several prominent TUC leaders, he appeared to 
accept that Britain 'should be prepared to give up our existing nuclear 
weapons', and consider other alternatives, including the non-nuclear club 
and even an American nuclear umbrella.14 Unfortunately, this was on the 
same day that the Government cancelled Blue Streak in favour of the 
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American Skybolt system. Although George Brown welcomed this decision, 
it was clear once again that Labour's official policy trailed behind the feeling 
in the wider Movement. For without a delivery system, any notion of an 
'independent' British Bomb appeared absurd and unrealistic.15 H Gaitskell 
had publicly revealed the contents of his memo outlining Labour's options 
on 13 April, he might have averted some of the bitter opposition he soon 
encountered. Instead, just four days later the Co-operative Party voted against 
Labour's official policy, while USDAW, against the advice of its leaders, voted 
to support unilateralism. Outside, but supported by a growing number 
within the Labour Movement, unilateralism had made further gains as the 
1960 CND Easter Aldermaston march demonstrated. 
While Gaitskell was away on a trip to Israel, Brown and Harold Wilson 
decided to act against the swing to unilateralism. When Parliament met to 
debate the cancellation of Blue Streak on 27 April, they both insisted that this 
effectively spelt the end of an independent British deterrent; a view that 
received widespread approval in the PLP.16 Even Anthony Crosland, one of 
Gaitskell's staunchest allies, supported the 'snap decision' taken by Brown 
and Wilson. In a letter to Gaitskell a few days later, he lamented the lack of 
political intelligence and forward planning that had led to the 'totally 
unnecessary upward defence battle'. He also criticised his leader for 'not 
being aware of how rapidly opinion was changing on the H-bomb' in the 
unions and the Parliamentary Party.17 
Meanwhile on 1 May, Gaitskell publicly rejected calls for a fundamental 
change of policy and accused its advocates of being 'pacifist, neutralist and 
unilateralist'. Privately, he appeared to support his colleagues' reappraisal up 
to a point when he considered the four alternatives contained in his earlier 
memo. Although he indicated that he had no clear preference and that any 
decision should be settled by joint meetings of the NEC I TUC, he failed to 
explicitly denounce the independent British Bomb.18 This had disastrous 
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consequences because, as Crosland was aware, many Labour members knew 
nothing of the options contained in the memo and due to Gaitskell's Mayday 
speech, assumed that he still supported the pre-Blue Streak nuclear policy.19 
At the same time, the attempts by Wilson and Brown to halt the drift to 
unilateralism failed. On 4 May, the AEU followed the Co-op and USDAW 
and rejected Labour's official defence policy. As the NUM and NUR 
conferences were due in July, urgent action was required if the unilateralist 
sentiment was to be prevented from taking hold in all the major unions.20 
With divisions over nuclear policy so widespread, this was no easy task. 
During preliminary discussions over the joint NEC I TUC talks, Gaitskell 
suggested that Shadow Cabinet members should be included, which 
provoked fierce opposition. Even though he had retreated from his earlier 
insistence that they should be able to vote, the participation and support of 
his close supporters made it inevitable that Gaitskell's views would prevail.21 
The result was a draft document produced by Gaitskell in collaboration with 
David Ennals. Divided into two parts, some progress appeared to have been 
made on the question of an independent British deterrent. For instance, the 
first part of the draft accepted that the West's nuclear shield should be left to 
the Americans, albeit with consultation over their use. Nevertheless, the 
latter part supported the retention of the V-bombers until they were obsolete 
or superseded by a non-nuclear club. Added to Gaitskell's insistence that 
Britain remain a member of NATO (which would keep nuclear weapons 
while the Soviet Union had them) it was clear that no substantive change of 
policy had occurred.22 
Although the draft was accepted, Gaitskell's behaviour (especially his 
insistence on Shadow Cabinet representation, lack of consultation and the 
speed of the draft) was attacked by critics and allies alike: even close 
supporters like Crosland, Jenkins and Patrick Gordon Walker were losing 
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patience with the Labour leader. As Dalton's diary records (and Philip 
Williams admits}, many of Gaitskell's former supporters were on the point of 
abandoning him.23 Because of the furore over the election defeat and his 
attempt to change the Party's constitution, it was hardly surprising that 
Gaitskell was placed in such a precarious position. However, his rigid line 
was helped when the British, American and Soviet disarmament summit 
collapsed after an American U2 spy-plane was shot down over the USSR on 1 
May. This incident served to harden Cold War attitudes.24 In particular, his 
robust defence of NATO ensured his widespread support from most of the 
PLP and simultaneously weakened the unilateralist case. Nevertheless, the 
Gaitskell-Ennals draft still had to be passed by the tripartite meeting of the 
NEC, TUC and Shadow Cabinet, and this led to further trouble. 
After further redrafting by Crossman, the document was presented on 31 May 
and immediately caused arguments between Gaitskell and Cousins, the 
T&GWU leader. This was because Gaitskell's insistence that NATO must 
retain nuclear weapons as long as the Soviet Union had them, had been left 
out of Crossman's draft.25 Cousins had approved Crossman's draft because of 
this omission, but when Gaitskell wanted it reintroduced, he concluded that a 
compromise was impossible.26 According to Williams, the row arose because 
Gaitskell realised that Crossman's draft was designed to give as little 
provocation to the Left as possible, and that the leader was not prepared to 
compromise on fundamentals. He suggests that it was what was said at the 
meeting rather than the actual draft that caused the hostility, and that 
Cousins was provoked by his colleagues in the TUC, not by GaitskellP 
Cousins certainly believed that there were 'fundamental differences' but he 
was also well aware of Gaitskell's (and the majority of the PLP's) insistence 
that NATO should retain the Bomb while the Soviet Union still had it.28 At 
the same time, Williams' admission - that Gaitskell would not concede 
anything because Crossman's draft might be accepted by the Left -
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demonstrated the Labour leader's intransigence and made a clash inevitable. 
Of course, it can be argued that while the T&GWU leader was an idealist 
intent on imposing a unilateralist policy on the Labour Party, Gaitskell was 
the prospective Prime Minister unwilling to make concessions which he 
believed were against the national interest. Whatever the merits of either 
argument, both men were set on a collision course that could have been 
avoided, as subsequent events illustrated. 
A revised draft was considered on 21 June. Despite reservations from some of 
those present, Gaitskell successfully pushed through a number of further 
amendments. 29 Although the TUC were reluctant to accept it, the NEC were 
anxious to issue a policy statement before the main trades unions conferences 
took place in July. Ironically, in view of the previous arguments between 
Cousins and Gaitskell, this draft omitted the leader's previously intractable 
view that NATO must retain a nuclear deterrent as long as the Soviet Union 
had nuclear weapons. There was also a reaffirmation that Britain's 
independent deterrent would be phased out with its V-bombers and that the 
West's strategic deterrent would be left to the Americans; albeit with the 
stipulation that this could not be used without NATO agreement. The draft 
called for disengagement in Central Europe, strict control over NATO's 
tactical nuclear weapons and a shift of emphasis from nuclear to 
conventional defence. It appeared to depart from previous policy, because of 
its pledge to unilaterally halt further British tests and by its rejection of 'first 
use'.30 
The last two points have been cited as proof of Gaitskell's desire for 
conciliation.31 In fact, the Labour leader had conceded very little in principle, 
nor in practice because no time limits had been agreed. In effect, this meant 
that the V-bombers would remain in service until obsolete, Britain would 
remain a loyal member of NATO and the American missile bases would 
remain until no longer necessary. The clear signal was that there was to be no 
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change from these principles in the foreseeable future and that no immediate 
action would be taken, even if Labour gained power. 
Despite some cautious praise in the left-wing press, these signals were not lost 
on the unilateralist Left. Misgivings were immediately raised over the 
document's ambiguity, especially that over the American bases and Britain's 
stocks of H-bombs.32 Foreign Policy and Defence had conceded some left-
wing demands, such as the end of British tests, 'no first use' of thermo-
nuclear weapons, a nuclear free zone and the end of an independent British 
deterrent. However, the leadership's strict adherence to the NATO alliance 
meant that American nuclear missile bases would still be sited on British 
territory and thus remain a target. As such, this made the other concessions 
meaningless. From the unilateralist point of view, the new policy was the 
worst possible, because it encouraged American control over .ail nuclear 
weapons. In addition, despite any similarity of the document to the original 
demands of CND and VFS, the Left's demands had moved on.33 
Up to this point, Gaitskell had managed to retain the overall support of the 
NEC and the PLP.34 Yet without the support of the major trades unions and 
their block vote, the leadership could not take it for granted that their policy 
document would be accepted at conference. Already, two of the 'big six' 
(USDAW and the AEU) had drifted into the unilateralist camp. As the 
T&GWU was certain to support unilateralism, constituency parties expected 
to support left-wing policies and the smaller unions' actions uncertain, the 
odds against the official policy looked increasingly doubtful. Indeed, the only 
crumb of comfort for the leadership was the NUM and NUR decision to 
support Gaitskell at their annual conferences. 
By July, Gaitskell's position was unquestionably in jeopardy. His earlier 
assault on Clause IV had antagonised many of his old supporters, especially 
in the trade unions. Still smarting at this, they turned against him over the 
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defence issue. At first Gaitskell remained belligerent, telling Alastair 
Hetherington that he did not expect to be defeated on either Clause IV or 
defence. Yet, almost immediately, he was forced to drop the proposed 
revisions to the constitution and bitterly complained that if he had 'foreseen 
the kind of opposition he would encounter on Clause IV, he would never 
have raised the issue in the first place' .35 
With his authority seriously undermined by the Clause IV dispute, and 
unprecedented defeat at conference over defence a probable consequence, the 
leader needed something to lessen the rout. Under the circumstances, there 
was little surprise when Gaitskell and his supporters reverted to the position 
that they had first adopted in 1959. As early as May 1960, Gaitskell had 
insisted to Patrick Gordon Walker that conference did not have the authority 
to dictate policy to the PLP, who were bound by Labour's manifesto and 
responsibility to the electorate. In July and August, Gaitskell had reiterated 
this view several times. Questioned about this threat, he told Richard 
Crossman that if he was defeated on defence, he would tell conference 
explicitly that it could not interfere with the decisions of the PLP.36 
Gaitskell's insistence on the PLP's primacy hardened when the TUC held 
their conference in September. Despite the efforts of loyalists, the 
unilateralist line urged by the T&GWU won nearly twice as many votes than 
the one which supported official defence policy.37 
As conference defeat appeared unavoidable, Crossman and George Brown 
proposed that the T&GWU resolution should be accepted alongside the 
official defence policy.38 They hoped that if both resolutions were accepted (as 
in the AEU case), neither would be defeated. Although the wording of the 
T&GWU resolution had avoided explicit support for unilateralism, there was 
no doubt about its intent. It rejected~ defence policy based on the nuclear 
deterrent, and therefore implied British withdrawal from NATO. Cousins 
had not contradicted this view when he told a Daily Herald reporter that his 
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union's ' ... resolution is clear ... We are not going to have anything to do with 
nuclear weapons' .39 Therefore, it was not surprising that the Crossman -
Brown compromise was seen as incompatible with the official policy, and that 
they were forced to withdraw it at a meeting of the International Sub-
Committee on 21 September.40 After this rejection, and with the intention of 
preventing further compromises, Gaitskell quickly sharpened the differences 
between the two sides. He argued that unilateral nuclear disarmament would 
logically lead to Britain's withdrawal from a NATO alliance which had these 
weapons, and lead to neutralism.41 
By now it was clear that both sides side were unwilling to avoid the 
forthcoming clash, despite last minute efforts to effect a compromise.42 The 
nuclear issue had been subordinated to who controlled the Party, and both 
were determined to win. Since the 1959 general election Gaitskell had 
been forced to retreat on Clause IV, lost the support of many of his former 
allies and provoked mistrust over his statements on the role of conference. 
With defeat over defence looming, he felt that he had no choice but to fight 
for total victory. For Cousins and his allies, Labour's defence policy presented 
them with their clearest chance yet to defeat the leadership, take control of the 
Party and reverse the sway of the revisionist hierarchy. 
On the eve of annual conference, Sunday 2 October, three major unions (the 
T&GWU, NUR and USDAW) decided to back the AEU resolution which 
demanded the unilateral renunciation of the testing, manufacturing, 
stockpiling and siting of all nuclear weapons in Britain. Two days later, the 
AEU voted to oppose the official defence statement, overturned their earlier 
policy which backed both, and committed themselves against the leadership 
as well. Apart from defence, the leadership also faced problems over the 
Party's constitution and Clause IV. Bound together, there was now no doubt 
that the leadership was going to be defeated over defence. 
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Less than two weeks before the conference, Gaitskell's mood had been 
confident. He had told George Strauss on the 22 September that he would not 
resign as leader even if he was defeated, and Patrick Gordon Walker recorded 
that his leader had been 'spoiling for a fight'.43 Subsequent events had 
obviously shaken his faith to some extent. Reports in the press suggested that 
he would lose by nearly a million votes.44 On the eve of the defence debate 
he told his wife that, 'probably he would lose, retire to the back-benches, and 
carry on the struggle from there.'45 
The Labour Party Conference defence debate of 5 October 1960 is too well 
rehearsed to necessitate further detailed examination here. However, 
Gaitskell's winding-up speech was significant because it is believed to have 
diverted a disaster. It is interesting to note that Gaitskell concentrated on two 
key issues: defence and his leadership. He opened with a forthright attack on 
the implications that a vote for unilateralism would have: it would result in 
British withdrawal from NATO, the adoption of a neutralist policy and lead 
to either the break-up of the alliance, or Britain's replacement as America's 
principal ally by West Germany. After he had dealt with each specific 
resolution, Gaitskell turned to the political ramifications. In his view it was 
the leadership of the Party, rather than the defence issue, that was at stake. As 
the majority of the PLP were opposed to unilateralism and neutralism, they 
could not be expected to go back on the pledges that they had made to the 
electorate. Although he admitted that he might be defeated, he vowed to 
'fight and fight again' any unilateralist victory.46 
Contemporary reaction to Gaitskell's conference performance was mixed. 
While the Daily Herald called it Gaitskell's 'finest hour' and the Guardian 
saw it as a moral victory, Tribune applauded it as a 'great and inspiring 
victory' for the unilateralists.47 Even the harshest critics of the Labour leader 
admitted that its impact was 'extra-ordinarily effective'. Certainly, the scale of 
the defeat was far narrower than expected.48 The speech had clearly swayed 
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the uncommitted delegates in the hall, who had been subjected to the 
consequences of unilateralism and neutralism in the starkest of terms. 
Gaitskell had also clearly influenced the floor when he linked the dispute 
over defence to his own leadership and the constitutional position of the PLP. 
Apart from the trade union votes, a later study revealed that the constituency 
parties, usually regarded as a bastion of the radical left, had given 67 per cent 
of their support to the leader.49 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
If the predictions over the scale of the defeat had been correct it is doubtful 
whether Gaitskell, considering the Clause IV d~bacle and the mistrust over 
the PLPs constitutional position, would have been able to carry on as leader 
with any authority. As it turned out, although the leadership had been 
defeated on all four defence votes, and for the first time ever an official 
Labour Party I TUC policy statement had been rejected, both sides claimed 
victory. The unilateralists had won an historic victory, but the narrowness of 
this made it clear that the battle was not yet over. The swing back to the 
leadership from the union and CLP votes was one of the biggest surprises. 
The combination of these factors convinced Gaitskell that he could reverse 
the conference decisions.50 
With the benefit of hindsight it is clear that the conference result actually 
proved indecisive. Although some of the loyalist trades unions had joined 
with the Left and inflicted a remarkable defeat on the Party leadership, this 
appeared to be aimed at Gaitskell's attempt to tamper with the Party's 
constitution, rather than any genuine desire to change defence policy. Once 
the point had been made, this uneasy alliance was not likely to continue, 
because most of the union leaders were as anxious to reject left-wing ideas 
and to preserve Britain's national interests as Gaitskell. Despite the 
leadership's discomfort, the result therefore represented little more than a 
hollow victory for the unilateralists, and their success was short-lived. 
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2. No Quarter! From Scarborough to Blackpool 
Despite Scarborough and the gloomy forecasts of many of his supporters, 
Gaitskell quickly recognised the significance of the narrow conference result 
and immediately planned the counter-attack. This involved sharpening the 
issue between himself and the unilateralists instead of making any attempt to 
conceal it.51 Gaitskelllinked the defence issue even closer with his position 
as leader and the constitutional position of the PLP: in other words, who 
made party policy? On one hand, this was a high risk strategy because it 
encouraged prolonged and bitter internecine warfare and could lead to 
further defeat. On the other hand, Gaitskell believed that any concessions 
would force unacceptable changes in policy and weaken his position further. 
By clashing with his opponents head-on and presenting unilateralism as a 
stark choice between moderation and extremism, the Labour leader hoped 
that the waverers and uncommitted would return to the fold. 52 It was his 
widespread support in the power base of the PLP, NEC and TUC General 
Council that made this strategy possible. 
This assault got off to a shaky start. While Gaitskell was determined to 
promote his case as a straight choice between two clear principles, others 
disagreed. Long-term jealousies and opportunism surfaced as several senior 
colleagues made a bid to challenge his leadership. Richard Crossman, the 
Party Chairman, publicly stated that the divisions were unnecessary because 
of the fluidity of defence policy, and that the final authority of Labour's 
decision-making process rested with Conference. In this statement and in a 
subsequent meeting with Gaitskell, Crossman emphasised that the issue was 
not over defence, but over the style of leadership.53 Although Gaitskell's 
harsh treatment at the hands of his opponents had helped his case in some 
quarters, the Left remained convinced that he was still committed to an 
independent British deterrent.54 Coupled to Crossman's public misgivings 
over the constitutional issue, this soon resulted in a leadership contest. 
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Anthony Greenwood, an enthusiastic unilateralist, was the first to stand. In 
his letter of resignation from the Shadow Cabinet, Greenwood accused 
Gaitskell of having created disunity in the Party by leading a faction whose 
views had been rejected by conference.55 Even though Greenwood stressed 
that he was not standing over the defence issue, his unilateralist credentials 
would have attracted support from the left-wing. This, as well as the fact that 
he withdrew from the challenge in favour of Harold Wilson, a committed 
multilateralist, demonstrated that unilateralism was subordinated to the 
question of Gaitskell's leadership. Wilson was altogether a more serious 
threat, even though he was initially reluctant to stand. As an important 
Shadow Cabinet member without being close to Gaitskell, Wilson was likely 
to attract more support from the centre than Greenwood, while his earlier 
association with the Bevanites also appealed to the Left.56 
Wilson's challenge was made on two levels: unity and defence. In his 
statements he made it clear that it was the question of Party unity and 
Gaitskell's defiance of conference that had made him stand; that the issue was 
not 'multilateralism versus unilateralism' but 'unity or civil war'. Although 
Wilson accepted the need for collective security, he rejected the need for a 
British H-bomb and supported the right to question NATO's reliance on 
nuclear weapons. He criticised Gaitskell's rigid adherence to an independent 
deterrent and the American bases, which he felt would soon become obsolete 
and therefore not worth splitting the Party over. Gaitskell's reply stressed 
that the PLP should abide by the principles they had been elected on, which in 
defence terms meant multilateral disarmament and collective security based 
I 
on the NATO Alliance. In his view, the conference decision had contravened 
these traditional policies and was likely to be overturned the following year.57 
In effect, and as he privately admitted to Hetherington, Gaitskell was opposed 
to any compromise with unilateralism and prepared to accept conflict within 
the Movement in order to fend off the challenge. 58 In contrast, Wilson 
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believed that compromise was essential and that he could bridge the gap 
within the Party. His criticism of the Labour leader implied that Gaitskell 
lacked judgement, would not implement conference decisions and was not 
interested in unity. While the divisions between the two appeared to focus 
on Gaitskell's vision of multilateralism and collective disarmament versus 
Wilson's concentration on unity, the real issue was over who should lead the 
Party. 
The splits between the two sides widened after 20 leading trade unionists 
publicly supported Gaitskell, while Richard Crossman backed Wilson.59 
Although Crossman believed that the leader's victory was a foregone 
conclusion, he believed that the challenge had achieved its goal since it had 
questioned Gaitskell's leadership. This was a view that many moderates 
regarded as treacherous. George Brown, who stood as Deputy Leader against 
Fred Lee, bitterly denounced Crossman's disloyalty as opportunist.60 In the 
end, as Crossman had forecast, Wilson's challenge failed. Gaitskell won by 
166 votes to Wilson's 81 - while Brown defeated Lee by 146 to 83 votes. 
Although he had overcome this hurdle, Gaitskell was soon under more 
pressure because he was still believed to support an independent British 
deterrent.61 In November 1960, the Government announced that an 
American Polaris base was to be built at Holy Loch in Scotland. Labour's 
motion questioned the extent of British control over the base, rather than 
objecting to its actual establishment. Indeed, their spokesmen had supported 
Polaris during the defence debate back in March 1960, subsequently reinforced 
by Gaitskell when he argued that, 
'Polaris is more effective .. .less dangerous .. .less likely to lead to 
war ... more likely to preserve peace than any other nuclear 
weapon hitherto available.' 
IMs "'« o. view with which a large majority of the PLP fully agreed.62 
1 8 I 
Despite this support, fear of another public split developing was confirmed 
during the defence debate of 13 December. Prior to this, 47left-wing MPs had 
supported an amendment by Emrys Hughes which opposed the Polaris base. 
In the debate itself, Michael Foot and Anthony Greenwood (the latter no 
longer constrained by Shadow Cabinet responsibility) embarrassed the 
leadership when they attacked them for having defied the decisions agreed at 
the Scarborough conference. The result revealed that 68 Labour MPs actually 
abstained, rather than vote for the official amendment. Three days later, the 
divisions were displayed further when 48 left-wing MPs supported Harold 
Davies' private members bill which deplored the establishment of a Polaris 
base at Holy Loch.63 
Although defence had once again exposed divisions in Labour's ranks, it is 
interesting to note the relationship between this and the issue of leadership. 
As David Cross' study reveals, when Gaitskell's leadership or the rejection of 
the Scarborough decisions were under question, the strength of opposition 
was greater. For example, Wilson received 81 votes as the 'unity' candidate 
in the leadership contest and 68 MPs had abstained in the official defence 
motion which had contradicted the Scarborough decision. In contrast, only 47 
MPs supported Emrys Hughes' amendment to the Address, while 48 MPs had 
backed Harold Davies' motion which opposed the Polaris base. While the 
Left's anti-nuclear stance remained constant, the difference suggests that the 
leadership issue attracted wider support within the PLP than that over 
defence.64 
While these attacks on his leadership caused concern, Gaitskell could rely on 
a strong power base. Support from individual union leaders like Carron, 
Birch and Watson, added to the general confidence of the TUC General 
Council, significantly bolstered his position. In addition, the support from 
the majority of the Parliamentary Party, especially the loyalist trades union 
sponsored MPs on the NEC, worked heavily in his favour. Overall, the anti-
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unilateralist majority in the PLP, NEC and TUC General Council was of 
considerable importance to Gaitskell's continued leadership.65 Two groups 
formed after the Scarborough conference within the Party also helped. These 
were the Campaign for Democratic Socialism (COS) and Campaign for 
Multilateral Disarmament (CMD), whose membership included MPs, 
constituency activists and trade unionists. 
Haseler estimates that between late 1960 and early 1961, a fifth of the PLP 
supported COS, whose sole objective by the latter date was to secure 
Gaitskell's continued leadership. CMD, formed to promote multilateralism 
and reverse the Scarborough defeat was supported by 40 back-bench MPs. On 
defence as a whole, approximately two-thirds of the PLP supported the 
leadership. Although it is far harder to estimate the number of rank and file 
COS and CMD supporters in the unions and constituency parties, the fact that 
most Labour MPs supported the leadership over defence was crucial.66 As 
Gaitskell had also managed to obtain agreement that representatives of the 
Shadow Cabinet should attend the joint NEC I TUC talks back in May and 
again in October 1960, this strengthened his position even more. Seen in this 
light, the Left's 'Appeal for Unity' and the 'Scarborough Conference 
Campaign Committee', though a thorn in the leadership's side, were 
marginalised in much the same way as VFS had been during 1958-59. 
On 8 December 1960 the NEC decided that a new defence statement should be 
drafted, distinct from the previous July's Foreign Policy and Defence.67 
Gaitskell's position had been strengthened by success in the leadership 
campaign and his insistence that the Shadow Cabinet should be included in 
the joint NEC I TUC discussions. This ensured that Cousins and the 
unilateralists were heavily outnumbered when they discussed defence policy 
on 24 January 1961. During the meeting, Gaitskell called for a short statement 
of principles: these included a commitment to multilateral disarmament; 
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support for NATO; and acceptance that the alliance must retain nuclear 
weapons as long as the Soviet Union did.68 
Considering that these points were virtually identical to those contained in 
Foreign Policy and Defence. and that the whole point of the new statement 
was to be distinctive from its predecessor, this again demonstrates Gaitskell's 
determination to resist change. This reluctance was not lost on Cousins, who 
immediately recognised the similarities between the two, and pointed out 
that these preferences had been defeated by conference in 1960. Despite efforts 
to find a compromise, the meeting ended without general agreement and it 
was decided that a twelve-man drafting committee should be set up (four 
members each from the Shadow Cabinet, the NEC and the TUC) to draft a 
new statement and report back.69 
The composition of the new committee had important implications. The 
Shadow Cabinet representatives were Gaitskell, Brown, Healey and 
Callaghan. The NEC's were Crossman, Driberg, Watson and Padley and from 
the TUC, Cousins, Webber, Hayday and Roberts. Only Cousins and Driberg 
were unilateralists and two others - Crossman and Padley - wanted a 
compromise statement. Considering that the multilateralists therefore had 
an in-built majority ratio of at least three to one, it is clear that Gaitskell's 
preferences as far as this committee was concerned were never in doubt, nor 
that the structure of its composition, as Epstein observes, was accidental.70 
In the first of four meetings on 31 January 1961 (the others were on 8, 9 and 15 
February) the committee agreed that Penis Healey would prepare a draft as a 
basis for discussion. This differed little from that of the previous year: it 
contained the pledge against thermo-nuclear 'first use', subsequently widened 
to include tactical nuclear weapons, and called for NATO to reduce its nuclear 
dependency. 71 Crossman's initial reaction to the draft was that it offered 
nothing new. He believed that Gaitskell's preferences proved that the Labour 
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leader was not prepared to compromise with Cousins at all, and therefore 
decided to prepare his own version.72 Cousins had simultaneously decided to 
submit his own draft, but due to illness, this was not presented.73 At the last 
meeting of the committee on 15 February, Crossman's draft was defeated by 
seven votes to four, while Healey's was passed by eight votes to one. 
Stephen Haseler has suggested that there was little to choose between the 
drafts submitted by Healey (supported by Gaitskell) and Crossman, and that 
even Cousins' draft was very similar.74 The evidence suggests that as far as 
the Healey and Crossman versions are concerned, this view has merit, as the 
later vote at the NEC confirmed. Over 'first use', Healey's document argued 
that NATO's conventional forces should be strengthened and reliance on 
nuclear weapons reduced. Crossman's version rejected the strategy which 
caused the Alliance to rely on nuclear weapons and called for this to be 
changed. Healey accepted the American bases as part of Britain's obligations 
under the alliance, although he reserved Britain's right to determine the 
conditions. Crossman's called for reform that would end the need for such 
bases.75 Despite Philip Williams' assertion that Gaitskell was passive at the 
meetings of the twelve, it does seem that Crossman's draft was rejected 
because Cousins had approved it beforehand. Because of this, the Labour 
leader felt it represented a compromise to the Left and was therefore 
unaceptable.76 
Regarding Cousins' draft, Haseler's view is slightly more problematic. 
Although it did not contain an explicit demand for a British withdrawal from 
NATO, it rejected ' ... any NATO strategy based upon the threat to use nuclear 
weapons, and a defence policy which compels NATO to rely on these 
weapons'. 77 This implied the rejection of nuclear weapons in any 
circumstances, even as 'retaliatory second strike'. As such, it effectively 
dismissed the whole concept of deterrence theory. Under these 
circumstances, it is difficult to see how Cousins' version would have been 
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acceptable to the majority of Labour's elite, who accepted multilateralism. 
Therefore, it was not surprising that only Healey's draft was approved 
consecutively by the NEC, TUC General Council and PLP.78 
Crossman believed that Healey's draft would be defeated at conference while 
his own, with Cousins' support, would ensure unity. Because of this, he 
publicly denounced the Labour leader in a speech at Cardiff, where he stated 
that it was 'an absolute tragedy that Hugh Gaitskell found it impossible to 
accept the compromise plan'.79 This implied that Gaitskell was to blame for 
the failure of the compromise and that he was therefore responsible for the 
obstacles to Party unity. This in turn provoked a furious response at a PLP 
meeting called over defence, which Crossman recorded as being 'the ugliest 
meeting' he had ever experienced.8° Considering Crossman's open support 
for Harold Wilson in the leadership contest and his continuous attacks on 
Gaitskell since the election, it is not surprising that the 'partiality' of the Party 
Chairman was 'savaged' by Labour's right-wing. 
Philip Williams has justified Gaitskell's opposition to the 'compromise' plan 
due to its lack of realism and because it was a ruse designed by Crossman and 
Cousins to undermine the leader's position.81 Nevertheless, the similarities 
between the Crossman I Healey drafts raises the suspicion that compromise 
was achievable, as some of Gaitskell's closest supporters actually wanted. In 
fact Williams, himself a founding member of CDS, appears to have forgotten 
that he had written to Crosland on 28 February 1961 stating that, ' ... all of us 
[CDS - naming some of the leading members - Bill Rodgers, Tony King and 
Frank Pickstock] think it would have been wise ... to accept Crossman's draft'.82 
Simultaneously, Gaitskell had revealed his intransigence. In a letter to 
Crosland, he complained about his allies recommendation for the Crossman 
Plan which ' ... could easily be misconstrued'. Gaitskell justified his position 
on the grounds that if it had been adopted 'We would ... have surrendered a 
great deal more than was palatable for no return .. .'. He added that the 
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conduct of Crossman and Cousins had been ' ... more than usually 
outrageous'.83 
Despite these complaints, Gaitskell himself appeared to accept that the 
differences were minuscule in two speeches given at the beginning of March. 
He conceded that Britain should give up attempts to remain an independent 
nuclear power and instead, use its influence to bring about NATO reforms. 
Nevertheless, he also used it as an opportunity to urge the left-wing to accept 
his position so as to avoid the split within the Party.84 In other words, 
Gaitskell blamed the divisions on them, rather than the other way round; 
this in turn provoked a furious response from one prominent unilateralist.85 
Three weeks later, Gaitskell reassured Crosland that the ' ... Crossman Plan is 
not likely to play a very large part in the trade union conferences .. .' and that 
he had ' ... tried to underline the narrowness of the points in which the drafts 
differ .. .'86 Having initially refused to countenance the Crossman 
compromise and provoked the Left irrecoverably, by March, Gaitskell had 
suddenly reverted to a position virtually identical to their earlier demands. 
Of course, as Michael Gordon points out, the Gaitskellites were only too 
happy to trade on the confusion that arose from the blurred distinctions 
between the NEC statement and the Crossman compromise.87 
This was clearly revealed in Labour's official response to government policy 
in the defence debate of 27 and 28 February 1961. Denis Healey demonstrated 
Labour's willingness to offer an alternative when he attacked the 
Government's adherence to the independent nuclear deterrent and their 
decision to extend the life of the British V-bomber force. He argued that 
NATO policies should be directed towards the extension of British 
conventional forces. These could then deal with 'local conflicts', rather than 
rely on NATO's tactical nuclear weapons which might in turn lead to all-out 
thermo-nuclear war.88 Healey's speech, especially where it concerned the use 
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of tactical nuclear weapons, closely resembled the line advocated earlier by 
Crossman. 
Of course, there are counter arguments. If Gaitskell had accepted the 
Crossman plan, especially as it had been supported by Cousins, this would 
have been regarded as a major concession to the Left. Determined to reassert 
his authority within the Party, Gaitskell appeared to have taken the decision 
to hold the line for internal political reasons rather than over any absolute 
principle. In turn, Cousins' acceptance of the Crossman compromise 
(whatever the truth of the argument that he would only do this as long as 
Gaitskell would not agree to it) can also be seen as a dilution of principle. The 
overwhelming feeling that emerges is that principles were of secondary 
iinpottance to the struggle for power. 
Whatever the merits of these particular arguments, Gaitskell had persuaded 
the PLP, NEC and TUC General Council to accept a draft defence statement 
that was almost identical to the one rejected by confereQce just five months 
before. Having achieved this, the leadership was determined to prevent the 
issue from being resurrected. In March 1961, they decided that the PLP should 
abstain in all divisions regarding the defence estimates.89 In this, the 
leadership's policy was only partially successful. In the Parliamentary defence 
debate of 27~28 February, the Left had not embarrassed their leaders as they 
had the previous December, and all of them voted against the Government. 
Nevertheless, twenty four Labour MPs voted against the Air Estimates on 8 
March and five against the Army Estimates the following week. In July, 
further trouble followed when the rebels joined with seven others to vote 
against a plan which proposed that German troops should train in Wales as 
part of NATO exercises.90 
Resurgence of anti-nuclear agitation was not restricted to the confines of the 
PLP. In early March, the International Sub-Committee discussed Macmillan's 
188 
Polaris agreement with the Americans, raised at the request of the Scottish 
Council of the Labour Party.91 In an attempt to address these concerns, 
George Brown criticised the Government because certain commitments had 
not been obtained from the Americans. In particular: that the Polaris missiles 
would never be used first; that it was unclear whether 'Thor' bases would be 
removed; whether there was adequate British control over the Polaris 
submarines; and whether a more suitable site than Holy Loch should have 
been chosen, considering its close proximity to an urban area.92 Although 
Brown's draft had been supported by critics like Ci'ossman and Jennie Lee 
(because some of their suggestions had been incorporated), a surprisingly 
large number of NEC members voted against the statement. Tom Driberg led 
those who objected to Brown's argument that Polaris could not be opposed on 
the same grounds as Thor, because it was clearly a 'second strike weapon'. In 
the rebels' opinion, Brown's statement had contradicted the Scarborough 
decisions which opposed the establishment of _am!. nuclear missile bases in 
Britain.93 
While the Left had earlier supported Crossman's compromise draft, they 
refused to accept the Polaris statement by Brown. Although this had not 
rejected Polaris outright, it had contained some concessions as Crossman 
recognised.94 This meant that the Left had reverted to their earlier rigid 
position: that the Scarborough decisions must be observed by the letter. 
Ironically, whereas the multilateralist majority, who had gained approval for 
their line in Policy for Peace, were now willing to concede some ground on 
Polaris, the Left who had initially accepted the compromise, were not. As 
Crossman observed, by May it appeared that the left-wing were 'only 
concerned to be anti-Gaitskell'.95 In this instance, they were just as willing as 
Gaitskell and the leadership to be 'flexible' with their principles. Again, this 
suggests that principles were subjugated to the struggle for power. 
189 
By May 1961, the unilateralists appeared to have lost ground. This, despite 
continued opposition and the fact that the CND Aldermaston march at Easter 
had attracted the largest attendance to date. Although Scarborough had 
looked like a breakthrough because it presented them with their best 
opportunity to gain support in the Labour Party, the movement had begun to 
falter. In April 1961, a Gallup opinion poll survey found unilateralist support 
had fallen to its lowest level, with only 19 per cent of all and 28 per cent of 
Labour voters in favour of its policies. In addition, further support drifted 
away when internal disagreements caused Bertrand Russell to break away 
from the main body and form the Committee of 100. This alienated much of 
their support because the Committee advocated direct action and civil 
disobedience. 96 
Of far more significance to the Labour leadership, unilateralism in the trades 
unions had begun to fade. The first real test was at the beginning of the 1961 
trade union conference round. The Shop workers, USDAW, had voted for 
unilateralism the year before. In 1961, the union was confronted with three 
options: motions for unilateralism, multilateralism or the Crossman 
compromise, the latter backed by their President, Waiter Padley. While 
unilateralism was rejected in favour of Crossman's 'unity' compromise, the 
multilateral motion was approved as the second choice. The AEU, also 
unilateralist the year before, was presented with the same three choices at its 
annual conference. The result was a three to one majority in favour of the 
'unity' motion, a narrow defeat for unilateralism, while the multilateralist 
motion was carried overwhelmingly. The outcome was that the AEU again 
supported both the official policy and the compromise.97 
Although Padley's endorsement of Crossman's 'unity' compromise snubbed 
Gaitskell, it also actually challenged Cousins and the T&GWU. In effect, 
unilateralism had been defeated and replaced by a motion which appealed for 
compromise from both sides. Yet the future of the Crossman- Padley plan 
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was only assured if it won support from the other unions, and Padley himself 
refused to propose it unless it commanded a majority. As Cousins had 
decided to reject the 'compromise', this was extremely unlikely.98 In June, 
the NUGMW had voted to support the official policy statement. Although 
several of the smaller unions remained unilateralist, this meant that two of 
the 'big six' had voted for unity and one for the official policy. More 
importantly, all three had rejected unilateralism. In mid-June, the 
unilateralist dream was shattered when Padley announced that USDAW 
would not submit the compromise resolution to conference after all, because 
it would not get a majority. This manoeuvre left his union with no 
alternative other than to vote for their second choice, the official statement.99 
In July, the NUM conference rejected unilateralism and, after some 
ambivalence, the NUR followed suit. With five out of the six major trade 
unions firmly set against it, only the T&GWU remained committed to 
unilateralism. 
Further damage to the Left was caused at the TUC's annual conference in 
September, when the official defence policy was carried, while a unilateralist 
motion proposed by the T&GWU was defeated. The TUC also rejected a 
motion which opposed the Polaris base at Holy Loch, even though several of 
the larger unions (which included USDAW, the AEU, NUR and T&GWU) 
had supported this at their own conferences. The Left's only success was their 
opposition to the training of German troops in Wales. 
Behind the union leadership's decision to oppose unilateralism, lay the 
recognition that any continuation of the defence battle would split the Party 
irrecoverably. In addition, the union leaders felt that the dispute had 
diverted attention away from the main enemy, the Tory Government. Both 
Padley and Carron were convinced multilateralists who had advocated the 
compromise plan in order to make a point to Gaitskell about the need for 
unity. Once this had been accomplished, they were not prepared to let the rift 
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widen any further. The dominance they exercised over their respective 
unions allowed the official policy through, even though there had been little 
actual movement away from the unilateralist sentiment that had been 
adopted the previous year.100 There is also evidence to suggest that COS 
agitation in favour of the leadership had some effect on the unions' decisions, 
even in the T&GWU, although this is harder to qualify.1°1 
With the backing of the majority of the large trades unions, Gaitskell's 
determination to reverse the Scarborough defeat was assured when the 
Party's annual conference met at Blackpool in October 1961. Nevertheless, his 
victory at Blackpool was not quite as decisive as later claimed.102 Before 
conference, the Left had been careful to separate the resolutions on 
unilateralism, neutralism, Polaris and the training of German troops in 
Wales. This precaution was taken in case there was a repetition of earlier 
instances, whereby separate left-wing resolutions had been merged into 
composites by the NEC in order to present them as unacceptable. As the first 
two were certain to be defeated, and while the latter two had some chance of 
success, this appeared an astute tactic.103 
In turn, the leadership had recognised these manoeuvres and tried to counter 
them. Having opened the defence debate with a predictable attack on 
unilateralism, George Brown emphasised that Britain must accept both the 
American bases and the training of German troops on British soil as part of 
her NATO commitments. Gaitskell followed Brown, but appeared to have 
trimmed the official policy statement in an attempt to maintain unity. He 
argued that NATO's policy should be adapted so that the alliance would 
never have to be the first to use nuclear weapons of any kind. He then 
addressed the specific issues over the Polaris base and the training of German 
troops. Although he stated that Britain could not oppose either on principle, 
he recognised the strength of feeling against them.104 
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Gaitskell's speech had conceded that on these two issues the leadership had 
admitted defeat. This, despite the fact that the demand for the removal of the 
Polaris base directly contravened Policy for Peace. Philip Williams points out 
that this was expected, and that Gaitskell was not unduly worried as he had 
won the main battle against unilateralism.105 Yet, he makes no reference to 
the fact that Gaitskell's conference speech, which recognised the need for 
NATO reform and misgivings over Polaris, had effectively endorsed the 
Crossman- Padley compromise, so vehemently rejected earlier that year. In 
addition, Labour had also reaffirmed its commitment to NATO in principle, 
while rejecting two of its specific policies.106 
.. .. .. 
Despite the reversal for the leadership over Polaris and the German troops, 
the official statement, Policy for Peace was accepted by a majority of over three 
to one. The result meant that both the unilateralist and neutralist motions 
were heavily defeated.107 Because of this, Blackpool has been cited as a 
stunning victory for Gaitskell and one which restored his authority.108 
Nevertheless, Gaitskell's speech revealed that he had accepted many 
elements of the Crossman - Padley plan. While Blackpool is often regarded as 
a major success for the leadership, they had also conceded two important 
points to the Left. This suggests that the victory was not quite as clear cut as 
often claimed. It also demonstrates that compromise could have been 
achieved, but was relegated in order to allow Gaitskell and Cousins to battle it 
out. 
3. Victory and Consolidation: From Blackpool to Brighton 
There is little doubt that Gaitskell's success at the Blackpool Conference 
consolidated his leadership. Of course, this infuriated his opponents who 
refused to accept defeat at this stage. They claimed that their victory over 
Polaris and the training of German troops in Wales had demonstrated the 
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strength of feeling against the leadership. Nevertheless, their position had 
been dealt a serious blow and it soon became clear that Scarborough had been 
their highpoint. This was confirmed after Blackpool when Anthony 
Greenwood unsuccessfully stood against Gaitskell for the leadership.109 
With this challenge easily repulsed, Gaitskell was able to strengthen his hand 
after the Shadow Cabinet elections. Harold Wilson was appointed Shadow 
Foreign Affairs spokesman. Although this move could be regarded as 
conciliatory, it was more likely that Wilson had been placed in a position that 
could be controlled, a notion strengthened by his replacement as Shadow 
Chancellor by James Callaghan, a Gaitskellloyalist. Gaitskell also promoted 
two other loyalists to further consolidate his position: Patrick Gordon Walker 
replaced the 'temperamental' George Brown at Defence and Denis Healey 
took the Colonies post. 
Mter Blackpool and the acceptance of Policy for Peace, the leadership might 
have believed that the nuclear issue had been side-lined. Ironically, it was the 
American decision to resume atmospheric thermo-nuclear testing (in 
response to the Soviet resumption in August 1961) that allowed the nuclear 
issue to regain prominence. On 21 and 22 December 1961, Macmillan and 
President Kennedy met in Bermuda to discuss East-West relations and how 
they should react to the Soviet tests. On 8 February 1962 Macmillan 
announced that the British would hold an underground test in Nevada, 
while the Americans would carry out an atmospheric test over Christmas 
Island, unless the Soviet Union suspended their current test programme.110 
Twelve days later, the publication of the 1962 Defence White Paper reinforced 
the Government's commitment to the British V-bombers and the American 
Skybolt missile system.111 
The issue of thermo-nuclear tests had been one of the most important 
reasons behind the furore over the Bomb within the Labour Movement in 
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the first place. In the 1960 and 1961 defence documents, Labour's official 
policy had demanded that all such tests should be banned. Considering this, 
Labour's official reaction over the Anglo-American decision to resume tests 
was conspicuously muted. The NEC criticised the British tests because they 
demonstrated the Government's commitment to retain an independent 
nuclear deterrent. Yet, the statement did not strongly condemn the American 
atmospheric tests, apart from a request that they postponed them pending 
further negotiations.112 This matched the line taken by the British 
Government: that the West could not be expected to suspend its tests while 
the Soviet Union went ahead with theirs. 
As such, the statement was unacceptable to some left-wing members of the 
PLP and NEC. In December 1961, 52 Labour MPs had supported a CND 
pamphlet which requested that the Soviet Union halt their tests.113 At the 
end of February 1962, Barbara Castle repeated these sentiments in a draft paper 
prepared for the NEC. While this criticised the Soviet action, it also called on 
'all the powers concerned to refrain from any further nuclear tests'. 
Although her draft was clearly critical of the American decision to resume 
their tests, its wording was almost identical to the official policy statement 
that had been accepted at Blackpool. Despite this similarity, it was defeated by 
eighteen votes to five.114 
During the defence debate held on 5 and 6 March 1962, the leadership's 
reluctance to openly criticise the resumption of American tests was again 
evident. Instead, Labour's attack concentrated on the Government's 
determination to retain an independent nuclear deterrent. Patrick Gordon 
Walker expressed regret over the American tests, but his subsequent defence 
of them clearly contradicted the line taken in Policy for Peace.115 Of course, 
the Left's constant criticism towards official defence policy and their clear 
preferences for unilateralist and neutralist policies invited certain defeat. 
Nevertheless, the rejection of Barbara Castle's draft (considering its 
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similarities with Brown's conference resolution) along with the persistent 
refusal to criticise the resumption of American tests, suggests that the 
leadership were reluctant, when it came to it, to even stand by policies that 
they had stubbornly fought for. 
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that this provoked further 
hostility from the Left, especially from those associated with CND. In January 
1959, Michael Foot had insisted that the only way to achieve nuclear 
disarmament was through the election of a Labour administration committed 
to such an objective.116 After Blackpool and the refusal of the leadership to 
even uphold their own policy over the American tests, many CND 
sympathisers within the Labour Movement finally realised that this position 
was untenable.117 This contributed to CND's decision to nominate 
independent unilateralist candidates to contest by-elections against Labour 
hopefuls who followed the official line. The strength of the frustration was 
also demonstrated by anti-nuclear protests whenever Gaitskell made 
speeches. At a May Day rally in Glasgow, after he had been heckled 
throughout the meeting, Gaitskell accused the demonstrators of being 
communists. This claim, despite angry denials, was enthusiastically taken up 
by other Labour leaders, who denounced CND for having been infiltrated by 
communist and other extremist left-wing organisations. liS 
The antagonism between the two sides reached new heights when CND 
leaders decided to sponsor a world disarmament congress in Moscow, 
arranged by the World Peace Council. As this was a proscribed organisation 
because of its communist connections, the NEC threatened to expel Collins, 
Russell and other prominent CND leaders from the Labour Party. Even 
though this threat was never carried out, the bitter row between Labour and 
CND proved counter-productive for the peace movement and played into the 
Labour leadership's hands. Since their zenith in April 1961, CND's initial 
popularity had begun to recede. The subsequent split between Russell and 
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Collins, the decision to contest by-elections and the violent demonstrations 
against Labour leaders all damaged CND's image, and instead won sympathy 
for Gaitskell's cause. 
Gaitskell's increased control over policy was also disguised by the heated 
confrontation with CND. His disregard for the conference decision on 
nuclear testing, which he had earlier supported, was one example.l19 Other 
controversies, such as Polaris and the training of foreign troops, were ignored 
until July 1962. At a Party meeting to decide whether these issues constituted 
a basis for a parliamentary debate, the Labour leader used the lack of time left 
in the session and the fear of another split to avoid them. Due to widespread 
concern over the latter, the PLP agreed by a large majority to vote for 
Gaitskell's preference of postponement.120 
During the summer of 1962, it was clear that the nuclear issue was being 
pushed to the periphery wherever possible. No new policy statement on 
defence emerged, nor were there any plans to have a debate on defence and 
disarmament at the Party's annual conference. This, despite the fact that a 
new joint committee on disarmament, which consisted of NEC and Shadow 
Cabinet representatives, had been formed. In September, the TUC 
overwhelmingly defeated a motion which called on Britain to abandon its 
nuclear weapons.121 Just before Labour's annual conference, Frank Cousins 
made one last attempt to reaffirm the Party's commitment to halt nuclear 
testing. Considering that the leadership had steadfastly ignored attempts to 
enforce any demands to this effect in the preceding months, the decision to 
accept Cousins' resolution and its warm reception at conference, appeared 
somewhat odd. 122 
Its success owed much to Gaitskell's stand over Britain's application to join 
the European Common Market. Since Macmillan's cautious approval for 
this in August 1961, the EEC had threatened another split within the Party. In 
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simple terms, the minority group of pro-Marketeers (mainly, but not all from 
the revisionist-right) regarded the EEC as the answer to many of Britain's 
economic and political problems. The larger group of anti-Marketeers (which 
included most of the centre and left-wing) dismissed the economic argument, 
believed that entry would harm the Commonwealth and undermine a 
British socialist government's freedom of manoeuvre. Gaitskell appeared 
neutral on the subject until mid-1962, after which doubts surfaced. As his 
objections increased (alienating many of his revisionist supporters in the 
process) Gaitskell struck up an alliance with many of his traditional 
opponents on the Left, even the 'irreconcilables'. This culminated in his 
speech to the 1962 annual conference, where the defence dispute was 
relegated to the sidelines and Labour's hostility to British entry into the EEC 
appeared explicit.123 
In fact, the Common Market was a way out of the exhaustive defence dispute 
for both sides. Although many of Gaitskell's revisionist supporters fervently 
approved entry, others, including some of his most prominent allies, did not. 
As the next chapter demonstrates, this allowed Gaitskell to reassert himself 
over any possible challenge from the enthusiasts. He also believed that 
Blackpool had been decisive and that further intra-party warfare would harm 
Labour's electoral prospects: an important factor considering the serious 
economic and political difficulties that confronted Macmillan's 
administration at this stage. For their part, the Left had also recognised the 
significance of Blackpool. They too were exhausted by the defence dispute 
and realised that the EEC and unity were of paramount importance. In 
addition, they believed that the split within the revisionist camp and their 
new alliance with Gaitskell would increase their influence: that if they bided 
their time, the leadership would recognise the merit of their case, even that 
regarding defence. Although strengthened by Gaitskell's sudden death in 
January 1963, the subsequent election of Harold Wilson as leader and premier 
proved to be a big disappointment in this respect. 
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Conclusion 
The period from the general election of 1959 to the 1962 annual conference 
was a turbulent one for the Labour Party. In an ill-fated attempt to modernise 
the Party's constitution, Gaitskell seriously undermined his position and 
forced his erstwhile trades union allies into an unlikely alliance with the Left. 
Unilateralist sentiments became inextricably linked to the battle over 
domestic policy and resulted in the shock defeat at the Scarborough 
Conference in 1960. This defeat led to a leadership challenge, bitter 
recriminations and continued internecine warfare. Yet, within a year 
Gaitskell had regained control and the unilateralist victory had been reversed. 
By the end of 1962 the furore over the H-bomb, which had split the Party since 
1957, had all but vanished. 
A number of factors have been suggested to explain this. Michael Gordon 
believes that the leadership had adopted most of the unilateralist demands by 
1962, which made further conflict unnecessary and damaging. Philip 
Williams has suggested that Gaitskell made some concessions in order to 
maintain unity, but having recognised that his opponents would never be 
satisfied, decided that a stand needed to be taken. Stephen Haseler believes 
that the defence dispute was simply a struggle for power, with Gaitskell's 
leadership at stake. All agree that a desire for unity within the Labour 
Movement, the return of the trade unions to the fold and the British 
application for entry into the Common Market consolidated Gaitskell's 
position. 
On one level, the independent British nuclear deterrent, the evidence 
suggests that between 1960 and 1962 Labour had distanced itself from the Tory 
Government over the Bomb. Yet Macmillan's administration had itself 
accepted this, after the cancellation of Blue Streak in April 1960. Despite 
repeated denials, the purchase of an American delivery system, whether 
Skybolt or Polaris and even with a British warhead, could not be considered 
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as independent. When the issue of national control is added, this makes such 
a claim ridiculous. Although Labour rhetoric had shifted over 'first use', 
tactical nuclear weapons and the need for stronger conventional rather than 
nuclear forces, the Party's commitment to the 'wisdom' of multilateralism 
remained intact. The V-bombers would remain in service until obsolete, 
Britain would be a loyal member of a nuclear NATO and American bases 
would stay until no longer necessary. Gaitskell's ambiguous response to Blue 
Streak and Thor in 1960, added to his later reluctance to criticise American 
thermo-nuclear tests or reject Polaris, all demonstrated little deviation from 
the Government line. 
Without doubt, Gaitskell took his role as Opposition Leader seriously and 
would not commit Labour to policies that he believed might threaten British 
national interests. However, his perceived adherence to strongly held 
principles deserves qualification. Between 1960 and 1961 it was clear that 
unilateralist pressure had forced him to adopt policies he had earlier rejected. 
The unilateral end to British H-bomb tests, the commitment over 'first use' 
and the value of tactical nuclear weapons were clear examples. It is also 
significant that his opposition to the Crossman compromise, ostensibly due to 
inalienable principles, was eroded to the point where the differences were 
indistinguishable. At the 1961 conference, two resolutions which Gaitskell 
had earlier insisted could not be opposed on principle - Polaris and the 
training of German troops - were passed with little objection. 
This is not to say that the unilateralists remained true to all their principles. 
Their acceptance of the Crossman plan, only when it was clear that the 
leadership would reject it, and the separation of the composite resolutions for 
the 1961 conference illustrated their 'flexibility' when needed. After 
Blackpool, the Left's clear reluctance to push the nuclear issue any further as 
well as the rapid reconciliation with their former arch-enemies, suggests that 
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defence had been used as a means with which to challenge the leadership, 
only to be swiftly abandoned when they recognised that it had not worked. 
More than anything else, it was the struggle for the Labour leadership that 
provoked the nuclear dispute. Since Gaitskell's succession, the struggle 
between the fundamentalist Left and revisionist Right had increased. After 
the 1959 election defeat and the abortive attempt to reform the constitution, 
the Left were given their dearest opportunity of challenging the right-wing 
leadership. This was because the trade unions, aghast at the threat to Clause 
IV, deserted the leadership in droves. With them, they took the block vote 
that had sustained the Party elite for so long. Without this protection, the 
Left knew the leadership was vulnerable and coupled with the steady rise of 
unilateralism, convinced themselves that defence was the key to a 
showdown. At first, their tactics appeared to work, as the leadership retreated 
over the independent deterrent and 'first use'. Even these concessions did 
not save them, as many trade unions followed the lead of the T&GWU and 
turned on them. It was this onslaught that resulted in the 1960 defeat and has 
been used by Beer, Gordon and Minkin to challenge the primacy of leadership 
argument. Having achieved an historic victory at conference, some on the 
Left believed that power was within their grasp. 
Nevertheless, this proved a serious miscalculation. Although dealt a blow, 
Gaitskell's leadership was far more resilient, as the narrowness of the 
Scarborough vote demonstrated. His conference speech and the appeal for 
moderation sharpened the issue. Here and afterwards, he emphasised the 
dangers that the conference decision would entail: withdrawal from NATO, 
neutralism and the threat to the leadership's constitutional position. 
Whether true or not, this convinced many that there was no alternative 
other than to support Gaitskell in a life and death struggle with the 
unilateralist Left. It was this conviction, along with the recognition of the 
damage the split had caused the Party, that brought most of the union 
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leadership back to GaitskeU. Careful· managf?ment, if r;\Ot m~nipulation by 
some union leaders, led to the reversal oftheir unilateralist stanc~ of 1960~ It 
was the decision taken 'by five ofthe 'big six' unions thatled to. the 
:leadership's recov:ery at Blackpool in [961. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to see. how the Left could have 
expioited their success to the full'. !Despite initial setbacks and· the challenges 
from some of his senior colleagues, Gaitskell had overwhelming ·support in 
:the power~base of 'the· Labour Party. ·In 'linking the defence issue to the 
constitutional position of leadership, he also demonstrated astute political 
sense. Although a high risk strategy,. this ·e11surec:l widespread sympathy in 
the country as well as in the wider Labour Movement. In ·addition; the: vast 
majority of the 1Labour leadership were just as committed to mulijlater~lism 
and the need to fend off. the Left's challellgl? a~ ·Gaitskell himself. With· their 
continued support, it was most unlikely that internal thre~ts froll\ VFS, 
'Appeal for Unity' andlthe: 'Scarborough Conference CClmpaign Committee' 
or .external ()nf?S from CND, co.uld. successfully challenge the Patty's existing 
structure. 
On balance, the McKenzie - Haseler thesis clearly outweighs that of Beer, 
Goi"don· and Minkm, despite the validity of part of their case. Even in the 
darkest days of 1960; Gaitskell's insistence that Shadow Cabinet colleagues 
shouid' participate in defence policy formulation alongside the NEC and TUC, 
illustrated the control that could' be' exercised by a determined' leader. Only 
flve months after Scarborough, Gaitskell's defence preferences had been 
restored' as Rarty policy. Having consolidated his position at Blackpool, 
Gaitskell further ·demonstrated his dominance over conference by refusing to 
criticise: the· .resumption of American tests (even though he had earlier 
supported this) and ignoring the 'Polaris jssue. It was only when defence had 
been repla~ed by Europe as the prirnary foreign ,policy issue, that any 
reconcili~tion between the warring :factions took place. As the next chapter 
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demonstrates, this was l;>orne ()ut of, a .. desire to. exacerbate .the: GOvernmenfs 
difficulties: andi present 1a 1.1nit~d fr()nt !to .the! electorate; rather than any 
IdeologiCal 'compromise. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Wait and See! Europe 1955-63 
On 27 July 1961 Harold Macmillan's Cabinet agreed that a formal application 
to join the European Economic Community (EEC) should be made, 
prompted by a belated recognition that Britain's future lay in Europe. Even 
before the Treaty of Rome in 1957, unease over Britain's political and 
economic position in the world had increased, fuelled by the Suez Crisis and 
the subsequent cooling of the 'special relationship' with the United States 
and large parts of the Commonwealth. The decision represented a major 
change in British foreign policy because, despite co-operation over some 
economic and defence questions, Europe had remained subord;n ... k in 
British thinking to the Atlantic Alliance and the Commonwealth since the 
end of World War Two. 
Since 1945, different shades of political opinion had believed that Britain 
might emerge as the head of a united Europe. This concept appealed to 
Churchill during the war, and in opposition between 1945-51. Some on the 
Left were also attracted, and briefly saw Europe as the ideal means of creating 
a 'Third Force', independent of the extreme capitalist USA and communist 
USSR.1 Despite this, Attlee's Government was decidedly unsympathetic, 
believing that this was incompatible with the Anglo-American 'special 
relationship', the leadership of a multi-racial commonwealth and interfered 
with the ability to introduce socialism. Although co-operation was sought in 
economic and defence terms, Bevin carefully left Europe on the periphery. 
When the Schuman Plan to pool Franco-German coal resources was 
announced in April 1951, Britain did not participate because a supranational 
administrative authority was a pre-condition. 
After the Conservative election victory in 1951, Churchill's 'vision' was 
quietly forgotten. The failure of the European Defence Community (EDC) in 
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August 1954 convinced many policy-makers that closer European co-
operation was unlikely to succeed, a view reinforced during Eden's 
premiership. Yet, it soon became clear that Britain would have to reassess its 
position after the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) approved 
moves towards further European unity at Messina in June 1955. The British 
responded in mid-1956 and pressed for an industrial free trade area which 
covered Britain, the ECSC and the Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation (OEEC) nations. The formation of the Common Market in 1957 
halted this and led to the rival European Free Trade Area (EFTA) in 
November 1959. However, its limitations and a drastic reassessment of 
British policy persuaded the Government to apply for EEC membership in 
August 1961. 
After 1951, Labour's attitude to Europe remained lukewarm and clouded by 
anti-German sentiments. Attlee and most of the leadership remained 
distinctly unenthusiastic, and even the 'Third Force' advocates had become 
disillusioned while Labour were still in office. This changed little when 
Gaitskell became leader in 1955, although proposals for an industrial free 
trade area were initially welcomed. Suez, European economic success and 
Britain's relative decline prompted some Labour support for the EEC towards 
the end of the 1950s, although it did not become a major issue until 1960. 
While the pro-EEC lobby was strongest amongst Labour's revisionist wing, 
this was not universal. Compared to other foreign policy issues, it has been 
argued that the predictable clear cut 'Left versus Right' ideological split was 
noticeable by its abs .ence.2 
It has been widely assumed that Gaitskell was neutral on the issue until his 
forceful rejection of Britain's application at Brighton in October 1962. This 
was the moment when an unlikely alliance was forged between the leader 
and many former opponents on the Left, and where a breach opened with 
some of his closest supporters on the Right. In the year before Brighton, 
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many believed that Gaitskell had moved towards Europe and this made his 
speech and the breach all the more surprising. Seen in the context of 
Gaitskell's well known tendency to lead from the front on any issue, it is 
little wonder that his motives have been a matter of debate ever since and 
have attracted criticism and sympathy in equal measure. To date, four main 
viewpoints have attempted to answer these related questions. 
Philip Williams argues that Gaitskell's attitude to Europe was consistent and 
that he never regarded it as an issue of principle. He explains that the fierce 
opposition in 1962 was provoked by the Government's intention to enter the 
EEC on any terms, which abandoned the original conditions and the 
safeguards for the Commonwealth. Robert Leiber believes that Gaitskell 
took a highly principled stand over the conditions of entry, regarding the 
economic case for joining the EEC as balanced and the political one 
advantageous, until the Commonwealth socialist leaders' meeting of 
September 1962. Nevertheless, Leiber also concedes that party unity pushed 
Gaitskell into an anti-EEC direction, as conciliation with the Left was needed 
after the exhaustive fighting over defence. Robins regards these explanations 
as inadequate and argues that Gaitskell's primary motivation was to prevent 
another damaging split, which was both successful and fully justified. P. S. 
Gupta has dismissed the importance attached to Commonwealth and third 
world links as excuses. He believes that these were marginalised by other 
issues including: national sovereignty; the 'capitalist' character of the EEC; 
effects on domestic prices; the intensification of the Cold War and the 
division of Europe.3 
This chapter examines Labour attitudes towards Europe between 1956 and 
1963 and focuses on Gaitskell's consistency and motives. The evidence 
suggests that the leader's actions were prompted mainly by electoral 
considerations and the necessity to maintain internal unity. Gaitskell 
remained committed to a 'wait and see' policy and changed, earlier than 
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generally assumed, due to the Government's unpopularity and their close 
identification with the Common Market. While many of Gaitskell's close 
allies supported the European cause, their influence was limited, in marked 
contrast to the anti-Market lobby who dominated the relevant policy-making 
bodies. Although an accommodation with the Left was important, Gaitskell 
also acted to forestall a possible challenge from the pro-European right. 
While he could rely on the Left's desire to attack the Government and 
revisionists, he simultaneously reassured the enthusiasts that he would not 
rule out an application if Labour's conditions were met. 
On Europe, this chapter demonstrates that Gaitskell displayed a greater 
degree of political awareness than hitherto: in his response to public opinion 
and improving Labour's electoral prospects, as well as successful party 
management and preventing another split. While again presenting the case 
for the primacy of the leadership, the chapter also illustrates the validity of 
Kavanagh's thesis: the importance of individuals in key posts. The chapter 
is divided into five sections, the first two examining the evolution of policy 
and the diversity of opinion up to Macmillan's decision to apply. The third 
examines the reaction to the application, the widening internal rifts and 
Gaitskell's determination to remain uncommitted. The fourth and fifth 
consider the scale of opposition and demonstrate that Brighton was a tactical 
ploy, used to play on anti-Market prejudices, only to be swiftly dropped 
afterwards. 
1. On the Sidelines: Labour and Europe 1956-59 
In the summer of 1956, the British Government decided to negotiate an 
industrial free trade area which would include Britain, the six members of 
the ECSC and any other OEEC nation that wished to participate. Up to this 
point, the British had remained aloof from Europe, but the threat of 
increased tariffs from a European customs union forced a reassessment of 
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policy. By that October Harold Macmillan, the Chancellor, had issued 
statements on economic association with Europe, although he took care to 
rule out Britain becoming a member of the European Common Market and 
Customs Union, which was under discussion by the ECSC. 
Distracted by Suez, the Labour Party did not respond until prompted by the 
TUC General Council. TUC and government officials had met to discuss the 
European issue in October. They agreed that an European Industrial Free 
Trade Area (EIFTA) was needed, provided it had certain safeguards. Anxious 
to discuss the matter with the Labour Party before they issued a statement to 
this effect, TUC representatives met a PLP delegation led by Harold Wilson at 
the end of the month. 4 In public, Wilson appeared to have concurred with 
the TUC's approach, as he advised the Government that it had Labour 
support to enter negotiations.5 Yet a discussion paper prepared for the 
Shadow Cabinet revealed his hostility to British involvement with EIFTA 
and European moves towards a Common Market. Like many of his 
colleagues, Wilson saw both institutions as anti-socialist and government 
interest as negative; based on what might happen if Britain was left out. In 
his paper, Wilson argued that Britain's economic problems were caused by 
lack of state intervention and insufficient investment. He added that if these 
trends were reversed, there would be little for Britain to fear from European 
competition.6 
Up to the end of 1956 Gaitskell's position was unclear, as the Labour leader 
had been preoccupied with the Suez Crisis. Nevertheless, his lack of 
enthusiasm was demonstrated when the President of the UK Council of the 
European Movement asked him to address a meeting with European 
socialists at the Royal Albert Hall in April1957: not only was the request 
refused, but none of Labour's Shadow Cabinet would even attend? The 
indifference displayed by the leader and his colleagues was nevertheless 
consistent. Like many others, Gaitskell's views on Europe were shaped by 
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the traditional 'three inter-connected circles' approach, and reinforced by an 
emotional attachment to the United States and the Commonwealth. In an 
earlier meeting with American State Department officials in May 1956, 
Gaitskell emphasised that British policy was determined by the importance 
of the Atlantic alliance; that while there should be close relations between 
Britain and the Continent, there was no possibility of joining any kind of 
European political federation.8 
Gaitskell elaborated on his preferences in the Godkin lectures at Harvard in 
early 1957. Although he conceded that a strong consensus of opinion in 
Britain favoured the proposed EIFI'A, this did not extend to the formation 
of the embryonic Common Market. He felt that Britain could not 
contemplate joining a European political federation as it was still the centre 
of the Commonwealth, and with which it had strong political and economic 
ties. The second main reason Gaitskell gave against closer European 
integration, was the possible effects it might have on the 'special 
relationship' between Britain and the United States. He believed that this 
might be weakened, and cited examples of Anglo-European military co-
operation to demonstrate that the American commitment was more 
important. Gaitskell argued that the 'third force' concept, aired since the war 
in some left-wing circles and adopted by some on the right after Suez, was 
impossible because Europe's different political systems made them 
incompatible. He predicted that closer ties with Europe would develop in 
the economic field, but that political ties were unlikely, unless America 
followed that course or if the Commonwealth disinte grated.9 
These examples demonstrate that between May 1956 and March 1957, 
Gaitskell had accepted that closer European economic co-operation (in the 
form of EIFf A, not the EEC) was inevitable, but ruled out any closer political 
ties. It is interesting to note that his views were almost identical to the 
Government's at this stage; also, that as the Americans were encouraging 
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Britain to have closer links with Europe, Gaitskell was not playing to a 
particularly receptive audience. In addition, while the Labour leader had 
accepted some elements of closer European economic co-operation, Harold 
Wilson had strongly argued against this, on the grounds that all that was 
needed was increased domestic state intervention and more investment. 
This was significant, as Wilson was later to assume responsibility for many 
of the Labour committees that dealt with the European issue. 
EIFfA was the subject of a joint discussion paper prepared by the NEC 
European Co-operation and Economic Sub-Committees in September 1957. 
Although the document acknowledged the conditional support of the TUC 
and PLP, the NEC made it clear that it was not yet committed either way. 
The paper expressed concern that the scheme might threaten the British and 
Commonwealth textile and agricultural industries, and supported the 
Government's refusal to negotiate on this. It also argued that 'for a variety 
of political and economic reasons' Britain could not join the new Common 
Market. Nevertheless, it concluded that the economic and political 
advantages of a free trade area outweighed the disadvantages, as long as 
adequate safeguards for Britain's standard of living and state planning were 
included.10 
In this and two subsequent meetings, the NEC decided that no decision could 
be made until further research on the proposals had been carried out. Yet, 
the very fact that they had not dismissed the proposals out of hand provoked 
a fierce response from the Left. Aneurin Bevan wrote that any Labour 
support for EIFTA was flawed and full of contradictions: that socialists could 
not call for economic planning and simultaneously accept a dogmatic free 
market economy, the policy followed by the British Government.11 Apart 
from the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), the only positive 
support for further British moves towards Europe within the Party came 
from the revisionist supporters of Socialist Commentary. In marked contrast 
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to the left-wing criticism, they believed that EIFTA was a step in the right 
direction towards increased planning and a united socialist Europe.12 
In general, the lack of interest in the European question was reflected by the 
NEC's response. It made no effort to bring any motion on the proposed 
industrial free trade area to the 1957 or 1958 annual conferences. That 
Europe received scant attention is of little surprise. Towards the end of 1957 
and especially the beginning of 1958, most of Labour's energy was occupied by 
the furore over the Bomb and the threat posed by CND and the re-emergence 
of VFS. In addition, increased agitation in the Commonwealth, with trouble 
in Cyprus, Malta, east Africa and southern Rhodesia diverted attention. It 
was not until July 1958 that the NEC met again to discuss EIFTA, and this 
was only prompted by the news that the Anglo-French negotiations were in 
difficulty .13 
In November 1958, the EIFTA negotiations collapsed. Macmillan responded 
by approaching the six OEEC countries outside the Common Market, with 
the aim of establishing a rival European Free Trade Area (EFTA). Although 
bi-partisanship continued, it was increasingly clear that a change of emphasis 
was detectable between the front benches. At first, this was influenced by 
Labour's general mistrust towards the right-wing ascendancy that had 
developed in Europe, especially after the French general election of 
November 1958 returned General de Gaulle to office. Later, it was because 
Labour believed that the British Government had mishandled the original 
negotiations. 
In December, Wilson led the NEC delegation at the Socialist International 
Congress in Brussels and the differences became explicit. Wilson made it 
clear that any new treaty must include guarantees of full employment and 
control over cartels.14 He expanded on these points at a joint-meeting of the 
European Co-operation and Finance & Economic Sub-Committees on 22 
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January 1959. Here, Gaitskell also demonstrated more impatience with Tory 
policy than before. He believed that the Government's failure to 
compromise over the industrial free trade area earlier in the negotiations 
had weakened Britain's position and led to the French intransigience.lS 
However, any desire to adopt a more partisan position was difficult as Labour 
had supported EIFTA in principle, if not detail. This reluctance was evident 
by the absence of any plans to table any amendments or divisions for the 
parliamentary debate on 12 February 1959.16 Instead, Labour accused the 
Government of having weakened the Commonwealth trade links (the 
Sterling area) before the outcome of the negotiations were known, and for 
their failure to recognise that the proposed industrial free trade system was 
unacceptable to the FrenchP 
/l.o in the previous year, Labour virtually ignored Europe until the summer of 
1959, despite the Government's reassessment of policy and the acceleration 
of negotiations to create the European Free Trade Area. When Labour Party 
representatives attended the 6th Congress of the Socialist International at 
Hamburg (14-17 July 1959), scant attention was paid to EFTA. Instead, the 
debates were dominated by nuclear weapons and the crisis in the Middle 
East.18 The general lack of interest was also evident in the lead up to the 
October 1959 general election. There was no mention of the proposed 
European Free Trade Area in the Labour manifesto. 
2. The Divisions Emerge: The General Election to Macmillao's Application 
After the 1959 general election, Europe was again relegated by the internal 
controversies over Clause IV and the H-bomb. Despite this, some interest 
was renewed by the EFTA negotiations, which were near completion. It was 
also clear that divisions had opened within the Party itself. While one 
sceptical faction believed that only wider economic expansion was acceptable, 
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the pro-European lobby emphasised the advantages of closer political co-
operation. In the December debate, both groups attacked the Tories, but from 
different angles. Wilson advised the Government to pursue closer economic 
co-operation between EFTA and the EEC, but felt that more effort should 
have been made to create a free trade area for the Commonwealth, which 
would have left Britain in a far stronger position. In contrast, the pro-
European group, notably George Brown and Roy Jenkins, believed that the 
Government was wrong to place so much emphasis on the economic 
advantages at the expense of political considerations. In their view, the 
establishment of EFT A would widen the gap between this organisation and 
the EEC, rather than narrow it, the declared intention.19 
These divisions, along with a desire to clarify Labour's European policy, 
appeared to be the principle motivation behind the NEC's decision to replace 
the European Co-operation Sub-Committee with a working party in January 
1960. The proposed new body, actively encouraged by Sam Watson of the 
International Sub-Committee, was to be dominated by pro-Europeans. Both 
Jenkins and John Hynd (from the European Sub-Committee) were to join 
other enthusiasts, including Fred Mulley and Shirley Williams.20 In fact, the 
working party was never activated, largely on the advice of Wilson and 
Denis Healey. They insisted that as Europe was primarily an economic issue, 
it should be controlled by the home affairs group, rather than the 
International Committee as originally envisaged. Their persuasion resulted 
in the formation of a new body ten months later, the European Economic 
Sub-Committee under the aegis of the NEC Home Policy Sub-Committee. In 
effect, the European issue was to be dealt with by two groups (the other was 
the Finance & Economic committee), both directly responsible to the Home 
Policy committee. As this was dominated by Wilson and other Euro-critics 
like Douglas Jay, the balance actually swung away from the enthusiasts.21 
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In May 1960, Harold Wilson and John Clark (of the International 
Deparbnent) were invited to an EEC socialist meeting as observers, where 
they offered a distinctly negative view. When questioned on the British 
view of EFTA, Wilson explained that while Labour had no fixed policy, it 
was not an ideal solution and that the present treaty meant that there could 
be no separate deal with the EEC. He argued that if EFTA was to become 
permanent it could be greatly strengthened by bringing in the nations of the 
Commonwealth. Questioned about the EEC afterwards, Wilson replied that 
he was certain that France would be against a British application; also that it 
was most unlikely that ~ British administration could accept the political 
and economic implications.22 
Although NEC meetings were dominated by debates over Clause IV and 
defence, several MPs suggested that Europe should be debated. In response, 
and at Gaitskell's request, Wilson presented a report on the current position. 
This attacked government policy for its failure to recognise that the prime 
motivation behind the Common Market was political rather than economic. 
In addition, that European progress towards integration meant little chance 
of bringing the EEC and EFTA together. Although Wilson conceded that an 
application to join the Common Market held some advantages, these largely 
rested on the negative consequences of being left out. The disadvantages 
were: that an application could be refused; that the conditions would be 
unacceptable; that Britain had obligations to the EFTA nations; and that 
British horticulture would be threatened. Denis Healey followed Wilson 
and concentrated on the political drawbacks: that Britain would lose 
influence in international affairs; that membership would have a damaging 
effect on Anglo-Afro-Asian relations; and that it could seriously weaken 
British influence over the USA. Healey finished by insisting that, 'On 
balance, the arguments against ... joining the "six" ... were decisive'. Outside 
the confines of the PLP, Gaitskell appeared slightly more positive, privately 
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telling Alastair Hetherington that 'the groundswell [was] towards going 
in ... despite the objections'.23 
Nevertheless, Wilson's stance against Europe was strengthened during a 
meeting of EEC and EFTA socialists in July 1960. The Swedish representative 
told him that EFTA needed more forthright support from the Labour Party, 
and that any British attempt to join the EEC would destroy it. He added that 
France would refuse the application anyway and Britain would become 
isolated.24 In the parliamentary debate on the Common Market two days 
later, Wilson questioned the Government over its intentions and outlined 
the difficulties that such a decision would present to the Commonwealth. 
Having conceded that the economic advantages were 'formidable', Wilson 
rejected the EEC because it might limit Britain's economic and social 
objectives. :He also (lrgued that closer identification with the foreign policies 
of some of the Community's nations (a thinly veiled reference to de Gaulle 
of France and Aden .auer of Germany) would lessen Britain's chance of 
bridging the gulf between the Superpowers.25 Despite some wishful 
thinking over the degree of British influence, Wilson's speech was astute 
because its references to France and Germany (especially in the light of the 
recent Berlin Crisis) appealed to the deep mistrust felt by MPs on both sides 
of the House. 
Because of the summer recess, Europe received little further attention from 
Transport House until September, when Wilson's report of 23 July 1960 was 
discussed. 26 In the lead up to the 1960 Scarborough Conference - with the 
odds stacked heavily against the leadership over defence - it was not 
surprising that it was marginalised. The European issue only briefly surfaced 
at conference during a fringe meeting arranged by Socialist Commentary 
supporters. When Gaitskell was questioned about Labour's ambivalence, he 
replied that the lukewarm support for Europe was because public opinion 
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was against any form of political federation and due to widespread concern 
over the Commonwealth. 27 
By December, the proposed European working party had been shelved and its 
remit passed to the alternative NEC committees, after further persuasion by 
the Secretary of the International Department. David Ennals called for a 
reassessment of Britain's world role in the light of the new European 
institutions, and felt that the International Sub-Committee was over-
stretched by the defence issue. Due to this, and the fact that it was primarily 
an economic question, Ennals argued that Europe should be left to the Home 
Policy Sub-Committee.28 Of course, Ennals admirable concern for the 
International Committee's heavy workload could be interpreted in a quite 
different light. While there is no doubt that he was eager to clarify the issue, 
Ennals was also highly sceptical of further British moves towards Europe and 
agreed with Wilson, Healey and Jay on this. His support for their preference 
- to leave the issue to the PLP and the NEC Home Policy Sub-Committee 
(chaired by Wilson) and its satellites- took it away from the International 
Sub-Committee and its pro-European chairman, Sam Watson. Apart from 
Gaitskell, the critics therefore constituted the most powerful force in 
controlling European policy. 
Between January and July 1961, renewed interest in Europe was reflected by 
the number of papers produced by Labour's Research Department.29 By May, 
after Edward Heath had tentatively laid out the advantages for joining the 
Common Market in the parliamentary foreign affairs debate, seven Research 
Department papers had been submitted to the NEC and Shadow Cabinet. 
Although the NEC delayed discussion until June, when the Shadow Cabinet 
met before Heath's speech, it demonstrated the divergence of views within 
Labour's elite. Wilson pursued his familiar theme: that Labour's attitude 
towards any application should be more cautious than the Government. 
Again, he concentrated on the negative effects that the Common Market 
225 
could have on British agriculture, the Commonwealth, EFTA and the 
neutral nations. Others, notably Brown, Gunter and Houghton, insisted that 
Labour should edge in front of the Government, by showing willingness to 
join.30 It is interesting to note that both sides of the Labour divide were eager 
to take a partisan line against the Government. While the critics maintained 
that the Tories were rushing headlong into an application, the enthusiasts 
insisted that the Government was not positive enough. 
Nevertheless, concern increased that a strong line one way or the other was 
premature, as any government application and its terms were still uncertain. 
Simultaneously, Europe threatened to create another damaging split, just as 
the leadership was regaining the support it had lost at Scarborough. The 
evidence suggests that the latter reason was the most important, because 
even the harshest of Labour's European critics remained remarkably neutral. 
In the Finance & Economic Sub-Committee, chaired by Ian Mikardo (a fierce 
opponent), it was agreed that Labour should avoid any firm commitment 
either way; a policy followed the next day by the Commonwealth Sub-
Committee, led by James Callaghan (non-committal at this stage).31 This 
extended to the Parliamentary Party, where Gaitskell cracked down on both 
factions. He and Brown urged that the Shadow Cabinet should not commit 
themselves publicly one way or the other and that the same should apply to 
the PLP. In a meeting on 15 June, Gaitskell had drawn attention to a number 
of pro-Market EDM's that had appeared on the order papers. He reminded 
MPs that as the Party had not made up its mind, these motions were a severe 
embarrassment and should be withdrawn. A week later, it was the anti~ 
Marketeers who earned his disapproval when Sydney Silverman, a left-wing 
critic, put down a private members bill which attacked the Common 
Market.32 
Despite the repeated attempts to keep the options open, the anti-EEC bias 
gained momentum in two lengthy reports released that July. The 
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International Department warned that the Commonwealth would be 
damaged economically and politically if Britain joined. This was supported 
by a report from the Research Department which concentrated on the 
dangers of weakened national control.33 The first paper was discussed at the 
Home Policy Sub-Committee on 10 July. According to Philip Williams, 
Gaitskell regarded it as a 'gross exaggeration' of the anti-Market case and was 
furious at the critical line taken.34 Before the joint NEC I TUC talks took 
place, Crossman and Barbara Castle agreed that the basic conditions for 
Labour support should be: 'full satisfaction of the Commonwealth claims; a 
clear understanding that we [Britain] were not committed to federal union; 
and meeting the requirements of EFTA and British agriculture'. When 
Crossman suggested that a general election should be called before any treaty 
was signed, Gaitskell, 
' ... weighed in and said he disagreed with everything I [Crossman] 
had said .. .it was foolish and irresponsible. He was as determined 
as ever to say absolutely nothing either way. Any kind of attempt 
to lay down conditions would split the Movement from top to 
bottom ... Hugh was terribly nettled, rough, hasty and back in his 
old form of plunging too far•.35 
When the NEC I TUC talks opened on 14 July, Wilson repeated that until 
the Government's intentions were known, no decision could be taken. 
Gaitskell asked the TUC representatives, who had consistently favoured 
closer economic association with Europe, to remain silent until the position 
was clarified. Although the Wilson- Gaitskellline was accepted, the 
minutes of the meeting show that Crossman, Castle and Jennie Lee argued 
for a firmer policy, especially over Commonwealth safeguards and freedom 
of economic planning.36 It is also worth noting that out of the fifteen NEC 
representatives at the meeting, Castle, Crossman, Alice Bacon, Lee, Mikardo, 
Wilson, Ennals and Shore were all critics and that Mulley and Gunter, two of 
the pro-European minority, were absent. 
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The rumours that the Government intended to make a formal application 
finally came to an end on 31 July 1961, when Macmillan announced the 
decision. The Labour leadership's reaction demonstrated their anxiety to 
preserve unity. On 1 August, Gaitskell told a meeting that he wanted to keep 
Labour united on Europe to ' ... avoid a major doctrinal quarrel'. For this 
reason a free vote or a binding majority decision was ruled out; instead, 
Labour would table an amendment and abstain in the division. This read, 
' ... that HMG will be conducting ... negotiations from a position 
of grave economic weakness ... that Britain should enter the EEC 
only if the conditions ... are acceptable to a Commonwealth 
Prime Minister's Conference and accord with our obligations and 
pledges to other members of the European Free Trade Area.'37 
This was an astute tactic, for the amendment was acceptable to both Labour 
factions and only two MPs (Woodrow Wyatt and John Winterbottom) defied 
the whip and voted against. The enthusiasts believed it was flexible and 
depended on the conditions, while the critics felt that the conditions would 
not be met and could be opposed later on . 
.. 
Up to this point, the leadership's clear preference was to 'wait and see' before 
they committed themselves. Although there was a great deal of scepticism 
about a British application to enter the Common Market, especially in the 
relevant committees and large sections of the Shadow Cabinet and PLP, the 
need to avoid a split was the dominant feature. With the furore over 
defence, it was not surprising that the Labour leadership was anxious to 
avoid a repeat performance, especially as a reversal of the Scarborough defeat 
was on the cards during the summer of 1961. In order to counter any threat, 
strident views by either side continued to be actively discouraged. 
3. Wait and See: The Application to the Brussels Meeting 
Macmillan's speech to Parliament on 2 August emphasised the economic 
case for joining the Common Market. Gaitskell opposed any terms that 
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would be unacceptable to the Commonwealth and urged that a special 
conference should be held to discuss the issue. On the political implications, 
Gaitskell stated that while, ' ... there is no question of Britain entering into a 
federal Europe ... British opinion is not ripe for this .. .', he indicated that the 
situation might change in the future. While Gaitskell had balanced his 
argument, Wilson was openly hostile. He started in a moderate enough 
vein, and laid out Labour's conditions for entry. However, his concern over 
the effects that the EEC would have on the Commonwealth soon turned into 
a bitter attack, and concluded with the notorious phrase, 
'We are not entitled to sell our friends and kinsmen down the 
river for a problematic and marginal advantage in selling wash-
ing machines in Dusseldorf.'38 
Although Gaitskell's speech was comparatively neutral, it was completely 
overshadowed by Wilson's contribution and attracted criticism from some 
pro-Marketeers. Against the accusation that his speech was too negative, 
Gaitskell replied that he had adhered to the compromise agreed in July.39 
Technically, Gaitskell's defence was justified as the Shadow Cabinet, PLP and 
the NEC committees had all accepted this. Nevertheless, it was also evident 
that each of these were dominated by the anti-EEC lobby, and Wilson's 
speech in particular had clearly departed from the agreed policy of non-
commitment. Robert Leiber has argued that at this stage, 'It was by no means 
obvious in advance what position the Labour Party would adopt on the 
Common Market'. 40 This view has some merit, as Labour's public response 
to the Government's EEC proposals after the debate were vague and 
cautious. Yet, more recent documentation, unavailable to Leiber, makes it is 
equally clear that the bias against the Common Market was widespread and 
dominant within Labour's policy-making bodies. The 'vague and cautious' 
reaction that he cites, signalled that the leadership were anxious to avoid a 
damaging split rather than balance the arguments objectively. Leiber also 
misses the way that the anti-EEC bias was resented by the pro-Marketeers: 
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Wilson's actions resulted in the resignation of Roy Jenkins as a front-bench 
spokesman. 
The Government's application for EEC membership meant that the issue 
received far greater prominence. Up to this point, discussion of the 
Common Market had been confined largely to Labour's elite, whether in the 
TUC General Council, NEC, Shadow Cabinet or PLP. Afterwards, the wider 
Movement began to express an interest. Constituency parties and rank-and-
file trades unionists urged the NEC to issue pamphlets and information 
which explained the implications of membership. While some had already 
made a decision one way or the other, these were in a small minority at this 
stage. In the months leading up to Labour's 1961 annual conference only 
eleven resolutions which opposed entry and two which supported it, were 
submitted to the NEC. Many others either asked for more information, or 
were prepared to follow the leadership's preference. On the eve of 
conference, the NEC considered three composite resolutions on the issue: 
one against, one for, and one which accepted the leadership's conditions.41 
Although Gaitskell did not take part in the actual debate, he had given an 
interview on 2 October that mirrored the Government's statement: that 
British agriculture, the Commonwealth and Britain's partners in EFTA 
'must be taken care of'.42 
When the debate opened on 5 October, the alternative views appeared to 
receive equal airing. John Stonehouse moved the NEC choice (Composite 
Resolution No.4) which approved entry only if British agriculture, 
horticulture, EFTA and the Commonwealth obtained guarantees, and if 
Britain retained control of domestic public ownership and planning. Of the 
individual resolutions moved or debated, four openly supported entry while 
five definitely opposed. The remainder supported the NEC composite 
resolution. George Brown endorsed this line - that no decision should be 
taken - and urged conference to remit the pro and anti-Market resolutions. 
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The outcome was that this was passed without a card vote; resolution No.321 
(anti) was remitted; and after objections over the same fate, the pro-European 
resolution (No.314) was overwhelmingly defeated. Despite Brown's vote, 
his lack of enthusiasm for the NEC option, then and later, made it clear that 
he was disappointed it was not more positive.43 
According to Philip Williams, Gaitskell had taken care to keep to the 'agreed 
compromise', as unconditional entry might destroy the Commonwealth. 
However, the Labour leader also believed that an abject refusal under-
estimated the importance of the EEC and the economic dangers of staying 
out.44 Although Brown's memoirs demonstrate that he believed that 
Labour had edged towards entry if their terms were met, Gaitskell's clear 
reluctance to commit himself was understandable on two counts. Firstly, 
any agitation to take a partisan line presented difficulties because the final 
terms of entry were as yet unknown. Secondly, many of the Party's concerns 
regarding the Commonwealth had been covered by Edward Heath in 
October. These were: overseas association for the Asian and African nations; 
continued access to British markets for those Commonwealth countries who 
were not offered or could not accept association; and 'comparable outlets' 
(the Morocco Agreements) in the enlarged Community for temperate 
foodstuffs exported by New Zealand, Australia and Canada. In addition, 
Heath had also stressed the need for protecting domestic agriculture and 
reiterated Britain's obligations to EFT A. 
Divergence was more apparent over the political implications. Macmillan's 
speech on 2 August (as well as Heath's statement to the 'six' on 10 October) 
had made it clear that the Government intended to take an active role in the 
political, not just economic, structure of the EEC once Britain had joined. 
This admission (Heath's statement was not originally meant for publication) 
and the Government's apparent support for the Bonn Declaration- which 
committed the 'six' to closer political ties - was an area where Labour could 
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take issue.45 In November 1961, Wilson's anti-European rhetoric sharpened 
when he warned that the Common Market had hardened cold war attitudes. 
He attacked any attempt towards further integration with Europe, because it 
would create, 'an arid, sterile and tight trading and defensive block against 
the East'. 46 
Another major problem was intra-party management. Although Gaitskell 
was supported by most of Labour's elite and could rely on collective 
responsibility to quell dissent, he was also confronted with two fluid and 
vociferous factions with widely differing approaches to Europe. This 
presented him with an unenviable dilemma. The 1961 Blackpool 
Conference had overturned the Scarborough defeat of the previous year, and 
was assisted by many of the leader's pro-Market revisionist sympathisers. 
Gaitskell could not afford to antagonise this hard-core of support, as his 
position was still vulnerable and he needed them to consolidate his 
leadership. This also applied to a large group within the trade union 
leadership, who were also sympathetic to the Common Market application. 
Simultaneously, he could not afford to antagonise those holding the 
opposite view - many of whom were returning to the fold, whether from the 
trade unions, the CLP's or the soft left- by accepting unconditional entry. 
Faced with the need to satisfy both sides, it is not surprising that Gaitskell 
remained distinctly cautious over Europe and freely admitted that he did 
' ... not want another internal Party row about this'.47 
The problem of unity and the anxiety to avoid any firm commitment was 
demonstrated again at the end of the year. William Blyton, an anti-
Marketeer, complained that pro-EEC motions were still being placed, in 
contravention of an agreement reached the previous August. Gaitskell 
replied that those concerned would be asked to withdraw them at the next 
Party meeting. When this took place at the end of January, Brown reiterated 
the position that the Party could not reach any definite conclusions until the 
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conditions were known. Despite this plea for patience, Blyton's repeated 
demand - that the motions should be withdrawn - caused heated exchanges 
between the two sides. Although Jenkins eventually withdrew, Gaitskell 
banned any motions and meetings that undermined the leadership's policy. 
The anti-Market case received the same treatment. When Barbara Castle 
argued that Europe presented Labour with a clear opportunity to seize the 
initiative from the Tories, Harold Wilson, backed by Gaitskell, quickly 
rejected it. 48 
While the PLP was kept on a tight rei n during this period, the Research 
Department and NEC sub-committees continued to argue against entry. 
Peter Shore was highly sceptical about the Government's 'over-enthusiasm' 
for the Bonn Declaration which, he argued, meant closer political union. He 
also criticised their apparent willingness to end Commonwealth preferences, 
the adoption of common commercial, agricultural and transport polices and 
the free movement of capital and Labour. On agriculture, Shore lamented 
the delay in negotiations over overseas association for Commonwealth 
nations as well as the effects it would have on British and EFT A agriculture. 
He concluded that the voting strength and formula in respect of qualified 
majority voting was crucial to British entry.49 Another report, submitted by 
Tom Balogh, went even further. This supported association with the EEC, 
but believed that 'full membership' destroyed Commonwealth safeguards 
and meant that the organisation would llQ1 survive British entry. Balogh 
believed that the common tariff and the elimination of trade barriers was a 
surrender to French pressure, and warned that a Labour administration 
would be severely restricted from any form of socialist planning. His report 
concluded that these threats decisively tilted the argument against the EEC. 
Like Wilson, Balogh suggested that a strong British socialist government 
could transform the economy; a view supported by the other papers released 
in early 1962.50 
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All the reports were highly critical of British entry into the EEC. Considering 
that that they had been prepared by anti-Marketeers for the Home Policy Sub-
Committee, chaired by Wilson (an arch-critic and since the autumn of 1961 
the Shadow Foreign Secretary), this was not surprising. Gaitskell's initial 
reaction was that they concentrated too much on the Commonwealth's 
economic problems and that more information, alternatives and possible 
solutions were needed. Nevertheless, Wilson's anti-Market hand was 
strengthened significantly when he visited the USA in February to gauge 
American reaction. On his return, he reported that although Kennedy's 
'administration was still very keen for the UK to join the Common Market 
on political grounds, it was now worried about the possible economic 
implications of the external tariff, both for the USA and the south American 
countries'.51 
Gaitskell also visited the United States in February 1962. He told his 
audience that Britain must be careful before it committed itself to an 'inward 
looking community' and a 'tightly knit political unit'. Gaitskell argued that 
some of the EEC member s' colonial past, as well as the high external tariffs, 
could adversely affect the West's relations with the third world. He also 
drew attention to the Government's three conditions for entry and Labour's 
two additions: the safeguards for an independent foreign policy and 
economic planning.52 Although Williams admits that Gaitskell pursued a 
critical line during his visit, he denies that he had made up his mind at this 
stage and, like other commentators, believed that this began in July 1962. 
Indeed, up to mid-summer many assumed, on both sides of the divide, that 
Gaitskell still followed a pro-European line.53 
At this stage it is worth considering the effect that the American attitude 
might have had. Up to early 1962, Kennedy's administration had favoured 
Britain joining the EEC because they believed it would strengthen Europe 
and the Atlantic Alliance. Gaitskell was a fervent Atlanticist, but he had 
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previously insisted that closer British ties with Europe, with hardliners such 
as Aden· auer and de Gaulle dictating policy, could adversely affect the 
relationship. The fact that both Wilson and Gaitskell had visited the USA 
appeared to be more significant than recognised at the time, because it 
suggested that American opinion (especially in light of Wilson's report) was 
a key factor in shaping Labour policy. At the same time and in marked 
contrast, a meeting organised by Roy Jenkins between Labour leaders and 
Jean Monnet in early April compounded the negative view of Europe.54 
Without doubt, the paramount concern was still to prevent any firm Labour 
commitment until the results of the EEC negotiations were known. In 
March, the NEC agreed to defer the matter until further work had been 
completed on how the EEC would affect the Commonwealth. The following 
month, Gaitskell instructed the PLP that only front bench spokesmen would 
speak on the subject and reaffirmed that motions and meetings on the issue 
were banned.55 Although Gaitskell successfully fended off any decision until 
after the Easter recess, anti-Market feeling had increased. This was reflected 
in the papers submitted by the Research Department, especially in relation to 
the negotiations between Edward Heath and the Council of Ministers which 
met on 22 February 1962. Denis Healey also lent his weight to the argument 
when he pointed out the difficulties that EEC agricultural policies would 
have on the 'old' and, more importantly, 'new' Commonwealth nations.56 
One method used to promote unity was increased pressure on the 
Government. In a speech to Fulham Labour Party on 14 April Gaitskell 
criticised their reluctance to keep the public informed on the negotiations 
and issues involved.57 Another, was to let members of the Shadow Cabinet 
air their views for and against British entry in discussion papers. Barbara 
Castle argued that the laissez-faire nature of the EEC undermined and ruled 
out any national planning measures that 'upset the free play of the market'. 
Although she conceded that some state intervention would be possible, she 
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believed that membership would affect industrial distribution, the 
nationalised industries and that the EEC's social fund and investment bank 
would not help create employment. In contrast, Fred Mulley argued that the 
EEC permitted much greater scope than Castle allowed for, and that British 
membership would lessen the right-wing Franco-German ascendancy.58 
Despite this apparent freedom of expression, Gaitskell carefully avoided any 
firm policy one way or the other. In early May Fred Hayday, of the pro-EEC 
NUGMW, asked the leader how to respond to trade union resolutions on 
the Common Market. Gaitskell replied that Labour should not commit itself 
at this stage, but set out the five conditions for membership: i.e. that the 
interests of (1) British agriculture (2) the Commonwealth and (3) EFTA must 
be safeguarded; (4) that Britain must remain free to introduce whatever 
social and economic planning was necessary and (5) retain the freedom to 
conduct an independent foreign policy. At the end of the memorandum, 
Gaitskell again demonstrated his determination to keep the options open, 
stressing that the ultimate decision rested on the terms of entry. He added 
that, 
' ... although there are undoubtedly circumstances in which we 
should not go in if our conditions are not fulfilled, nevertheless, 
if they are ... there is little or nothing to fear and great benefits may 
well result'. 59 
Also in May, Gaitskell delivered a televised party political broadcast, where 
he emphasised the importance of the Common Market issue and laid out 
Labour's conditions. He explained that although the economic case for 
membership was about fifty-fifty and that there could be a slight advantage in 
the long run, it would be 'silly' to say yes or no until the conditions of entry 
were known. On the political side, Gaitskell dismissed the view that British 
independence would be destroyed as 'rubbish', but added that safeguards 
were needed. He emphasised the importance of the Commonwealth in 
maintaining continued British world influence. In Gaitskell's opinion, the 
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Commonwealth did not prevent British entry and could actually stop Europe 
from becoming more insular, reactionary, and nationalistic. Nevertheless, 
he warned that further political integration could threaten this and result in 
a disastrous economic settlement. Gaitskell concluded that the Government 
had given the false impression that the issue was settled even as negotiations 
were still in progress and that, 
' ... To go in on good terms, would ... be the best solution ... Not to go in 
would be a pity, but it would not be a catastrophe. To go in on bad 
terms which ... meant the end of the Commonwealth would be a step 
which I think we would regret all our lives, and for which history 
would never forgive us.'6o 
Some commentators believed that the events of early May showed that 
Gaitskell was taking a more positive attitude to Europe.61 On closer 
examination, the message appeared to be purposefully even-handed. To the 
public, the speech was intended to present both sides of the argument and 
leave them to make up their own minds. To the Government, it could be 
interpreted as tacit acceptance as long as the conditions were met, and a 
warning if not. To Labour supporters, and as Gaitskell probably intended, it 
contained sentiments that both opponents and enthusiasts alike could agree 
with. As such, it was an astute speech and let Labour remain 'on the fence'. 
During the rest of May, the Common Market attracted further scrutiny. In 
the Shadow Cabinet, Fred Peart presented a paper which examined the effect 
the EEC could have on British agriculture. He concluded that higher prices 
for the consumer would be offset by a reduction of price guarantees to British 
farmers. A week later, this was followed by a report on the legal implications 
of the Treaty of Rome by Sir Frank Soskice. This expressed concern over the 
majority voting arrangements and the right of veto in the EEC.62 However, 
it was in the PLP that the fullest discussion on Europe took place when 
Gaitskell opened the first of four special meetings. He explained that 
although no decisions would be taken, the purpose was to prepare the Party 
for the time when it should. After Gaitskell had outlined the proposed 
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government safeguards and Labour additions, Healey and Wilson took a 
much more strident line against the EEC. Healey warned that the Treaty of 
Rome spelt the end of the Commonwealth as an economic unit because of its 
effects on foodstuffs, raw materials and manufactured goods. Wilson 
pursued this theme and insisted that Britain would have to choose between 
Europe and the Commonwealth.63 
Throughout the meetings, all sides were given the opportunity to air their 
views. However, it is worth noting that of the active participants, the EEC's 
opponents were in a majority over the enthusiasts and neutrals respectively 
by a ratio of 4:2:1.64 In the last meeting, Gaitskell again outlined the two cases 
and insisted that it 'was absolutely essential to secure reasonable conditions', 
while the Shadow Cabinet unanimously agreed that .no. commitment should 
be given.65 In some respects, the debate appeared to show intra-party 
democracy and freedom of expression. Yet discussion was limited to the PLP, 
and from the start it had been stressed that no decisions would be binding. In 
addition, apart from Gaitskell, all the meetings were dominated by the anti-
Marketeers: Wilson (the Shadow Foreign Secretary), Healey (the Shadow 
Colonies spokesman) and Jay (Shadow Board of Trade). As they were the key 
figures who would deal with the issue in any future Labour administration, 
their views carried considerable weight within the PLP, especially from the 
neutrals who were likely to follow their lead. The evidence suggests that the 
meetings were inspired to give the impression of debate and placate the pro-
Marketeers. 
Up to this point, discussion had concentrated on the political and economic 
implications contained in the five conditions. In June, another factor came 
into the equation: electoral considerations. Peter Shore submitted a paper to 
the Home Policy Sub-Committee, which argued that while a federal Europe 
was not an immediate prospect and therefore could not be used by socialist 
opponents in other countries wishing to join, it posed a 'much more serious 
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problem for those, like ourselves, who stand at the threshold of state 
power'.66 Shore's comments reflected two related questions: an increase in 
anti-Market public opinion and a fall in the Conservative Government's 
popularity. 
Until mid-1961, public opinion had been largely indifferent to the EEC. In 
July 1960, polls demonstrated that 49 per cent approved of a decision to join, 
13 per cent disapproved and 38 per cent were undecided. Macmillan's 
application showed an initial rise in pro-entry sentiment, which reached 52 
per cent approval with only 13 per cent against in September 1961. From this 
peak, approval fell to 36 as against 30 per cent in June 1962. Simultaneously, 
by mid-1961, Labour's lead over the Tories had steadily increased. In 1961 
Labour voters' approval for the EEC was 52 against 20 per cent, but by April 
1962 this margin had dropped to 38 against 33 per cent. This contrasted 
sharply with Conservative pro-Market sentiment which approved by 58 
against 22 per cent. Leiber concludes that the Prime Minister's close 
identification with the Common Market meant that when Conservative 
popularity fell, so did that of the EEC.67 It is also likely that the floating 
voters provided Labour with a large potential target area. Unlike most 
foreign policy issues which make little impact, the EEC was regarded 
primarily as an economic issue which affected prices and the standard of 
living. This perception drew attention away from the political implications 
to a large extent, although the emotional appeals over the Commonwealth 
and Britain's world influence had some resonance. 
How much effect public opinion had on Gaitskell at this point is difficult to 
judge, but as Williams admits, the Labour leader was often more influenced 
by this than party strategists or the progressive liberal intelligentsia. This is 
shown by the way he paid scant attention to the concerns of the Labour 
Common Market Committee (LCMC) or even COS, the organisation his 
close supporters had formed to back his leadership in the fight over defence. 
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The LCMC, set up to promote British entry, was led by one of Gaitskell's 
closest revisionist supporters and a fervent pro-European, Roy Jenkins. 
Although it contained some left-wing sympathisers, the LCMC was 
dominated by the revisionist Right. Similarly, from its foundation CDS had 
been pro-Market and Campaign. its mouthpiece, had welcomed Macmillan!s 
announcement to apply for membership in July 1961. Between then and 
May 1962, many articles appeared from leading Labour figures who favoured 
membership and insisted that Britain could only benefit from joining. They 
attacked the scepticism of the anti-Marketeers and dismissed their claims that 
the Commonwealth was an effective world force.68 
Even the fact that most of the liberal and progressive publications; such as 
the Observer and the Guardian and highly respected periodicals like the 
Economist. were pro-Market appeared to have had little effect on Gaitskell. 
Neither did the mass circulation pro-Market Labour press, the Daily Mirror 
and Daily Herald. whose COII\bined daily readership was around six million. 
The smaller left-wing tomes such as Tribune, the Daily Worker and the N.e..w. 
Statesman were all opposed to entry, although they had never supported 
Gaitskell anyway. Although most of the right-wing press backed the 
Government's application, ironically, the Daily Express and its sister 
publication the Evening Standard opposed it, and drew the names of many 
former prominent Labour figures, including Clem Attlee, who objected to 
British membership.69 
One of the main bastions of support for the Labour leadership, the trade 
unions, could not be relied on to support non"comml.tment either. Close 
allies of Gaitskell like Sam Watson, Bill Carron and Alan Birch were all pro-
European. Generally, the TUC were influenced by the economic case and, 
with the exception of left-wingers like Frank Cousins and Ted Hill, had been 
sympathetic to Macmillan's announcement. Despite opposition from some 
left-wing unions over the political implications, the General Council 
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accepted Edward Heath's offer for talks on a British application. In June 1962, 
the TUC issued a statement demonstrating that economic expansion was 
their main criteria for entry, but that the Government should retain its 
power over price controls, aid to nationalised industries and the control of 
capital movements. While it expressed concern over the provisions for 
employment, free movement of labour and various other socio-economic 
matters, it was significant that the TUC concentrated on the aspects which 
directly affected its own sectional interests. Wider questions - including 
Commonwealth trade and support for British agriculture - were largely 
ignored, and the TUC showed little interest in the political implications of 
membership. Apart from guarantees for full employment, the TUC's 
Economic Committee appeared satisfied on most points.7° 
By June 1962 the tacit approval of the TUC, pro-Market agitation from COS, 
the LCMC and most of the Labour press, combined with Gaitskell's 'wait and 
see' attitude, had convinced some that Labour was taking a pro-Market 
stance.71 However, this optimistic view did not consider the scale of internal 
opposition. While prominent members of the Shadow Cabinet such as 
Brown, Mulley, Houghton, Strachey and Gunter supported the EEC, they 
were outnumbered and restricted by collective responsibility. In addition, 
they were opposed by the group who would gain control of European policy 
if Labour assumed power: Wilson, Jay, Healey and Callaghan. In the PLP, it 
was estimated that 75 MPs favoured entry, 80 were against and the rest would 
follow the leader's line.72 Within the NEC, the pro-Market group had lost 
most of its influence since 1961, when the matter had been transferred to the 
Home Policy Sub-Committee and its satellites. The domination of the anti-
EEC lobby was also reflected in the Research and International departments, 
while in the wider Movement the resolutions submitted by trade unions and 
constituency parties had also swung against Europe.73 
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If internal opposition was insufficient to convince Gaitskell, other factors 
might have been. In June, anti-EEC public opinion had risen dramatically, 
co inciding with a sharp slump in Macrnillan's popularity and a 10 per cent 
poll swing against the Tories. According to Philip Witliarns, Gaitskell did 
not consider the electoral implications of the Common Market issue until 
rnid-July, when Macrnillan's dismissal of a third of his Cabinet hardly helped 
the situation.74 However, Gaitskell's speech during the parliamentary debate 
in early June, demonstrates a flaw in Williams' argument. Instead, this 
appeared to show that public opinion and anti-Market sentiments within the 
Party were beginning to have more effect, because Gaitskell took a firmer line 
against the Government. 
In Parliament, Gaitskell outlined the options. He accepted that the 
Commonwealth was not a viable alternative to the EEC and could leave 
Britain isolated in the future. Nevertheless, he could not accept the threat 
posed by the EEC's 'pretty intolerable' Common Agricultural Policy, and 
failed to see why the 'six' could not treat the Commonwealth as favourably 
as the former French colonies. Gaitskell then turned to the problems of the 
Scandinavian countries and called on the EEC to admit 'neutrals' (meaning 
Sweden) as associates. He argued that failure to do this would alienate 
Norway and Denmark because of their reluctance to erect tariffs against their 
neighbour, Sweden. This in turn would be detrimental to British interests as 
the Scandinavians were 'our most likely allies' in the EEC; without their 
inclusion, EFT A would remain a competitive trading block.75 While Philip 
Williams has suggested that the speech proved Gaitskell's willingness to 
pressurise the Government, others have argued that it showed pro-Market 
sentiments.76 It appears more likely that the speech publicly laid the 
foundations for Labour's move into opposition if their conditions were not 
met. 
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The same line was repeated at a meeting of the Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Association in early July. In his speech and answers to the 
questions that followed, Gaitskell reiterated that the position rested on the 
negotiations. He felt that some of the objections to entry were 'grossly 
exaggerated' - that the EEC could not be ignored and did not have to threaten 
the Commonwealth - and that their concern added to Labour's, would 
prevent the Government entering on unacceptable terms. Nevertheless, he 
refuted the suggestion that there was an overwhelming case for joining and 
warned that if the Commonwealth felt that it was being abandoned by 
Britain, this ' ... would be disastrous'. Gaitskell had been careful to balance the 
arguments, and some believed that he was still positive towards entry.77 
However, his scepticism over the economic case and the strident tone 
towards the end, combined with his recent parliamentary speech, 
demonstrated that Labour support for British entry should not be taken for 
granted. Just three days later the cautious moves to opposition accelerated 
dramatically, even though the outcome of the negotiations between the 
Government and the EEC were not revealed for another month. 
4. Towards Opposition: From Brussels to Brighton. July - October 1962 
In July, Labour leaders met European Socialists in Brussels to discuss the 
Common Market. Just six weeks before, Gaitskell had attended a Socialist 
International Congress in Oslo where the delegates had warmly welcomed 
Britain's application to join the EEC. They hoped that the Common Market 
would be progressive, radical and internationalist; sentiments which 
Gaitskell fully supported.78 In contrast, the July meeting exposed the 
fundamental differences between British Labour and the continental 
socialists. Gaitskell repeated the obligations to the Commonwealth and 
EFTA, and argued that the British electorate was firmly against joining a 
European federation. Although he had often disagreed with federalism, 
Gaitskell's emphasis on the importance of British public opinion angered the 
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Europeans, particularly Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister. In 
Spaak's view, Gaitskell had proposed unacceptable conditions and expected 
the 'six' to beg Britain to join. While the Labour Party delegation opposed 
federalism, the Belgian's 'biting response' held that European unification 
was the 'most essential function of the Treaty of Rome' and must not be 
blocked.79 
According to his biographer, Gaitskell was surprised at Spaak's 'outburst', but 
felt that the Belgian had 'contrived' to put him at a disadvantage, had been 
arrogant over the British case against federalism, unsympathetic towards the 
Commonwealth and contemptuous of the neutral nations.80 Considering 
the different interpretation of the European vision offered by both sides, it is 
not surprising that such a dash occurred. Nevertheless, it is significant 
because it has been widely regarded as the point where Gaitskell came 'off the 
fence'. 81 
Despite the meeting's portrayal as the crucial moment, the evidence suggests 
that other factors were involved. Conservativeunpopularity had ris<.n. 
dramatically and was compounded when Macmillan sacked seven of his 
Cabinet and nine junior ministers between 13 and 16 July 1962. The Tory 
disarray was extremely advantageous to Labour, and the Common Market 
provided an ideal opportunity to launch an attack. In addition, the 
Government's 'over-enthusiasm' had cast doubts over whether their earlier 
pledges to the Commonwealth, British agriculture and EFT A would be 
upheld. This uncertainty had prompted 40 Tory MPs to rebel against their 
leadership. lain Macleod (chairman of organisation) also inadvertently 
helped Labour when he decided that the EEC was a potential vote-winner. 
This had the effect of identifying the Government even more closely with 
the EEC and reinforced the Tory - Labour divide. As the Liberal Party was 
even more pro-European, there was no course to take other than opposition 
if Labour wanted to pursue an effective partisan attack.82 
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By early August, Gaitskell was well aware of the benefits that Labour could 
reap if negotiations between the Government and the EEC were unacceptable 
or broke down.83 Although the Anglo-European talks were not actually 
suspended until October, Gaitskell's other hope - that the negotiations would 
prove unacceptable - was realised. On 5 August, the French laid down strict 
conditions for import levies against all external foodstuffs entering the EEC. 
In effect, this meant that if no new proposals had been agreed by 1970, the 
Commonwealth preferences would be abolished. As the Government had 
constantly insisted that the Commonwealth had to be protected and that the 
negotiations would not threaten this, the French action caused considerable 
embarrassment (though not admitted of course). After the details were 
published on 10 August 1962, Labour lost little time in presenting the 
Government's predicament as a betrayal.84 
Although parliament had broken for the summer recess and Gaitskell was 
away on holiday, the Research Department quickly capitalised on the 
implications of Heath's setback. In a ten page document, it expressed 'grave 
disappointment' at the proposed settlement, listed Heath's original 1961 
safeguards for the Commonwealth and castigated the Government for their 
surrender. The document stated that the White Paper: denied overseas 
association for over 500 million Commonwealth citizens in the 
underdeveloped countries; that with one possible exception they had not 
accepted any 'Morocco type agreements; and that the basic principle of 
'comparable outlets' had been replaced by the derisory 'reasonable 
opportunities' clause. The paper concluded that ever since the issue had 
arisen, Commonwealth interests had been crucial and that any opposition to 
the conditions by their leaders ruled out membership. Finally, it warned that 
'The Commonwealth attitude ... would be a major factor in deciding the 
policy of the Labour Party itself'.ss 
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Further anti-Market tracts, from right-wing opponents such as Douglas Jay to 
left-wing critics like Barbara Castle, were also published in August. Jay, as 
Shadow Secretary of the Board of Trade and a close ally of Gaitskell, was 
highly influential. He had consistently argued that British entry would 
mean the abandonment of an age-old policy of cheap food and undermine 
British national sovereignty. He now warned that a protective European 
barrier, which restricted imports of food and raw materials, would damage 
the British economy and raise prices. In addition, British industry would be 
unable to compete against the other members of the EEC in certain areas of 
the domestic market and so suffer accordingly.86 While Jay's views were 
well known, the warning over price rises was useful ammunition for the 
anti-Market case as the cost of living influenced public opinion against 
membership of the EEC. 
Further change had also taken place in the trades unions. Representatives 
from the TUC, concerned over the question of full employment, had met 
Heath on 23 July and concluded that the terms were generally acceptable. 
Nevertheless, not all the individual unions followed this lead, and their 
conference round had demonstrated a wide divergence of views on EEC 
membership. Although the NUGMW and the Clerical & Administrative 
Workers remained enthusiastic, others who had strongly favoured the EEC 
in 1960, (e.g. the AEU and the Confederation of Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Union) had since adopted Labour's 'conditional' approach. 
While some national unions like the NUM were divided by area, others 
were vehemently opposed. The Cine & TV Technicians, the Draughtsmen's 
(DATA) and the NUR all opposed entry, as did the Scottish TUC and a 
number of smaller unions. By September the b'alance was fairly even, with 
one of the 'Big six' (NGMWU) keen on entry and another (NUR}, firmly 
against. The rest adopted the 'wait and see' approach at the TUC conference 
by a majority of three to one.87 Although the unions had not come out 
explicitly on either side, this was to prove significant for the Labour 
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leadership as it meant that their policy, when it came, was assured of a large 
majority. 
To many, the Government's August White Paper had constituted a major 
retreat from the commitments made in 1961. The greatest concern centred 
on the tacit acceptance that unless circumstances changed, Commonwealth 
preferences would be abolished by 1970. From this moment, out of the five 
conditions (Commonwealth, British agriculture, EFTA, Economic planning 
and Foreign policy) the first received most prominence and provided Labour 
with the clearest means with which to oppose the application and the 
Government. Before the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference, 
Gaitskell and his colleagues met Commonwealth and European socialist 
leaders to discuss the EEC. The result was a highly critical communique, 
which attacked Macmillan for having reneged on his pledges and warned 
that, 
' .. .if Britain were to enter the Common Market on the basis of 
what has so far been agreed, great damage would inevitably be 
done to many countries in the Commonwealth and therefore 
to the unity of the Commonwealth itself.' 
Listing the four other main areas of disagreement with Government policy, 
the statement continued that Britain should not enter until these issues were 
settled as they were all too 'vague or damaging to be acceptable'.88 
Gaitskell's contemporary view of the talks was that the Commonwealth 
Labour leaders had been 'very hostile' to the present terms, whereas the 
European socialists had remained indifferent and failed to realise the 
importance of the underdeveloped countries. Although Gaitskell denied 
that he had changed his mind and that there were still important advantages 
for entry, he believed that if the conditions as a whole were not improved, 
'then undoubtedly we should ask for a general election'.89 On television he 
was more explicit, 
' ... as things are, we are giving everything away. We are comp-
letely disrupting our previous trading system. We are being 
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asked to discriminate against our friends in the Commonwealth 
in favour of Europe. What do you give us in exchange? Nothing 
but promises.'90 
Gaitskell had used the interview over the communique to warn that the 
issue was now a partisan one and that there should be, 'a clear division of 
opinion between the two major parties'. While this and his call for a general 
election delighted Labour's anti-Market lobby, it enraged the enthusiasts and 
sparked off furious exchanges between Wilson and Jenkins.91 
Two months later, Gaitskell told a reporter that he had decided to oppose the 
British application at this point.92 Since then, others have taken a similar 
view. According to Williams, the talks with the Commonwealth Labour 
leaders had been the precedent, and the communique would have been even 
more strident if Gaitskell had had his way.93 While it has been argued above 
that this point had actually been reached earlier- even before the Brussels 
meeting- Gaitskell's call for a general election certainly demonstrated his 
determination to promote it as a partisan issue. At a meeting of the Home 
Policy Sub-Committee on 10 September, Gaitskell reported on the meetings 
and justified his press statement. It was agreed that copies of this, along with 
the Research Department discussion paper prepared for the meeting, should 
be circulated to all members of the NEC and that a draft paper combining 
these points should be released at conference.94 As both were hostile to entry 
and emphasised the plight of the Commonwealth, it was this issue that 
dominated discussion. 
On the day of the NEC meeting, the Commonwealth Prime Minister's 
conference opened. A week later, they released an official statement which 
accepted the Government's position and agreed that Britain should continue 
negotiations with the EEC. Considering that Holyoake of New Zealand, 
Menzies of Australia and Deifenba ker of Canada were all reluctant to 
criticise British policy in public, it was not surprising that they kept their 
reservations to themselves. Privately, Gaitskell was disappointed because he 
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felt that Maanillan had 'bull-dozed' the Commonwealth leaders into 
accepting the British terms for entry.95 In a press interview immediately 
afterwards, he insisted, 
'I have always said that British entry must depend on the con-
ditions ... We do not think the terms are good enough. They 
are damaging to the Commonwealth, and they do not match 
up to the solemn pledges given by the Government. .. We must 
get better terms or stay out.'96 
Five days later, Gaitskell appeared in a televised party political broadcast in 
response to one by Macmillan the night before. Gaitskell concentrated on the 
problems that faced the Commonwealth and rebutted the Tory claim that the 
application would have little effect on this, 
'Let's be clear what it means. It means the end of Britain as an 
independent nation .. .It means the end of a thousand years of 
history, it means the end of the Commonwealth .. .' 
He then proceeded to chastise the Government for abandoning its pledges 
and entering ' ... a system which imposes taxes on Commonwealth goods, 
keeps them out and lets in European goods free'. This, Gaitskell argued, 
would not be so bad if proper compensatory measures were taken, but 
instead there had only been 'vague assurances and nothing more'. He 
accused the Tories of rushing the negotiations in order to have ' ... everything 
sealed, signed and delivered before the next election'. In his view, a decision 
of this importance should not be taken without the chance of the electorate 
to have their say, and he demanded a general election before any 
commitment was made. Gaitskell dismissed the Government's economic 
case as ' ... not proven ... lt's not more than fifty-fifty'. On the political side, he 
accepted that the EEC could be beneficial if 'a bridge between the 
Commonwealth and Western Europe' could be created; if the policies of 
Western Europe would be 'internationalist. . .less reactionary, more 
progressive'. Nonetheless, this could not be achieved unless all the 
Commonwealth interests were fully safeguarded, which the present terms 
did not do. Gaitskell concluded, 
'I don't want to see a choice between Europe and the Common-
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wealth and I don't think it's inevitable ... But the present terms 
do confront us with this choice. Make no mistake about it...I 
don't think the British people ... will in a moment of folly, throw 
away the tremendous heritage of history'.97 
Since his meetings with the European and Commonwealth socialists, 
Gaitskell had publicly moved closer to opposition on the known terms. As 
Williams notes, the broadcast received praise from anti-Market Tories and 
the Beaverbrook press, but earned scorn from Macmillan, the Liberal leader 
Jo Grim ond and dismayed much of the press, even the Daily Mirror and 
I2a.ily. Herald.98 It also upset the Labour pro-Marketeers, and according to one 
of the most prominent enthusiasts, 'dashed all hopes'.99 
Until this broadcast, Gaitskell's perceived neutrality had presented few 
problems to the Party's EEC enthusiasts. Only the day before, Labour's 
Common Market Committee had demonstrated their continued 
commitment to the EEC and welcomed the Commonwealth Prime 
Minister's communique.100 Nevertheless, Jenkins and Anthony Crosland 
both concluded that Gaitskell had 'drifted away' from them.101 Although 
Jenkins, Strachey and others doubted if it could be achieved (and even 
considered replacing him as leader) they decided to try and persuade 
Gaitskell to readopt a 'neutralline'.102 Subsequently, the Executive 
Committee of COS wrote to the Labour leader on the day of his broadcast. 
Gaitskell replied that he would not take an out and out anti-EEC line, but 
that Britain should only go in on the best possible terms and if certain 
safeguards, especially those regarding the Commonwealth, were met.103 
William Rodgers was certainly not convinced by Gaitskell's assurances; he 
wrote, 
'It is not simply a question of insisting on adequate terms ... The 
danger is in saying that the Commonwealth is the supreme con-
sideration and implying that Britain really has little in common 
with Europe ... Gaitskell has expressed no positive sympathies at 
all ... Everyone believes that he has come down off the fence 
against the Common Market...everything must be done to per-
suade the leadership of the Party that. .. a firm commitment 
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against entry .. is a disaster [and] we must redress the balance .. .'104 
While some recognised that the tide was against entry, others believed that 
they were still in with a chance, despite increased evidence to the contrary. 
Prior to conference, 39 resolutions opposed EEC entry, only three approved 
and the remainder were either undecided or waited to follow the leadership 
line. Amongst Labour's elite, the TUC General Council remained 
uncommitted, the Shadow Cabinet was dominated by anti-Marketeers and 
the PLP had moved firmly against entry. Robins estimates that 155 MPs 
opposed entry, 40 favoured it and 40 could be counted on to rally behind the 
leadership's decision.105 Gaitskell had already indicated which line he was 
likely to follow in his response to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' 
communique. This was reinforced in a Shadow Cabinet meeting on 25 
September when he told his colleagues that although the Party was not 
against joining the EEC indefinitely, they ' ... could not accept it since ... the 
Government now repudiated all the past pledges to the Commonwealth, and 
had ignored all ... the safeguards'.106 Privately, Gaitskell told Hetherington 
that he considered a fight between Labour's factions a 'good thing' because it 
meant that his approach would be accepted.107 
Although the minutes of the Shadow Cabinet meeting on 25 September 
showed that the enthusiasts were heavily outnumbered by the anti-Market 
group, Gaitskell's comment, that the application could still be supported on 
the right terms, offered some comfort. This was reflected in the pro-
Marketeers' eventual support for the official policy statement 'Labour and 
the Commonwealth', which was approved by the NEC prior to 
conference.108 The first draft, by Peter Shore, was strongly anti-Market and 
won left-wing support. However, after objections that it was too negative 
and invited deadlock, it was agreed that Brown, Watson, Gaitskell and 
Crossman would redraft it. Somewhat naively, the enthusiasts allowed the 
latter to draft the pro-Market amendments.109 On this occasion Crossman, a 
fervent anti-Marketeer, was Gaitskell's ally against Watson and Brown, who 
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believed that the main threat to the draft was from Wilson. Brown's 
conference address demonstrated some optimism that Labour might yet be 
persuaded, when he called the policy, ' ... a firm statement of the arguments 
for going in on good terms'. Later, he wrote that although it ' ... was too 
cautious and too hedged around for my liking, it did favour a policy of trying 
to get in'.110 
In fact, the statement had synthesised Labour's views on the Common 
Market since the 1961 decision. It reiterated the conditions, emphasised the 
dangers of the federalist structure intended by the 'six', laid out the economic 
and political aspects and demanded precise agreements protecting the 
Commonwealth countries. Although explicit that entry was unacceptable on 
the present terms, it did not rule out this eventuality altogether if the 
conditions were met.111 Most importantly, the statement bore a heavy 
resemblance to the compromise issued in March, which allowed both sides 
to place their own interpretation on it. As Robins has observed, Labour's 
five conditions proved acceptable to both sides: while the critics believed 
them to be unattainable and tantamount to outright opposition, the 
enthusiasts were heartened by the absence of any election threat to decide the 
issue, and because it offered the prospect that further negotiations could 
make the decision go their way.112 As such, the document's ambivalence 
was masterful as it avoided the danger of a split in the run up to conference. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that some pro-Marketeers were still doubtful and 
anxious to clarify Gaitskell's intentions. In a fringe meeting the day before 
Gaitskell's conference speech, Rita Hinden questioned the leader's position 
and warned against any prolongation of the divisions. Gaitskell replied that 
the differences ' .. .lay in the sphere of means, and not ends' but gave no 
indication of the line he was to take.113 That evening George Brown, 
concerned over what his leader would say and anxious to avoid being 
embarrassed, asked Gaitskell to see the text of his speech as he [Brown] was to 
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wind up the debate. Suspicious about Gaitskell's reluctance to let him see it, 
Brown only left after he had been assured that the line taken in the NEC 
statement would not be changed.114 
Gaitskell's Conference speech on 3 October 1962 needs little rehearsal here. 
Although he initially appealed for toleration to be shown about the 
divergent views, and that he was only opposed to entry on the latest terms 
and not principle, Gaitskell soon turned this on its head. He dismissed the 
Tory economic case for joining a 'dynamic Europe', claiming that it would 
not only harm the Commonwealth, but that Britain would ' ... gain in 
markets where we sell less than one-fifth of our exports and lose in markets 
where we sell about half our exports'. Gaitskell then attacked the political 
implications which might reduce Britain to, 
' ... no more than a state in the United States of Europe' [and 
meant] ' ... the end of Britain as an independent European state 
... the end of a thousand years of history'. 
The effect on the Commonwealth was again vividly brought to the fore, with 
emotional references to the sacrifices made at 'Vimy Ridge and Gallipoli' on 
Britain's behalf. Gaitskell argued that the Tory claim that they had got 'very 
good terms' for the underdeveloped Commonwealth was false, as the loss of 
the existing preferences and the proposed European replacement would 
mean 'it was all over'. After concluding with a summary of the differences 
between Labour and Tory policy, he stressed that while the Government had 
been backed into a corner and abandoned its pledges, to stay out would not be 
disastrous, because Britain could increase its trade with EFfA and the 
Commonweal th.115 
Although Gaitskell's speech did not rule out closer co-operation with Europe 
or even joining on better terms, the overwhelming impression was that it 
opposed entry. It was not so much the arguments, but the emotional 
references that went far beyond the context of the NEC statement, and 
provoked delight and horror in equal measure. Gaitskell had used the 
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phrase, 'the end of a thousand years of history' before, but not with the same 
passion, and the references to the Commonwealth's help at Vimy Ridge and 
Gallipoli were guaranteed to stir the emotions.l16 According to Douglas Jay, 
the speech, 
' ... was unique among all the political speeches I ever heard; not 
merely the finest, but in a class apart .. .lt can only be described as 
an intellectual massacre•.117 
As Jay had consistently argued against the EEC and was one of Gaitskell's 
most fanatical followers, this accolade is not unexpected. While other anti-
Market Gaitskell supporters such as Gordon Walker, Michael Stewart and 
Denis Healey applauded, critics such as Shinwell and Wilson were also 
delighted by their leader's 'historic speech'.118 Even so, the most 
enthusiastic response came from the Labour Left: Crossman, Driberg, 
Mikardo, Cousins and Foot could hardly contain their jubilation, prompting 
Dora Gaitskell to remark that ' ... all the wrong people are cheering'.119 
Others did not see Gaitskell's speech in quite the same light. Obviously 
shocked, some pro-Marketeers reluctantly applauded, whereas others 
including Rodgers, Diamond and Gunter remained seated. Roy Jenkins, 
who opened the general debate did not suppress his disappointment, while 
Bill Carron of the AEU warned against the 'disastrous' dangers that calls for a 
general election would have on party unity. Against the tide, the pro-Market 
Jack Diamond reminded conference that if the terms of the NEC statement 
were, ' ... obtained, we do go into the Common Market'. Winding up the 
debate, George Brown presented the case for joining, stressed the importance 
of the NEC statement and argued against any demands for a general election 
before the final terms were known.120 Despite the anger and shock from the 
enthusiasts, conference accepted the NEC statement.121 
As most commentators have observed, Gaitskell's Conference speech went 
far beyond the remit of the NEC statement on the Common Market. While 
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many of his closest supporters were devastated by his actions, Gaitskell had 
not only won support from his milder critics, but also from many of the 
'irreconcilables'. If that had been the objective, it had succeeded admirably. 
Since the 1960 Scarborough Conference defeat, Gaitskell had been careful to 
re-establish his leadership. At Blackpool the following year, his position had 
been consolidated, apart from the setbacks over Polaris and the training of 
German troops in Wales. At the 1962 Conference there was no new NEC 
statement on defence or disarmament and no plans to hold a debate. Instead, 
the Common Market had come to the fore and dominated the agenda. 
5. Back on the Fence: Mter Brighton 
Yet, any notion that Gaitskell's speech had put Labour on an exclusively anti-
Market course is exaggerated. For example, the NEC's statement - though 
ambiguous- was accepted, while both DATA's anti-Market resolution and 
ASSET's call for a general election were rejected. It was recognised that the 
latter was designed to hamper the negotiations, because it would make the 
'six' wary of British intentions and would also provoke a split from the 
Labour enthusiasts who had consistently ruled this option out. Even the 
anti-Market T&GWU had backed the NEC statement, (Cousins had promised 
to sponsor printing Gaitskell's speech and somewhat more reluctantly, 
Brown's) which led to some suspicion that a deal had been reached between 
them. It is also worth noting that Gaitskell almost immediately played down 
the speech, pledged support for the NEC statement and admitted that he had 
not intended to be as 'emotional as the strict logic of the case warranted'.122 
These events - including the refusal to let Brown read the text of the speech 
beforehand, the blow felt by his supporters and the willingness to print 
Brown's contribution along with his own- suggest that Gaitskell's speech 
was a tactic intended to unite Labour and bring his former opponents back to 
the fold, rather than herald any significant change of direction. Although he 
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had laid himself open to charges of 'little Englander' mentality and possibly 
threatened the relationship with some of his closest allies, with the Left back 
on side after so many years of antagonism, Gaitskell probably calculated that 
he could also soon win his friends back over and thus avoid another 
damaging split. 
As Philip Williams has noted, having dismayed many of his old allies at 
Brighton, Gaitskell immediately attempted to clear up the differences.123 
Some, like William Rodgers, felt betrayed and many believed that, 'CDS will 
never feel the same personal loyalty to Gaitskell again'. Although there was 
some talk about replacing him, the Euro-sceptic and realist wings of the 
organisation felt that they should not be deflected from supporting his 
leadership, as this had been the reason behind the group's formation.124 
Gaitskell himself acknowledged the serious misgivings that his action had 
caused, and pursued a policy of damage limitation. At a meeting with CDS 
leaders on 21 October he pointed out that the Common Market had nothing 
to do with the principles for which CDS stood, and that he regarded the 
matter as a 'bore and a nuisance'. He stressed that 
' ... the present terms were not good enough [that] ... As late as July 
he anticipated having to deal with the Left ... and bring the Party 
round to support for entry ... [but that] the Government's White 
Paper ... totally changed the situation•.t25 
Afterwards, he told Alastair Hetherington that this meeting had met most of 
the Right's objectives, although he conceded that some like Gunter would 
not accept his assurances.126 A few days later, Gaitskell stressed that Britain's 
relationship with the EEC would be 'even closer and friendlier than at 
present' .127 
It is worth considering the motives behind Gaitskell's 'betrayal' of his 
supporters. Since the low point of Scarborough, Labour's right-wing had 
recovered its strength and organisation. With CDS, the LCMC and 
promiment right-wing enthusiast colleagues gaining influence, it is quite 
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conceivable that Gaitskell felt that this posed a threat to his position, 
especially as they frequently questioned his views over Europe and latterly, 
even his leadership. As the EEC attracted most support from the revisionist 
wing, it was this issue that provided the opportunity to pull them to heel. 
This was certainly the view of some commentators at the time: Anthony 
Howard wrote that it was a 'ruthless power struggle' and that Gaitskell, 
'unable to win his friends over, decided that they must be destroyed'.128 At 
Brighton, he had not only won support from the Left and centre, he had also 
weakened the possibility of a right-wing challenge. 
In a similar way, Gaitskell appeared to have won over large sections of the 
Left because of the Brighton speech. Here, the evidence suggests that this was 
a tactical move rather than any fundamental shift. It is true that there was a 
reconciliation of sorts between Gaitskell and his chief antagonist, Frank 
Cousins. To some, the way Gaitskell had turned on some of his closest 
political friends at Brighton, as ruthlessly as he had dealt with his left-wing 
critics in the past, was more important than the actual issue itself.129 The 
Left had only reluctantly reconciled themselves to his continued leadership, 
and there was little question of a realignment within the Party even if, as one 
senior figure believed, Cousins was destined to become a Minister in a 
Gaitskell CabinetP0 Of course, some believed that they had achieved more 
influence over the leader than they had had since the general election 
campaign of 1959. In addition, they were just as exhausted by the prolonged 
internecine warfare, and as eager for a respite from this as the leadership. 
Both factors were linked to the slide in Conservative popularity and the 
prospect of a Labour administration gaining power. If nothing else, this was 
guaranteed to have a galvanising effect. 
Having reached an accommodation with the Left and attempted to heal the 
breach with the pro-Marketeers, Gaitskell reverted to the position taken prior 
to conference. It was noticeable that the European issue was dealt with in a 
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similar manner to the defence debate of 1960. Prior to the parliamentary 
debate on the EEC, Gaitskell told his colleagues that although conference had 
overwhelmingly supported the NEC statement, the PLP was an autonomous 
body and would make its own decision.131 The recent Tory conference had 
followed Macmillan's lead and voted for a total commitment to join the 
EEC. This helped Gaitskell, as it allowed Labour to concentrate on the terms 
rather than the principle of entry. In turn, these actions offered some 
tentative encouragement to the enthusiasts, because the leadership had 
appeared to move away from a policy of outright opposition. 
In fact, Labour's amendment simply reverted to the position taken in 
August, namely that they regretted the existing provisions which did not 
fulfil the Government's 'binding pledges': that Labour would, 
' ... support entry ... provided that guarantees safeguarding British 
agriculture ... the Commonwealth and the EFfA countries are 
obtained and that Great Britain retains her present freedom to 
conduct her own foreign policy and to use public ownership and 
planning to ensure social progress .. .'132 
On 7 and 8 November, Gaitskell and Brown attacked the Government on 
these lines in the House, argued that the Tories had reneged on their pledges 
and that their 'commitment to enter on any terms' had persuaded the 
European negotiators against making any concessions.133 
In December, Gaitskell again demonstrated his determination not to be 
committed to a position of outright hostility. At a PLP meeting, William 
Warbey had urged that a censure motion be taken against the Government. 
Gaitskell replied that this was not a 'sensible tactical move' as it would 
divide the Party. In his opinion, Labour should only continue to expose the 
Government's failure to secure the conditions that they demanded.t34 A few 
days later, Gaitskell wrote a long memorandum to President Kennedy, which 
explained Labour's attitude to the EEC application since 1961. This letter 
condemned the Government's provisional agreements of August and 
emphasised that a final decision was impossible until the negotiations were 
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over. Gaitskell concluded that while Labour considered that going in on the 
right terms would be the best solution, they did not consider a breakdown to 
be 'disastrous'.135 
Five days after this memo was sent, Gaitskell entered hospital with suspected 
influenza and although discharged just before Christmas, returned almost 
immediately afterwards. Negotiations on the EEC had resumed, but on 17 
January 1963 the French suspended the talks, despite protests, on the grounds 
that Britain could not meet the conditions necessary for entry. Meanwhile, 
Gaitskell's condition had deteriorated gravely and he died on 18 January 
1963. Ten days later, Edward Heath was told by French officials that no 
further agreement could be reached and that the EEC negotiations were at an 
end. Ironically, they were unsuccessfully resurrected over three years later by 
that arch-critic and scourge of the Common Market, Harold Wilson. 
Conclusion 
Gaitskell's speech at Brighton in 1962 provoked a mixed response in and 
outside the Labour movement. Prior to this, many believed that Labour 
would support Britain's application for membership as long as some of their 
concerns were met. When this did not happen, they received accolades from 
the anti-Marketeers and bitter disappointment from the enthusiasts. Pro-
entry opinion outside the Labour Party attacked Gaitskell in a manner 
reminiscent of the Suez Crisis of 1956: he was charged with having adopted a 
cynical manoeuvre to save his leadership; reacting to internal Party pressure; 
exploiting the Government's difficulties; and destroying British interests for 
partisan gain. In fact, three main factors accounted for Gaitskell's approaches 
to Europe. First, there was genuine concern that Labour's five conditions 
should be met. Secondly, partisanship and electoral considerations played an 
important part, although they did not assume prominence until 1962. 
Finally, and most important, there is overwhelming evidence to show that 
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Gaitskell handled the Common Market so as to avoid another damaging 
split within the Labour Movement. 
It is not surprising that the Government and its supporters accused Labour of 
having damaged Britain's application; indeed there is an element of truth in 
this. Labour's stance, especially in the autumn of 1962, hardly placated 
European fears that a future Labour administration would take a much 
tougher stand than the Conservatives. On the other hand, Labour's position 
was supported by approximately half the electorate, and it was Macmillan 
and Macleod who. had 'upped the stakes' when they identified themselves 
and the Conservative Party so closely with the application. In the event, it 
was French jealousy over the Anglo-American relationship that resulted in 
the 1963 veto. 
In policy terms, Labour had originally given a cautious welcome to the 
proposals for the European Free Trade Area. They had even tacitly approved 
the three original conditions for the application to the EEC in July 1961, 
namely the safeguards for British agriculture, Commonwealth interests and 
obligations to EFT A. To these, Labour added two of their own: that Britain 
must retain its own independent foreign policy and its freedom of economic 
and social planning. In reality, there was little in these additions that the 
Government disagreed with. It was only after August 1962- when the 
Government accepted French plans that denied overseas association to large 
parts of the Commonwealth, ruled out the 'Morocco Agreements' and 
threatened to end the Commonwealth preferences by 1970- that Labour 
moved decisively against them. Even here, and despite anger at a Tory 'sell-
out', it was stressed that Labour might reconsider its position, if better terms 
could be obtained. 
P .5. Gupta has implied that Labour concern towards the Commonwealth 
was shallow and concentrated on the 'old' dominions rather than the 'new' 
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Asian and African nations. The evidence cited above indicates that although 
Labour's public statements and Gaitskell's Brighton speech were not wholly 
dedicated to the new Commonwealth, many party research documents and 
internal discussion papers were. Gaitskell's affection for the Indian 
Subcontinent was also well known, and his concern over the effect that the 
Government's reversal of overseas association would have on the Asian and 
African Commonwealth was far from slight. While Gupta's interpretation 
concedes a positive change towards the new Commonwealth after Gaitskell 
took over in 1955, it is also clear that he does not think that Labour had 
strayed far from its early Fabian paternalist imperialism. 
Electoral considerations were an important factor in determining Labour 
policy. Although foreign affairs are usually subservient to domestic matters, 
the EEC was presented and seen primarily as an economic issue. By 1962 the 
British economy had stagnated and Conservative support had dipped 
sharply. The Labour Party was thus presented with an opportunity to 
capitalise on the European debate, because it was so closely linked to the 
Government's economic policy. In the summer of 1962 there is little doubt 
that Gaitskell was influenced by this and took full advantage of Macmillan's 
difficulties. Although the cost of living influenced public opinion more 
than the appeals for Britain to honour its former imperial commitments, 
Gaitskell could also rely on widespread sympathy to the wartime sacrifices 
and a genuine affection for the Commonwealth. 
Within the Labour Movement itself, opinion was divided. The TUC was 
more sympathetic to the EEC because they viewed it in sectional economic 
terms. In contrast, the bulk of the PLP were more concerned with the 
political implications, the concept of internationalism, distrust of German 
dominance, dislike of European colonial policies, as well as a firm emotional 
allegiance to the Commonwealth. There was a strong element in the Party -
mostly but not entirely from the revisionist wing - that believed the EEC 
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would be Britain's salvation and dismissed the rival claim, that the 
Commonwealth provided an alternative. Opposite them, was a vociferous 
left-wing who saw the Common Market as a capitalist club which would 
have unacceptable control over the British economy, restrict any attempt to 
implement a socialist programme and who believed that the reactionary 
regimes within the EEC reinforced Cold War attitudes. 
Between these elements, the majority were initially content to follow the 
leadership's direction, whichever line they took. However, it was clear 
during 1962 that the Party had moved towards opposition. Although 
prompted by the need for unity, public opinion, the Government's perceived 
betrayal and a desire for partisanship, it was also heavily influenced by the 
dominant anti-Market forces in Labour's policy-making elite: the Shadow 
Cabinet, the various NEC sub-committees, the Research and International 
Departments. The influence of the individuals who were involved in one 
or more of these groups should not be under-estimated and serves to 
demonstrate the validity of the Kavanagh thesis. 
In the final analysis, Gaitskell faced the dilemma that while many of his 
closest allies wanted his support in their struggle against the anti-Marketeers, 
many of his strongest critics shared the same sceptical view as his policy 
advisers, the majority of the Shadow Cabinet and the PLP. Gaitskell had 
been defeated in 1960, had recovered and consolidated his position, only to 
see another damaging split loom over Europe, an issue that he had 
dismissed in the past as an irrelevance. In this context, Gaitskell calculated 
that he could win back his allies' support relatively quickly and 
simultaneously head off any threat from the minority pro-European Right. 
By contrast the Left, anxious to isolate the revisionist Right and eager to 
reach an accommodation with the broad anti-Market Centre, leaned towards 
the leadership. Gaitskell therefore adopted a strategy that appealed to both 
sides, (the five conditions) until he was strong enough to head off any 
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potential challenge. Having dismayed many of his allies at conference and 
won support from the Left, he immediately reverted to the' wait and see' 
position and let the Government take the strain. U nothing else, the 
Common Market debate demonstrated Gaitskell's ability to recognise that 
confronting the issue head-on was not always the best tactic. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the Labour Party's views on foreign and defence 
policy under Gaitskell's leadership between December 1955, through to his 
sudden death in January 1963. In particular, it has concentrated on the three 
main controversies in international affairs that affected Gaitskell's career as 
leader: Suez, the H-bomb and Britain's application to join the European 
Economic Community. This approach was adopted in order to assess 
Gaitskell's contribution to international affairs, as well as the limitations 
and advantages associated with it. It also explored the inter-related questions 
concerning the nature and extent of Labour's opposition to government 
policy; the Labour Movement's policy formulation; internal divisions over 
policy and the power struggle between Left and Right. In this context, the 
thesis also considered the structure of the Labour Party and identified the 
control exercised by Labour's elite. 
Despite some reservations, Gaitskell's accession to the leadership of the Party 
was widely welcomed within the Labour Movement. Elected over Morrison 
and Bevan, the vote for Gaitskell reflected a clear desire for an end to the 
internecine warfare that had plagued the Party since defeat in the 1951 
general election, which was at least partly due to the faltering leadership of 
Clement Attlee. Yet in his time as leader, the Party was plunged into a 
period of internal strife that surpassed anything that had happened between 
1951 and 1955, and which culminated in the unprecedented conference 
defeat of 1960. Although an economist by training and notwithstanding the 
Clause IV controversy, most of the battles fought during his leadership 
focussed on foreign and defence policy. In view of this, it appears somewhat 
surprising that this has remained a neglected area of research: even more so 
when the arguments over Gaitskell's career generally have remained so 
sharply divided. 
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As leader, Gaitskell was a complete contrast to Attlee. Eager to be involved 
in all the minutiae, it has been observed that his personality suited him to 
the role of an administrator rather than that of a politician. Full of restless 
energy, he was never content to sit back and let others take decisions, 
especially if he doubted their ability in any way. This, and his meteoric rise 
to the leadership, only becoming an MP in 1945, raised widespread 
resentment from many of the traditionalists within the Party, especially 
amongst those whose careers his ascendancy had eclipsed. Nevertheless, his 
capacity for hard work, clarity of thought, and a deep sense of patriotism 
impressed many within the centre-right bloc of the Party, and more 
importantly the trade union barons. What flawed this otherwise admirable 
character, however, was his determination to mould the Party in his own 
image and the way in which he never fully grasped that the Labour 
Movement could hold and support such a diverse variety of views and 
opinions. This meant that once Gaitskell had made his mind up on an issue 
he saw it through to its conclusion, steadfastly discounting alternative views 
and with a scant, sometimes reckless, regard for the consequences. Although 
this trait sometimes achieved its purpose, a different approach and more 
willingness to compromise would have averted some of the disastrous and 
needless confrontations which he and Labour encountered during his time 
as leader. 
Before his rise to the top, Gaitskell had concentrated on Labour's domestic 
programme and had only indirectly influenced international policy. After 
succeeding Attlee, he was immediately thrust into an area where he was not 
an acknowledged expert and where his active, often very unwelcome, 
participation in policy-making was characterised by a blend of finesse and 
blunder. Early excursions, such as the 'tanks scandal' and the 'Crabbe affair' 
were ill-conceived mistakes, but Gaitskell benefited from his response to 
British policy in the Middle East and for his forthright views on the Soviet 
Union. It was the Suez Crisis that raised his profile. Despite the fact that 
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many of Labour's natural supporters backed the Government and that he 
was never forgiven for his condemnation of Eden by many on the right, 
Gaitskell's resolute response to protect Britain's reputation received 
overwhelming support within the Party and from progressive opinion 
outside. Over the H-bomb, it was a different matter. Naturally, Gaitskell's 
support for deterrence and multilateral disarmament was supported by 
much of the Labour Movement, and in the country as a whole. Yet, there 
were numerous instances where simple and non-binding compromises 
could have averted the near catastrophic splits that plagued Labour between 
1958 and 1961. Europe was again different, in that Gaitskell displayed an 
astute awareness of what was needed to simultaneously voice widespread 
concern over the economic and political implications of the EEC, boost 
Labour's electoral chances and successfully manage the Party. 
The question of bi-partisanship during Gaitskell's leadership is an area that 
also deserves qualification. It has generally been accepted that up to 1956, 
and ever since Attlee and his Labour colleagues had joined Churchill in the 
wartime coalition, a remarkable degree of bi-partisanship existed in British 
foreign policy. This only appeared to falter with the advent of the Suez 
Crisis, a break subsequently widened by the dispute over the British 
independent nuclear deterrent and the application to join the Common 
Market. On one level, this assumption has some merit, as in all three cases 
the official policies of both major parties diverged. Yet, as this thesis has 
argued, the claim that Gaitskell's tenure as leader marked the end of bi-
partisanship needs to be treated with caution. When he became leader, 
Gaitskell was determined to establish his authority and emphasise Labour's 
differences with the Conservative Government wherever possible, and 
foreign affairs was no exception. Nevertheless, his initial efforts were largely 
thwarted due to a combination of tactical mistakes, the self-imposed 
constraints of responsibility, and the Government's advantage in taking 
Labour's most popular ideas and claiming them as their own. 
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Over Suez, while there is little doubt that Labour hoped to benefit from the 
Government's difficulties, it was Eden who defied international law, 
strained the Anglo-American Alliance and threatened Commonwealth 
unity, whereas Labour remained committed to the accepted orthodoxy that 
had been laid down and accepted since 1945, and supported up to that point 
by the Prime Minister himself. With the H-bomb, the difference with 
Government policy was more one of emphasis than of substance, as the 
Labour leadership also viewed the retention of the Bomb as crucial to the 
preservation of Britain's international prestige and influence. Like 
Macmillan's administration, and to the distress of many of their own 
supporters, the majority of Labour's elite remained firmly committed to the 
theory of deterrence and believed that disarmament could only be achieved 
through multilateral negotiations. Britain's application to join the 
Common Market and Labour's belated opposition is probably the clearest 
example where bi-partisanship can be claimed to have ended. Yet even here, 
it can be convincingly argued that while Labour had not strayed from the 
traditional British suspicion towards Europe, Macmillan and the Tories had. 
While overall the Labour leadership displayed little inclination to 
countenance a radical break with the Conservatives, this did little to endear 
them to their own left-wing. Since 1951 the loose grouping of the left had 
focussed on one individual, Aneurin Bevan. His defeat in the leadership 
contest in 1955 had raised the spectre of a prolongation of the internecine 
strife so prevalent since Labour had left office. Yet, Bevan's surprise 
appointment as Shadow for Colonies by Gaitskell early on -later bolstered by 
posts as Treasurer, Shadow Foreign Secretary and sealed by his 1957 
conference speech - robbed the Left of one of their most powerful exponents. 
Gaitskell had demonstrated a distinct shrewdness in Bevan's rehabilitation 
after so many years of antagonism, as it ensured that the 'darling' of the Left 
was bound by a degree of collective responsibility in a way that he had not 
been before. For his part, Bevan appeared to have accepted that while he 
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could not assume the leadership, the best way to temper the new leader's 
excesses and remain influential was on the inside. He must also have 
acknowledged that many of his former associates on the centre-left, 
including such key figures as Wilson, Crossman and Castle had already 
nestled themselves within Gaitskell's new administration. 
Even before they were deprived by the loss of such a prominent spokesman, 
the irreconcilable Left remained highly suspicious of the new leadership's 
domestic and international policy. Although dissent had increased during 
the early stages of the Suez Crisis - swiftly abandoned in the interests of unity 
against the Government - the furore over nuclear weapons revived the 
Left's confidence. Notwithstanding Bevan's defection, the anti-nuclear 
agitation from CND, VFS and within the trade unions convinced many on 
the radical wing of the Party that their time had come. After the general 
election defeat they were undeniably aided by Gaitskell's ill-judged attack on 
Clause IV. The swing against the leadership from the hitherto loyalist trade 
unions, prompted the Left to adopt unilateralism as the instrument with 
which to inflict an unprecedented defeat on the leadership at Scarborough in 
1960. However, Gaitskell's assault on the consequences of unilateralism and 
widespread fear of the Party's disintegration within the wider Movement, 
ensured that left-wing success was narrower than expected and short-lived. 
Although challenged immediately after the conference defeat by some senior 
figures, as the trade unions and other waverers returned to the fold, 
Gaitskell reversed unilateralism at Blackpool in 1961 and consolidated his 
position thereafter. With the recognition that their position had been dealt a 
serious blow and eager to restore a measure of influence, the Left used the 
opportunity afforded by the Government's application to join the EEC to re-
establish an uneasy alliance with the leadership. 
Despite the Scarborough defeat, there is little doubt that between 1955 and 
1963 the structure of the Labour Party benefited the leadership, and in 
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particular, Gaitskell. The evidence cited throughout this thesis shows the 
personal control exercised by the leader during his term of office, whether 
within the Shadow Cabinet, the Parliamentary Party or through the various 
committees of the National Executive. It is worth noting that out of all the 
internal disputes within the Party over foreign and defence policy, the 
leadership only suffered one major defeat. Up to and immediately after that 
point, they could rely on the majority of the trade union barons for support, 
with their all important block vote. This support extended into the rest of 
the Movement, even into those bastions of the radical Left, the constituency 
parties. Even when much of this support was briefly withdrawn in 1960, 
Gaitskell and his close allies made it clear that they would ignore the 
conference decision and insist on the primacy of the Parliamentary Party. 
This is not to say that arguments supporting the importance of Labour's 
pluralism can be ignored, or that the influence of the rank and file should be 
under-estimated. The growth of active dissent and the seriousness with 
which this was treated, whether within the trade unions, CLPs, or from 
groups such as VFS, is a testament to their effect. It is also clear that the 
leadership was forced into making some initial and unpalatable concessions, 
especially during the defence dispute: for example on thermo-nuclear tests, 
the proposals for a non-nuclear club, the training of German troops in Wales 
and the Polaris base at Holy Loch. Equally though, it cannot be denied that 
once the leadership had consolidated its position in the year after Blackpool, 
these were either pushed to the periphery or quietly forgotten. Ultimately 
the preferences of the leadership, and above all Gaitskell's control, remained 
virtually intact. 
It appears fair to conclude that the official policies taken by Labour in this 
period demonstrate the extent to which Gaitskell and much of the Labour 
Movement excluded left-wing radicalism from foreign affairs and remained 
faithful to the British social democratic tradition. When Gaitskell died 
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suddenly in early 1963, the leadership battle was won by the reputedly left-
inclined, but in reality more centrist Wilson. Any hope that his leadership 
would usher in a more radical approach to foreign and defence policy was 
swiftly dashed. Indeed, as well as most of the Centre-Left group he 
represented, Wilson had been as committed as Gaitskell to the Atlantic 
Alliance, the nuclear deterrent and multilateralism. 
As Premier from 1964, Wilson quickly assumed the mantle bequeathed by 
Gaitskell as far as Britain's world influence was concerned. He effectively 
reneged on the pledge to renegotiate the Nassau agreement, kept the V-
bombers and only very reluctantly reduced overseas defence commitments 
towards the end of the 1960s when devaluation and the cost of Labour's 
social programme forced him to do so. Uke his predecessor, his close 
attachment to the Anglo-American Alliance earned him the wrath of the 
Left, most notably in his failure to act forcefully against American policy in 
Vietnam. Despite his vociferous campaign against the EEC from the mid-
1950s on, he applied for membership less than three years after heaping 
scorn on 'that capitalist club'. Apart from minor deviations, many of the 
Gaitskellites' initial misgivings over Wilson were soon proved to be ill-
founded as he virtually followed the dead leader's policies to the letter. 
Despite the problems that he encountered later, possibly Wilson's clearest 
asset over Gaitskell was that he managed intra-party conflict in a far less 
abrasive manner, and thus sensibly avoided many of the schisms his 
predecessor had faced. 
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